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ABSTRACT	
In	today’s	digital	public	sphere,	individuals	have	little	choice	but	
to	participate	on	online	platforms,	whose	design	choices	shape	what	
is	 possible,	 content	 policies	 influence	 what	 is	 permissible,	 and	
personalization	algorithms	determine	what	is	visible.	Ensuring	that	
online	 content	moderation	 is	 aligned	with	 the	 public	 interest	 has	
emerged	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	 pressing	 challenges	 for	 freedom	 of	
expression	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century.	Taking	 this	 challenge	as	 its	
focus,	 this	 Article	 examines	 the	 promise	 and	 pitfalls	 of	 a	 human	
rights-based	approach	to	content	moderation—with	a	specific	focus	
on	 the	 choices	 and	 challenges	 that	 online	 platforms	 are	 likely	 to	
confront	 in	 adhering	 to	 their	 corporate	 responsibility	 to	 respect	
human	rights	in	this	context.	The	Article	examines	three	dimensions	
of	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 to	 platform	 moderation	 in	
particular:	a	substantive	dimension,	encompassing	the	alignment	of	
content	moderation	 rules	with	 international	 human	 rights	 law;	 a	
process	dimension,	encompassing	the	standards	of	transparency	and	
oversight	that	platforms	should	 implement	as	part	of	 their	human	
 *	 Postdoctoral	 Fellow,	 Fundação	 Getulio	 Vargas	 (FGV),	 School	 of	 International	Relations,	São	Paulo,	Brazil,	barrie.sander@graduateinstitute.ch.	The	Author	would	like	to	thank	 Mark	 Bunting,	 Daphne	 Keller,	 Richard	Wingfield,	 Daragh	 Murray,	 Mike	 Godwin,	Evelyn	Douek,	Thomas	Kadri,	Molly	Land,	and	Nicolas	Suzor,	as	well	as	the	participants	at	the	8th	Annual	Conference	of	the	Cambridge	International	Law	Journal	held	at	the	Faculty	of	Law,	University	of	Cambridge,	20-21	March	2019,	for	their	comments	on	earlier	drafts	and	presentations	of	this	Article.	The	Author	would	also	like	to	acknowledge	the	funding	of	Fundação	de	Amparo	à	Pesquisa	do	Estado	de	São	Paulo	(FAPESP),	which	enabled	this	research	to	be	conducted.	All	errors	remain	the	Author’s	own.	
940	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	
rights	 due	 diligence	 processes;	 and	 a	 procedural-remedial	
dimension,	 encompassing	 the	 procedural	 guarantees	 and	
remediation	 mechanisms	 that	 platforms	 should	 integrate	 within	
their	 systems	 of	 content	 moderation.	 The	 Article	 concludes	 by	
reflecting	on	some	of	the	limits	of	the	human	rights-based	approach	
and	cautioning	against	viewing	human	rights	as	a	panacea.	
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I.	 INTRODUCTION	The	 online	 platform	 revolution—like	 the	 digital	 revolution	from	 which	 it	 emerged—has	 altered	 the	 social	 conditions	 of	speech. 1 	By	 lowering	 the	 cost	 of	 generating	 and	 sharing	information,	 whilst	 expanding	 and	 diversifying	 access	 to	 both	content	 and	 conversation,	 online	 platforms	 have	 created	unprecedented	possibilities	for	widespread	cultural	participation	and	interaction.	At	the	same	time,	platforms	have	also	established	and	enabled	new	methods	of	control	which	serve	to	both	limit	and	shape	what	users	see	and	hear	on	a	daily	basis.	Until	recently,	online	platforms	were	inclined	to	disavow	the	extent	 to	which	 they	govern	speech.2	Yet,	platforms	have	always	been	 active	 moderators	 of	 online	 content,	 with	 today’s	 largest	platforms	such	as	Facebook	and	YouTube,	 exerting	considerable	influence	 over	 public	 discourse	 around	 the	 world.	 When	moderating	 their	 sites,	 online	 platforms	 generally	 perform	 two	functions: 3 	first,	 as	 content	 gatekeepers,	 platforms	 determine	which	categories	of	 content	are	allowed	and	prohibited	on	 their	
 1.	 Jack	 M.	 Balkin,	Digital	 Speech	 and	 Democratic	 Culture:	 A	 Theory	 of	 Freedom	 of	
Expression	for	the	Information	Society,	79	N.Y.U.	L.	REV.	1,	2	(2004).	2.	 See	Timothy	Garton	Ash	et	al.,	GLASNOST!:	Nine	Ways	Facebook	can	Make	Itself	a	
Better	 Forum	 for	 Free	 Speech	 and	 Democracy,	 REUTERS	 INST.	 STUD.	 J.,	https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-01/Garton_Ash_et_al_Facebook_report_FINAL_0.pdf	[https://perma.cc/QL9K-UZ66].	3.	 GILLESPIE,	CUSTODIANS	OF	THE	INTERNET:	PLATFORMS,	CONTENT	MODERATION,	AND	THE	HIDDEN	 DECISIONS	 THAT	 SHAPE	 SOCIAL	 MEDIA	 18	 (2018).	 See	 also	 York	 and	 Zuckerman,	‘Moderating	the	Public	Sphere’,	 in	JØRGENSEN	(ED),	HUMAN	RIGHTS	IN	THE	AGE	OF	PLATFORMS	(2019)	137,	at	140	(referring	to	“the	concepts	of	hard	control	–	a	platform’s	authority	over	what	can	be	published	online	–	and	soft	control	–	a	platform’s	authority	over	what	we	are	likely	to	see,	and	what	is	deprioritized	in	algorithms	that	govern	a	user’s	views	of	posts	on	the	network”)	(emphasis	in	original).	
942	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	sites;4	and	second,	as	content	organizers,	platforms	 individualize	the	 experiences	 of	 their	 users,	 highlighting	 some	 content	 over	others,	through	algorithmic	personalization.5	As	 the	 digital	 public	 sphere	 has	 become	 increasingly	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	a	small	number	of	online	platforms,	concerns	have	grown	that	platform	moderation	is	being	driven	to	a	significant	extent	by	corporate	imperatives	for	growth	and	profit	at	the	expense	of	the	public	interest.6	At	the	same	time,	a	spate	of	high-profile	 controversies,	 including	 Russia’s	 cyber	 influence	operation	 on	 the	 2016	 US	 presidential	 election	 and	 the	 use	 of	online	platforms	by	members	of	the	Myanmar	military	as	part	of	the	 government’s	 campaign	 of	 mass	 violence	 against	 the	Rohingya,7	have	awakened	the	public	to	the	potential	for	platforms	to	 be	 used	 to	 disrupt	 elections,	 spread	 hate	 and	 disinformation,	and	inspire	deadly	atrocities	around	the	globe.8	In	this	climate,	the	pertinent	challenge	has	become	to	identify	a	way	 to	 re-align	 the	 private	 incentives	 of	 platform	 governance	with	 the	 broader	 public	 interest.9	In	 a	 report	 published	 in	April	2018,	the	UN	Special	Rapporteur	on	Freedom	of	Expression,	David	Kaye,	charted	one	possible	path	forward.	Kaye’s	report	set	out	“a	framework	 for	 the	moderation	of	 user-generated	online	 content	that	puts	human	 rights	 at	 the	 very	 centre.”10	According	 to	Kaye,	human	rights	principles	can	enable	online	platforms	“to	create	an	inclusive	 environment	 that	 accommodates	 the	 varied	needs	 and	interests	 of	 their	 users	 while	 establishing	 predictable	 and	
 4.	 EMILY	B.	LAIDLAW,	REGULATING	SPEECH	 IN	CYBERSPACE:	GATEKEEPERS,	HUMAN	RIGHTS	AND	CORPORATE	RESPONSIBILITY	2	(2015).	5.	 Zuiderveen	Borgesius	et	 al.,	Should	We	Worry	About	Filter	Bubbles?,	 5	 INTERNET	POL’Y	REV.,	no.	1,	2016,	at	2.	6.	 Rikke	Frank	Jørgensen,	Human	Rights	and	Private	Actors	in	the	Online	Domain,	in	NEW	TECHNOLOGIES	FOR	HUMAN	RIGHTS	LAW	AND	PRACTICE	243,	251-53	(2018).	7.	 See,	 e.g.,	 YOCHAI	 BENKLER,	 ROBERT	 FARIS,	 &	 HAL	 ROBERTS,	 NETWORK	 PROPAGANDA:	MANIPULATION,	DISINFORMATION	AND	RADICALIZATION	 IN	AMERICAN	POLITICS	235-69	 (2018);	
see	 also	 Steve	 Stecklow,	Hatebook:	 How	 Facebook	 is	 Losing	 the	War	 on	 Hate	 Speech	 in	
Myanmar,	 REUTERS,	 (Aug.	 15,	 2018),	 https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/	[https://perma.cc/B65U-F83Y].	8.	 Mark	 Bunting,	 From	 Editorial	 Obligation	 to	 Procedural	 Accountability:	 Policy	Approaches	to	Online	Content	in	the	Era	of	Information	Intermediaries	3	J.	CYBER	POL’Y	165,	174	(2018).	9.	 Id.	10.	 Report	of	the	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Promotion	and	Protection	of	the	Right	to	Freedom	of	Opinion	and	Expression,	UN	Doc	A/HRC/38/25,	6	Apr.	2018	[hereinafter	Kaye	Content	Moderation	Report],	para	2.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 943	consistent	 baseline	 standards	 of	 behaviour.”11	To	 this	 end,	 Kaye	recommends	 that	 platforms	 “should	 recognize	 that	 the	authoritative	global	standard	for	ensuring	freedom	of	expression	on	their	platforms	is	human	rights	law	[…]	[and]	re-evaluate	their	content	standards	accordingly.”12	Building	on	the	foundations	of	David	Kaye’s	report,	the	Article	examines	 the	 promise	 and	 pitfalls	 of	 a	 human	 rights-based	approach	 to	 platform	moderation—with	 a	 specific	 focus	 on	 the	choices	and	challenges	that	online	platforms	are	likely	to	confront	in	 adhering	 to	 their	 corporate	 responsibility	 to	 respect	 human	rights	 in	 this	 context.	 To	 this	 end,	 this	Article	proceeds	 in	 three	parts.	 The	 Article	 begins	 by	 outlining	 the	 current	 practice	 of	platform	 moderation,	 illuminating	 the	 mechanics	 of	 content	moderation,	 the	 different	 influences	 that	 shape	 moderation	policies	 and	 processes,	 and	 the	 concerns	 that	 have	 been	 raised	about	how	moderation	is	conducted	by	online	platforms	in	practice	(Part	II).	The	Article	then	turns	to	examine	the	promise	and	pitfalls	of	applying	a	human	rights-based	approach	to	help	alleviate	such	concerns	 (Part	 III).	 The	 Article	 examines	 three	 dimensions	 of	 a	human	 rights-based	 approach	 to	 platform	 moderation	 in	particular:	a	substantive	dimension,	encompassing	 the	alignment	of	content	moderation	rules	with	international	human	rights	law;	a	process	dimension,	encompassing	the	standards	of	transparency	and	 oversight	 that	 platforms	 should	 implement	 as	 part	 of	 their	human	rights	due	diligence	processes;	and	a	procedural-remedial	dimension,	 encompassing	 the	 procedural	 guarantees	 and	remediation	mechanisms	 that	 platforms	 should	 integrate	within	their	 systems	 of	 content	 moderation.	 The	 Article	 concludes	 by	reflecting	 on	 some	 of	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 human	 rights-based	approach	 and	 cautioning	 against	 viewing	 human	 rights	 as	 a	panacea	(Part	IV).	
II.	 THE	PRACTICE	OF	PLATFORM	MODERATION	Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 past	 decade,	 the	 growing	indispensability	of	accessing	and	participating	in	online	discourse	has	 been	 paired	with	 an	 increasing	 concentration	 of	 power	 and	control	over	 the	 Internet’s	 content	 layer	 in	 the	hands	of	 a	 small	
 11.	 Id.	para.	43.	12.		Id.	para.	70.	
944	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	number	 of	 private	 online	 platforms. 13 	In	 today’s	 digital	 public	sphere,	 individuals	 have	 little	 choice	 but	 to	 participate	 on	 these	platforms,14	whose	design	choices	shape	what	is	possible,	content	policies	 influence	 what	 is	 permissible,	 and	 personalization	algorithms	 determine	 what	 is	 visible. 15 	By	 establishing	 and	enforcing	rules	of	private	governance	that	moderate	how	ideas	and	information	are	exchanged	online,	today’s	largest	platforms	have	emerged	 as	 “governors	 of	 online	 speech,” 16 	“custodians	 of	 the	public	sphere,”17	and	“stewards	of	public	culture.”18	This	 Part	 begins	 by	 defining	 the	 core	 characteristics	 of	platforms	 and	 explaining	 the	 mechanics	 of	 content	 moderation	(Section	A).	The	section	then	turns	to	identify	the	different	factors	that	influence	how	platforms	moderate	online	content	(Section	B),	before	revealing	some	of	 the	concerns	 that	platform	moderation	has	given	rise	to	in	practice	(Section	C).	
A.	 Defining	Platforms	and	Content	Moderation	The	 term	platform	 is	 notoriously	 vague	 and	 ambiguous.	 To	some	extent	this	is	because	the	term	tends	to	vary	depending	on	the	context	in	which	it	is	deployed.19	The	term’s	elusiveness	is	also	part	 of	 its	 appeal.	 A	 wide	 range	 of	 companies	 have	 designated	themselves	as	platforms	in	an	attempt	to	appear	neutral	and	evade	regulatory	scrutiny.20	In	an	effort	to	elucidate	the	meaning	of	the	term,	 the	 Article	 relies	 on	 the	 definition	 recently	 elaborated	 by	Tarleton	 Gillespie,	 who	 refers	 to	 platforms	 as	 online	 sites	 and	services	that	“host,	organize,	and	circulate	users’	shared	content	or	social	interactions	for	them,”	without	having	produced	the	bulk	of	
 13.	 Paul	 Nemitz,	 Constitutional	 Democracy	 and	 Technology	 in	 the	 Age	 of	 Artificial	
Intelligence,	ROYAL	SOCIETY	PHILOSOPHICAL	TRANSACTIONS	1,	2-4	(2018).	14.	 BRUCE	SCHNEIER,	DATA	AND	GOLIATH:	THE	HIDDEN	BATTLES	TO	CAPTURE	YOUR	DATA	AND	CONTROL	YOUR	WORLD	60-61	(2015).	15.	 See	 generally	 NICOLAS	 P.	 SUZOR,	 LAWLESS:	 THE	 SECRET	 RULES	 THAT	 GOVERN	 OUR	DIGITAL	LIVES	(2018).	16.	 Kate	 Klonick,	 The	 New	 Governors:	 The	 People,	 Rules,	 and	 Processes	 Governing	
Online	Speech,	131	HARV.	L.	REV.	1598,	1603	(2018).	17.	 Jack	M.	Balkin,	Free	Speech	is	a	Triangle,	118	COLUM.	L.	REV.	2011,	2041	(2018).	18.	 Tarleton	Gillespie,	Platforms	Are	Not	Intermediaries,		2	GEO.	L.	TECH.	REV.	198,	199	(2018).	19.	 See	 generally	 Robert	 Gorwa,	What	 is	 Platform	 Governance?,	 22	 INFO.,	 COMM.	&	SOC’Y	854	(2019).	20.		See	generally	Robyn	Caplan,	Content	or	Context	Moderation:	Artisanal,	Community-
Reliant,	and	Industrial	Approaches,	DATA	&	SOC’Y	8	(Nov.	14,	2018).	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 945	that	content	themselves,	built	on	an	infrastructure	for	processing	data	for	a	range	of	different	purposes	including	the	generation	of	profit,	and	which	“moderate	the	content	and	activity	of	users.”21	Within	the	broad	parameters	of	this	definition,	platforms	vary	significantly	in	terms	of	their	functions	(e.g.,	social	network	sites	like	 Facebook,	microblogging	 providers	 like	 Twitter,	 and	 video-sharing	sites	like	YouTube),	business	models	(e.g.,	different	types	of	advertising	and	subscription-based	monetization	methods),	and	size	(e.g.,	in	terms	of	the	number	and	geographical	spread	of	their	users	 and	 employees). 22 	Moreover,	 platforms	 are	 not	 static,	evolving	over	time	to	develop	new	uses,	sources	of	revenue,	and	communities	of	users.23	Yet,	 despite	 their	 diversity,	 it	 is	 the	 final	 element	 of	 the	definition—content	 moderation—which	 constitutes	 the	indispensable	 and	 definitional	 part	 of	 what	 platforms	 do. 24 	In	practice,	 online	 platforms	 emerged	 to	 simplify	 the	 process	 of	navigating	 the	 abundance	 of	 information	 available	 in	 the	 digital	public	sphere.	As	Gillespie	explains,	“[t]hough	part	of	the	web,	[…]	platforms	promise	to	rise	above	it,	by	offering	a	better	experience	of	all	this	information	and	sociality:	curated,	organized,	archived,	and	moderated.”25	It	is	for	this	reason	that	“moderation	is,	in	many	ways,	the	commodity	that	platforms	offer.”26	Without	moderation,	platforms	would	 be	 unable	 to	 shape	 user	 participation	 into	 the	“right”	 kind	 of	 online	 experience. 27 	“Right,”	 Gillespie	 observes,	“may	mean	ethical,	legal,	and	healthy,	but	it	also	means	whatever	will	promote	engagement,	increase	ad	revenue,	and	facilitate	data	collection.”28	
 21.	 GILLESPIE,	supra	note	3,	at	18-21.	22.	 Caplan,	supra	note	20,	at	8-13;	see	also	OECD,	An	Introduction	to	Online	Platforms	
and	their	Role	in	the	Digital	Transformation	(OECD,	2019).	23.	 Sasha	 Desmaris	 et	 al.,	 Creating	 a	 French	 Framework	 to	 Make	 Social	 Media	
Platforms	More	Accountable:	Acting	 in	France	with	a	European	Vision	8	 (Mission	Report	submitted	 to	 the	 French	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Digital	 Affairs,	 May	 2019),	https://www.numerique.gouv.fr/uploads/Regulation-of-social-networks_Mission-report_ENG.pdf	[https://perma.cc/C9TA-L77A]	[hereinafter	French	Interim	Report].	24.	 GILLESPIE,	supra	note	3,	at	21.	25.	 Id.	at	13.	26.	 Id.	(emphasis	in	original).	27.	 Gillespie,	supra	note	18,	at	202.	28.	 Id.	
946	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	In	practice,	platform	moderation	 is	operationalized	 through	rules	 of	 private	 governance. 29 	Some	 of	 these	 rules	 are	 implicit,	expressed	 in	the	code	and	algorithms	that	 influence	the	types	of	social	interactions	that	are	possible	on	a	platform,	as	well	as	how	content	is	organized,	promoted	and	presented	to	users—processes	that	amount	to	forms	of	“architectural	regulation.”30	Other	rules	are	explicit,	such	as	those	documented	in	public-facing	platform	community	standards	and	terms	of	service,	as	well	as	 non-public	 internal	 moderation	 guidelines. 31 	Through	 these	documents,	 which	 are	 subject	 to	 continual	 update	 and	 revision,	platforms	 establish	 restrictions	 on	 a	 range	 of	 categories	 of	content—most	commonly	hate	speech,	graphic	or	violent	content,	sexual	 content,	 harassment,	 copyright,	 and	 illegal	 activity—the	interpretation	and	enforcement	of	which	contribute	to	a	body	of	“platform	law.”32	Importantly,	 the	 explicit	 rules	 of	 platform	 governance	 are	enforced	through	recourse	to	a	range	of	moderation	techniques.33	For	 certain	 types	 of	 content,	 moderation	 occurs	 prior	 to	publication	 (ex	 ante	 moderation).	 A	 picture-recognition	technology	 called	 PhotoDNA,	 for	 example,	 relies	 upon	 digital	fingerprints	 (hashes)	 to	 automatically	 detect	 and	 prevent	 the	upload	of	known	images	of	child	exploitation.34	Similarly,	Content	ID,	a	 technology	developed	by	YouTube,	 scans	uploaded	content	against	a	database	of	content	provided	by	copyright	owners,	who	can	 decide	 to	 block,	 monetize	 or	 track	 content	 containing	 their	work.35	
 29.	 Bunting,	supra	note	8,	at	172.	30.	 GILLESPIE,	supra	note	3,	at	179	&	chapt.	7.	31.	 See	generally	GILLESPIE,	supra	note	3,	chapt.	3;	see	also	Klonick,	supra	note	16,	at	1630-35.	32.	 Kaye	Content	Moderation	Report,	supra	note	10,	para.	1.	See	generally	ARTICLE	19,	
Side-stepping	rights:	Regulating	speech	by	contract	(2018);	Molly	K.	Land,	The	Problem	of	
Platform	Law:	Pluralistic	Legal	Ordering	on	Social	Media	(2019).	33.	 See	generally	Klonick,	 supra	 note	16,	 at	1635.	See	also	GILLESPIE,	 supra	 note	3,	chapt.	4-5.	34.		Microsoft,	PhotoDNA,		https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/photodna	 [https://perma.cc/T8M2-DLWX]	 (last	visited	June	25,	2019).	35.Google,	 How	 Content	 ID	 Works,	https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en	 [https://perma.cc/2EUF-SGPH]	(last	visited	June	25,	2019).	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 947	Moderation	 also	 occurs	 after	 content	 has	 already	 been	published	 (ex	 post	 moderation).	 Relying	 on	 a	 combination	 of	community	 and	 automated	 flagging	 to	 detect	 potentially	impermissible	 content,	 ex	 post	 review	 may	 be	 conducted	automatically	by	software	and/or	manually	by	human	moderators.	Facebook,	for	example,	recently	confirmed	that	the	platform	uses	machine	learning	to	assess	content	that	may	signal	support	for	the	Islamic	 State	 of	 Iraq	 and	 Syria	 (“ISIS”)	 or	 al-Qaeda,	 producing	 a	score	indicating	how	likely	it	is	that	a	post	violates	the	platform’s	counterterrorism	 policies. 36 	Facebook	 automatically	 removes	posts	where	the	tool’s	confidence	level	 indicates	that	 its	decision	will	be	more	accurate	than	human	reviewers.	For	all	other	posts,	the	score	system	enables	Facebook’s	team	of	human	moderators	to	prioritize	reviewing	content	that	receives	the	highest	scores.	In	practice,	the	precise	combination	of	techniques	relied	upon	as	well	as	the	organizational	structure	of	content	moderation	tend	to	vary	depending	on	a	range	of	factors	including	the	function,	size,	resources	and	policies	of	the	platform.	Robyn	Caplan,	for	example,	distinguishes	 three	major	 approaches	 to	 platform	moderation:37	
artisanal	approaches,	involving	smaller-scale	case-by-case	review	of	content	by	teams	of	between	5	and	200	human	moderators	(e.g.,	Medium);	community-reliant	approaches,	which	typically	combine	overarching	 policy	 decisions	 by	 a	 small	 team	 of	 company	employees	with	a	larger	group	of	volunteer	human	reviewers	(e.g.,	Reddit);	 and	 industrial	 approaches,	 which	 typically	 rely	 upon	large-scale	bureaucracies	of	tens	of	thousands	of	human	reviewers	to	 enforce	 community	 standards	 that	 are	 defined	 by	 separate	policy	teams	(e.g.,	Facebook).		Importantly,	the	techniques	and	organizational	structures	of	content	 moderation	 are	 not	 neutral	 but	 affect	 how	 content	 is	reviewed	 and	 which	 values	 are	 prioritized	 in	 the	 process.	 For	example,	whereas	 the	 hands-on	 approach	 of	 artisanal	 platforms	generally	enables	greater	sensitivity	to	context,	the	bureaucratized	approach	of	industrial	platforms	tends	to	place	greater	emphasis	
 36.	 Monika	Bickert	&	Brian	 Fishman,	Hard	Questions:	What	 Are	We	Doing	 to	 Stay	
Ahead	 of	 Terrorists?,	 FACEBOOK	 NEWSROOM,	 (Nov.	 8,	 2018)	https://about.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/	[https://perma.cc/NJ4T-B62P].	37.	 Caplan,	supra	note	20,	at	15-25.	
948	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	on	 the	 value	 of	 consistency. 38	As	 the	 next	 section	 reveals,	 these	organizational	dynamics	constitute	just	one	of	a	broader	range	of	factors	 that	 influence	 how	 platform	moderation	 is	 conducted	 in	practice.	
B.	 Influences	Over	Platform	Moderation	Platform	moderation	 is	 not	 a	 static	 process	 but	 an	 ongoing	negotiation	 between	 a	 plurality	 of	 actors,39	not	 only	 the	 various	policy	 teams	 and	 moderators	 employed	 or	 contracted	 by	 the	platforms	 themselves,	 but	 also	 user	 communities,	 governments,	advertisers,	 mass	media	 organizations,	 civil	 society	 groups,	 and	academic	 experts.	 In	 other	 words,	 platforms	 do	 not	 moderate	content	 in	a	vacuum	but	are	subject	to	a	range	of	pressures	that	feed	 into	 and	 shape	 the	 substance,	 processes	 and	procedures	of	their	content	moderation	policies.	In	practice,	content	moderation	is	driven	by	at	least	four	sets	of	influences—corporate	philosophy,	
regulatory	 compliance,	 profit	 maximization,	 and	 public	 outcry—each	of	which	affects	what	is	possible,	permissible,	and	visible	on	online	platforms.	 1.	 Corporate	Philosophy	Platform	moderation	is	at	least	partially	shaped	by	corporate	philosophy.40	Different	platforms	aim	to	provide	unique	products	and	services	 for	 their	users.	At	 the	most	general	 level,	platforms	tailor	their	architectures	to	ensure	they	are	suitable	for	providing	particular	types	of	experiences—whether	photo	and	video	sharing	on	 Instagram	 or	 microblogging	 on	 Twitter.	 At	 a	 more	 granular	level,	platforms	operate	more	or	 less	permissive	 speech	policies	depending	on	the	particular	environments	they	wish	to	nurture	on	their	 sites.	 These	 environments	 are	 typically	 grounded	 in	particular	 corporate	 values	 which	 exert	 influence	 over	 how	platforms	moderate	 content	on	 their	 sites	 in	practice.	Facebook,	for	example,	places	significant	emphasis	on	“authenticity,”	a	value	
 38.	 Id.	39.	 On	the	characterization	of	online	speech	governance	as	“pluralist,”	see	generally	Jack	M.	Balkin,	Free	Speech	 in	the	Algorithmic	Society:	Big	Data,	Private	Governance,	and	
New	 School	 Speech	 Regulation,	 51	 UC	 DAVIS	 L.	 REV.,	 1149,	 1186-93	 (2018);	 Hamilton,	
Governing	the	Global	Public	Square	(manuscript	on	file	with	author).	40.	 See	also	Klonick,	supra	note	16,	at	1625-27.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 949	that	informs	a	number	of	areas	of	its	content	moderation	practices	including	its	requirement	that	people	that	connect	on	the	platform	must	use	“the	name	that	they	go	by	in	everyday	life.”41	Importantly,	corporate	philosophies	tend	not	to	be	static	but	evolve	 over	 time.	 Twitter,	 for	 example,	 initially	 established	 a	largely	hands-off	moderation	policy,	only	intervening	to	moderate	content	in	certain	exceptional	circumstances.	Originally	branding	itself	as	“the	free	speech	wing	of	the	free	speech	party,”42	Twitter’s	maximalist	approach	to	freedom	of	expression	ended	up	creating	a	toxic	hunting	ground	for	minority	groups,	who	found	themselves	targeted	by	racists,	misogynists	and	trolls	simply	for	participating	on	the	platform.	As	one	commentator	put	it,	“On	Twitter	abuse	is	not	 just	 a	 bug,	 but—to	 use	 the	 Silicon	 Valley	 term	 of	 art—a	fundamental	feature.”43		Over	time,	however,	Twitter	has	gradually	instituted	slightly	more	restrictive	moderation	policies	on	the	premise	that	“freedom	of	 expression	 means	 little	 as	 our	 underlying	 philosophy	 if	 we	continue	to	allow	voices	to	be	silenced	because	they	are	afraid	to	speak	 up.” 44 	In	 practice,	 a	 platform’s	 corporate	 philosophy	 is	important,	not	only	as	a	means	to	develop	the	platform’s	user	base	but	also	to	satisfy	the	platform’s	founders	and	employees,	who	will	typically	want	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 company’s	 underlying	mission	and	values	are	aligned	with	their	own.45	
 41.	 Community	Standards:	17.	Misrepresentation,	FACEBOOK,	https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/misrepresentation	[https://perma.cc/M8E5-FVG9].	42.	 Josh	Halliday,	Twitter’s	 Tony	Wang:	 ‘We	 Are	 the	 Free	 Speech	Wing	 of	 the	 Free	
Speech	 Party’,	 GUARDIAN	 (Mar.	 22,	 2012),	https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/22/twitter-tony-wang-free-speech	[https://perma.cc/T6PB-QGFA].	43.	 Charlie	Warzel,	 “A	Honeypot	 for	Assholes”:	 Inside	Twitter’s	10-Year	Failure	 to	Stop	 Harassment,	 BUZZFEED	 NEWS	 (Aug.	 11,	 2016),	https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/charliewarzel/a-honeypot-for-assholes-inside-twitters-10-year-failure-to-s	[https://perma.cc/WV27-9SLM].	44.	 Vijaya	 Gadde,	Twitter	 Executive:	 Here’s	 How	we’re	 Trying	 to	 Stop	 Abuse	While	
Preserving	 Free	 Speech,	 WASH.	 POST	 (Apr.	 16,	 2015),	https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/04/16/twitter-executive-heres-how-were-trying-to-stop-abuse-while-preserving-free-speech/	[https://perma.cc/9VJS-7DG8].	45.	 GILLESPIE,	supra	note	3,	at	47.	
950	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	2.	Regulatory	Compliance	Beyond	corporate	philosophy,	content	moderation	 is	also	shaped	by	the	need	for	platforms	to	comply	with	various	forms	of	regulation—whether	 mandatory	 regulatory	 measures	 or	 more	
informal	regulatory	pressures.46	In	terms	of	mandatory	regulatory	measures,	states	sometimes	use	their	authority	to	order	particular	courses	of	action,	for	example,	platform	blocking	orders	restricting	access	 to	 particular	 platforms	 or	 content	 restriction	 orders	requiring	the	restriction	of	specific	content.	States	also	rely	on	a	combination	of	content	restriction	laws	and	intermediary	liability	laws	 to	 influence	 the	 governance	of	 speech	on	online	platforms.	Content	restriction	laws	define	categories	of	content	that	are	illegal	in	 particular	 domestic	 and	 regional	 contexts.47	In	 the	 European	Union,	 for	 example,	 illegal	 content	 includes	 incitement	 to	terrorism,	 xenophobic	 and	 racist	 speech	 that	 publicly	 incites	hatred	and	violence,	as	well	as	child	sexual	abuse.48	Intermediary	liability	laws	establish	the	conditions	under	which	platforms	may	be	 held	 liable	 for	 illegal	 content	 generated	 by	 their	 users.	Importantly,	 the	 scope	 and	 nature	 of	 content	 restriction	 and	intermediary	liability	laws	applicable	in	any	given	national	context	will	generally	affect	how	platforms	moderate	their	sites.	According	to	 Daphne	 Keller,	 for	 example,	 experience	 with	 intermediary	liability	 laws	 around	 the	 world	 suggests	 that	 legislation	 which	lacks	 rigorous	 procedural	 safeguards,	 places	 monitoring	obligations	 on	 companies	 to	 proactively	 police	 their	 platforms,	defines	 the	 mental	 state	 required	 for	 liability	 in	 broad	 terms,	and/or	 requires	 platforms	 to	 make	 context-dependent	assessments	 concerning	 the	 legality	 of	 complex	 categories	 of	content	such	as	terrorist	recruitment	materials	or	propaganda,	will	generally	 result	 in	higher	 rates	of	 lawful	 content	being	removed	from	platforms	through	their	moderation	processes.49	
 46.	 For	 a	 useful	 typology	 of	 different	 types	 of	 government	 action	 concerning	 the	governance	of	content	on	online	platforms,	see	generally	Molly	K.	Land,	Against	Privatized	
Censorship:	Proposals	for	Responsible	Delegation,	VIRGINIA	J.	OF	INT’L	L.	(forthcoming).	47.	 REBECCA	 MACKINNON	 ET	 AL.,	 FOSTERING	 FREEDOM	 ONLINE:	 THE	 ROLE	 OF	 INTERNET	INTERMEDIARIES,	31-36	(2014).		48.	 European	Commission,	 Tackling	 Illegal	 Content	Online:	 Towards	 an	Enhanced	Responsibility	of	Online	Platforms,	at	2,	COM	(2017)	555	final	(Sept.	28,	2017).	49.	 Daphne	Keller,	 Internet	Platforms:	Observations	on	Speech,	Danger,	and	Money,	HOOVER	INSTITUTION,	Oct.	31,	2018,	at	18-20.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 951	In	 addition	 to	 mandatory	 regulatory	 measures,	 various	forms	of	informal	regulatory	pressure	have	also	been	exerted	over	the	 content	 moderation	 practices	 of	 platforms.	 Three	 forms	 of	pressure	 have	 proven	 particularly	 prevalent	 in	 practice.	 First,	special	units	have	been	established	in	certain	jurisdictions	to	flag	potentially	 illegal	 content	 to	 platforms	 for	 their	 voluntary	evaluation	against	their	terms	of	service.	Europol,	for	example,	has	established	 an	 Internet	 Referral	 Unit	 (“IRU”)	with	 a	mandate	 to	refer	 terrorist	 and	 violent	 extremist	 content	 to	 online	 service	providers	 for	 their	 voluntary	 review.	 Between	 July	 2015	 and	December	 2017,	 the	 IRU	 made	 44,807	 decisions	 for	 referral	 of	terrorist	 content,	 with	 a	 removal	 success	 rate	 of	 ninety-two	percent.50	Second,	 regulatory	 institutions	 have	 sometimes	 reached	informal	agreements	with	online	platforms	to	establish	particular	standards	in	their	content	moderation	practices	and	meet	specific	targets.	 For	 example,	 pursuant	 to	 the	 2016	 Code	 of	 Conduct	 on	
Countering	 Illegal	 Hate	 Speech	 Online	 agreed	 between	 the	European	 Commission	 and	 Facebook,	 Microsoft,	 Twitter,	 and	YouTube,	participating	companies	committed	to	collaborate	with	“trusted	 reporters”—particularly	 civil	 society	 groups	 but	 in	practice	also	 specialized	 law	enforcement	departments	who	will	notify	platforms	of	the	existence	of	illegal	hate	speech—review	the	majority	 of	 valid	 removal	 notifications	 in	 less	 than	 twenty-four	hours,	 and	 remove	or	disable	 access	 to	 such	 content	 if	 found	 to	violate	their	terms	of	service	or	national	laws.51	In	other	instances,	voluntary	agreements	have	been	reached	with	respect	to	content	that	is	lawful	but	nonetheless	deemed	harmful	or	undesirable.52	In	2018,	 for	example,	 the	European	Commission	unveiled	a	Code	of	
Practice	 on	 Online	 Disinformation,	 which	 establishes	 self-regulatory	 standards	 for	 social	 media	 platforms	 and	 the	advertising	industry	to	fight	disinformation	worldwide.53	Finally,	content	moderation	practices	have	also	been	shaped	by	 various	 forms	 of	 jawboning	 through	 public	 appeals	 for	
 50.	 EU	Internet	Referral	Unit,	Transparency	Report	2017,	at	5	(Sept	12,	2018).			51.		European	Commission	Press	Release	IP/16/1936,	European	Commission	and	IT	Companies	Announce	Code	of	Conduct	on	Illegal	Online	Hate	Speech,	(May	31,	2016).	52.	 Raso	et	al.,	Artificial	Intelligence	&	Human	Rights:	Opportunities	&	Risks,	BERKMAN	KLEIN	CENTER	FOR	INTERNET	&	SOCIETY,	Sept.	25,	2018,	at	37-38.	53.	 EU	Code	of	Practice	on	Disinformation	(2018).	
952	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	platforms	 to	 alter	 their	 moderation	 processes	 and	 practices	 in	particular	ways	or	face	the	prospect	of	future	regulation.	Danielle	Citron,	 for	 example,	 has	 examined	 the	 impact	 of	 “the	 shadow	of	threatened	 regulation”	 by	 the	 EU	 on	 the	 content	 moderation	policies	 of	 online	 platforms. 54 	In	 particular,	 the	 adoption	 by	Facebook,	Microsoft,	 Twitter	 and	 YouTube	 of	 a	 shared	 industry	database	 of	 hashes	 for	 terrorist	 content	 appears	 to	 have	 been	timed	to	diminish	the	prospect	of	future	regulation	that	was	feared	might	 follow	 the	European	Commission’s	 critical	 review	of	 their	compliance	with	 the	Code	 of	 Conduct	 on	 Countering	 Illegal	 Hate	
Speech	Online.55	As	 this	 analysis	 indicates,	 a	 range	 of	 regulatory	 tools	 have	been	 relied	 upon	 to	 incentivize	 online	 platforms	 to	 put	 in	 place	systems	of	content	moderation	that	meet	particular	requirements,	standards,	and	targets.	It	is	important	to	recognize,	however,	that	not	 all	 governments	 have	 sufficient	 leverage	 to	 secure	 the	attention	 and	 successfully	 ensure	 compliance	 of	 platforms	 with	their	regulatory	demands—typically	only	those	that	control	access	to	the	most	commercially	valuable	markets.56	3.	Profit	Maximization	Since	the	digital	public	sphere	is	predominantly	controlled	by	private	 platforms,	 content	 moderation	 is	 also	 influenced	 to	 a	significant	extent	by	the	corporate	imperative	to	maximize	profits.	Notably,	 many	 of	 today’s	 largest	 online	 platforms	 rely	 on	 a	business	model	that	involves	the	sale	of	human	attention.	As	the	cost	of	creating	and	distributing	content	has	radically	declined	and	the	speed	at	which	information	can	be	disseminated	has	become	
 54.	 Danielle	 Keats	 Citron,	Extremist	 Speech,	 Compelled	 Conformity,	 and	 Censorship	
Creep,	93	NOTRE	DAME	L.	REV.	1035,	1045-49	(2018).	See	also	Balkin,	supra	note	39,	at	1177	(referring	to	the	State	practice	of	“jawboning	–	urging	digital	infrastructure	operators	to	do	the	right	thing	and	block,	hinder,	or	take	down	content”);	Robert	Gorwa,	The	Platform	
Governance	Triangle:	Conceptualizing	the	Informal	Regulation	of	Online	Content,	8	DATA	&	SOCIETY	(2019).	55.	 Citron,	 supra	 note	 54,	 at	 1048.	 On	 the	 concerns	 raised	 by	 opaque	 and	unaccountable	forms	of	collaboration	between	online	platforms,	see	generally	Douek,	The	
Rise	of	Content	Cartels,	KNIGHT	FIRST	AMENDMENT	INSTITUTE	(2020).			56.	 See	Andrew	Keane	Woods,	Litigating	Data	Sovereignty,	128	YALE	L.	 J.	328,	405	(2018);	 Daphne	Keller,	Who	Do	 You	 Sue?	 State	 and	 Platform	Hybrid	 Power	Over	 Online	
Speech,	Aegis	Series	Paper	No.	1902,	at	7	(2019);	Hamilton,	supra	note	39.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 953	supercharged, 57 	informational	 scarcity	 within	 the	 mass	 media	public	 sphere	 has	 been	 superseded	 by	 what	 Tim	 Wu	 terms	“attentional	 scarcity”	within	 the	digital	 public	 sphere.58	Drawing	on	their	enormous	social	networks,	major	social	media	platforms	such	as	Facebook	and	YouTube	generate	 revenue	and	profits	by	monetizing	the	attention	of	their	users.59	Through	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 Shoshana	 Zuboff	 calls	“surveillance	 capitalism,”60	many	online	platforms	enable	people	to	connect	and	communicate	with	each	other	around	the	world	in	exchange	 for	surveilling	their	online	expressions	and	behavior.61	In	 this	 context,	 surveillance	 is	 driven	 by	 a	 financial	 imperative:	platforms	collect	large	swathes	of	data	in	order	to	monetize	it	by	selling	 targeted	advertising.62	Using	big	data	analytics,	platforms	develop	 highly	 specific	 and	 detailed	 digital	 dossiers	 about	 their	users	 so	 that	 advertising	 can	 be	 narrowly	 tailored	 according	 to	their	 demographics	 and	 inferred	 interests.63	Data	 collection	 also	enables	platforms	to	curate	and	present	content	to	their	users	in	ways	that	aim	to	improve	engagement	with	their	sites.64	Increasing	user	 engagement	 is	 financially	 lucrative	 for	 online	 platforms:	 as	users	spend	more	time	and	attention	on	their	sites,	platforms	can	collect	 ever	 more	 behavioral	 data,	 improve	 their	 targeted	advertising	 and	 engagement	 capabilities,	 and	 grow	 their	advertising	revenue.65	
 57.	 See	 Claire	 Wardle	 &	 Hossein	 Derakhshan,	 Information	 Disorder:	 Toward	 an	
Interdisciplinary	Framework	for	Research	and	Policymaking,	at	11-12	(2017).	58 .	 Tim	 Wu,	 Is	 the	 First	 Amendment	 Obsolete?,	 in	 Emerging	 Threats	 (2017)	https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete	[https://perma.cc/522Q-9T9D].	59.	 Id.	60.		See	generally	Shoshana	Zuboff,	Big	Other:	Surveillance	Capitalism	and	the		
Prospects	of	an	Information	Civilization,	30	J.	INFO.	TECH.	75	(2015)	61.	 Jack	Balkin,	Fixing	Social	Media’s	Grand	Bargain,	Aegis	Series	Paper	No.	1814	at	3	(2018)	https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf	[https://perma.cc/2EML-NUPR].	62.	 Nathalie	Marechal,	Targeted	Advertising	Is	Ruining	the	Internet	and	Breaking	the	
World,	 VICE:	 MOTHERBOARD,	 (Nov.	 16,	 2018),	https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwjden/targeted-advertising-is-ruining-the-internet-and-breaking-the-world	[https://perma.cc/3X8X-59L9].	63.	 DIPAYAN	GHOSH	&	BEN	SCOTT,	#DIGITALDECEIT:	THE	TECHNOLOGIES	BEHIND	PRECISION	PROPAGANDA	ON	THE	INTERNET,	5-12	(2018).	64.	 JAMIE	BARTLETT,	THE	PEOPLE	VS	TECH:	HOW	THE	INTERNET	IS	KILLING	DEMOCRACY	(AND	HOW	WE	CAN	SAVE	IT),	25-26	(2018).	65.	 Balkin,	supra	note	61,	at	3.	
954	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	In	 terms	 of	 content	 moderation,	 surveillance	 capitalism	incentivizes	online	platforms	to	moderate	content	in	ways	that	aim	to	maximize	 both	 user	 engagement	 and	 advertising	 revenue	 on	their	 platforms.	 In	 this	 vein,	 changes	 to	 content	 moderation	policies	 have	 sometimes	 been	 driven	 by	 the	 demands	 of	 the	advertising	industry.	 In	2013,	 for	example,	Facebook	updated	its	policy	on	sexually	violent	content	after	fifteen	advertisers	pulled	their	 advertising	 in	 response	 to	 images	 that	 glorified	 rape	 and	domestic	 violence	 appearing	 on	 the	 platform. 66 	In	 addition,	content	moderation	has	also	been	guided	by	the	goal	of	increasing	the	 engagement	 of	 users.	 This	 is	 particularly	 evident	 in	 the	algorithmic	personalization	that	many	online	platforms	offer	in	an	effort	 to	keep	users	glued	to	their	sites—a	product	of	which	has	been	 the	 promotion	 of	 emotionally	 charged,	 extreme	 and	inflammatory	 content.67	Although	profit	 is	 not	 the	 sole	 driver	 of	content	 moderation	 on	 online	 platforms,	 over	 the	 years,	 it	 has	become	readily	apparent	that	content	moderation	has	become	tied	to	 a	 business	 model	 that	 incentivizes	 the	 maximization	 of	 user	engagement,	 data	 surveillance,	 and	 targeted	 advertising	 for	 the	generation	of	revenue	and	growth.	4.	Public	Outcry	Platform	 moderation	 can	 also	 be	 influenced	 by	 public	outcry.	In	particular,	when	collective	action	by	users,	civil	society	groups,	 and/or	 members	 of	 the	 general	 public	 concerning	particular	 moderation	 policies	 has	 been	 paired	 with	 significant	media	 coverage	 and/or	 litigation,	 platforms	 have	 sometimes—though	 by	 no	 means	 always—been	 responsive	 to	 the	 concerns	raised.68	A	high-profile	example	that	illustrates	both	the	potential	and	 limits	 of	 public	 collective	 action	 concerns	 the	 evolution	 of	Facebook’s	moderation	policy	regarding	breastfeeding	photos.	In	2008,	 Facebook	 became	 the	 target	 of	 an	 80,000-plus	 protest	 by	
 66 .	 Laura	 Stampler,	 Facebook	 Will	 Block	 Photos	 Celebrating	 Rape	 Following	 Ad	
Boycott,	 BUSINESS	 INSIDER	 (May	 28,	 2013),	 https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-fbrape-ad-boycott-2013-5	[https://perma.cc/A8KH-68G8].	67.	 See,	e.g.,	Zeynep	Tufekci,	YouTube,	the	Great	Radicalizer,	N.Y.	TIMES:	OPINION,	(Mar.	10,	 2018)	 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.html	[https://perma.cc/FU4E-ZRZT];	Ronald	Deibert,	Three	Painful	Truths	About	
Social	Media,	30	J.	DEMOCRACY	25,	31-34	(2019).	68.	 Klonick,	supra	note	16,	at	1652-55.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 955	angered	mothers	after	breastfeeding	photos	were	removed	from	its	 platform. 69 	Initially,	 Facebook	 merely	 attempted	 to	 clarify	rather	than	alter	its	policy.	In	2009,	the	platform	explained	that	it	only	 intervened	when	 a	 photo	 contained	 a	 fully	 exposed	breast,	citing	 concerns	 about	 allowing	 such	 photos	 on	 a	 site	where	 the	minimum	age	is	13-years-old.70	In	2012,	a	second	wave	of	protests	and	 the	 leak	 of	 Facebook’s	 internal	 moderation	 guidelines	garnered	 further	 press	 coverage	 around	 the	 issue. 71 	However,	protesters	 would	 ultimately	 have	 to	 wait	 until	 2015	 before	Facebook	finally	yielded	to	pressure	and	updated	its	moderation	rules,	explaining	that	the	platform	would	restrict	some	images	of	female	breasts	if	they	included	the	nipple	but	would	“always	allow	photos	 of	 women	 actively	 engaged	 in	 breastfeeding	 or	 showing	breasts	 with	 post-mastectomy	 scarring.” 72 	The	 struggle	 against	Facebook’s	 moderation	 policy	 on	 breastfeeding	 photos	demonstrates	 how	 collective	 action	 can	 sometimes	 provoke	changes	in	the	rules	of	social	media	platforms.	At	the	same	time,	the	 episode	 also	 reveals	 that	 significant	 media	 coverage	 and	protests	 spanning	 a	 number	 of	 years	may	 be	 required	 before	 a	platform	 is	 willing	 to	 implement	 even	 slight	 alterations	 to	 its	policies.	
C.	 Concerns	Over	Platform	Moderation	Although	 subject	 to	 a	 range	 of	 external	 pressures,	 major	online	platforms	such	as	Facebook	and	YouTube	wield	enormous	influence	 over	 the	 digital	 public	 sphere,	 acting	 as	 a	 gateway	 for	information	and	expression	around	the	world.	 Initially	emerging	as	a	means	to	tame	the	disorder	of	the	open	web,	today’s	largest	online	platforms	have	gradually	developed	 increasingly	 intricate	systems	of	moderation	that	influence	what	is	possible,	permissible,	and	 visible	 online.	 In	 practice,	 however,	 platform	 moderation	
 69.		Mark	Sweney,	Mums	Furious	as	Facebook	Removes	Breastfeeding	Photos,	GUARDIAN	(Dec.	 30,	 2008),	 https://www.theguardian.com/media/2008/dec/30/facebook-breastfeeding-ban	[https://perma.cc/2Y2B-9HDA].	70.	 GILLESPIE,	supra	note	3,	at	160.	71.	 Id.	at	162ff.	72.	 Vindu	Goel,	Facebook	Clarifies	Rules	on	What	It	Bans	and	Why,	N.Y.	TIMES:	BITS,		(Mar.	16,	2015),	https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/facebook-explains-what-it-bans-and-why/	[https://perma.cc/4W2W-R4KF].	
956	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	policies	 have	 given	 rise	 to	 a	 range	 of	 substantive,	 process,	 and	
procedural-remedial	concerns.73	1.	Substantive	Concerns	In	terms	of	substantive	concerns,	online	platforms	have	often	found	 themselves	 on	 the	 receiving	 end	 of	 criticism	 for	 adopting	content	 standards	 that	 are	 deemed	 either	 too	 restrictive	 or	 too	permissive.	 Given	 the	 size	 and	 diversity	 of	 the	 communities	 on	today’s	leading	online	platforms,	criticism	of	content	permissibility	standards	is	to	some	extent	inevitable.	At	the	same	time,	platforms	have	 often	 appeared	 inattentive	 or	 indifferent	 to	 the	 trade-offs	involved	in	the	policies	they	adopt.	Facebook,	 for	 example,	 has	 been	 criticized	 for	 failing	 to	carefully	 consider	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 platform’s	 authentic	name	 requirement.	 Ostensibly	 aimed	 at	 protecting	 users	 from	online	 harassment,	 the	 policy—which	 initially	 required	 users	 to	use	 their	 legal	 names	 on	 the	 platform—has	 proven	 culturally	biased	and	hazardous	for	groups	as	diverse	as	drag	queens,	human	rights	activists,	victims	of	crime,	and	minority	groups	that	rely	on	pseudonyms	 to	 protect	 themselves	 from	 physical	 harm	 and	danger.74	In	addition,	when	combined	with	Facebook’s	community	flagging	system,	the	policy	has	also	facilitated	“organised	reporting	sprees”	 against	 political	 activists	 and	other	 vulnerable	 groups—effectively	enabling	forms	of	abuse	that	the	policy	was	designed	to	deter.75	Beyond	 the	 relative	 restrictiveness	 of	 content	 standards,	concerns	have	also	arisen	 that	 the	 imprecision	and	ambiguity	of	many	moderation	rules	can	render	them	vulnerable	to	censorship	
 73.	 See	generally	GILLESPIE,	supra	note	3;	ZEYNEP	TUFEKCI,	TWITTER	AND	TEAR	GAS:	THE	POWER	AND	FRAGILITY	OF	NETWORKED	PROTEST	132-64	 (2017);	 SIVA	VAIDHYANATHAN,	ANTI-SOCIAL	MEDIA:	HOW	FACEBOOK	DISCONNECTS	US	 AND	UNDERMINES	DEMOCRACY	 (2018);	MIKE	GODWIN,	 THE	 SPLINTERS	 OF	 OUR	 DISCONTENT:	 HOW	 TO	 FIX	 SOCIAL	 MEDIA	 AND	 DEMOCRACY	WITHOUT	 BREAKING	 THEM	 (2019);	 DAVID	 KAYE,	 SPEECH	 POLICE:	 THE	 GLOBAL	 STRUGGLE	 TO	GOVERN	THE	INTERNET	(2019).	74.	 Kaye	Content	Moderation	Report,	supra	note	10,	¶	30;	GILLESPIE,	supra	note	3,	at	62-63;	ARTICLE	19,	supra	note	32,	at	30.	75.	 Dia	Kayyali,	Facebook’s	Name	Policy	Strikes	Again,	This	Time	at	Native	Americans,	ELECTRONIC	 FRONTIER	 FOUND.	 (Feb.	 13,	 2015),	https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/02/facebooks-name-policy-strikes-again-time-native-americans	[https://perma.cc/9SYL-REDJ].	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 957	creep,	inconsistent	application,	and	discriminatory	enforcement.76	David	Kaye,	for	example,	has	recently	observed	that	the	vagueness	of	 platform	 hate	 speech	 and	 harassment	 policies	 “has	 triggered	complaints	 of	 inconsistent	 policy	 enforcement	 that	 penalizes	minorities	while	 reinforcing	 the	 status	 of	 dominant	 or	 powerful	groups.”77	Inconsistent	application	of	moderation	 rules	may	also	be	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 time	 and	 resource	 constraints	 placed	 on	human	moderators,	as	well	as	their	 lack	of	knowledge	about	the	specific	 linguistic	 and	 cultural	 contexts	 in	 which	 content	 is	shared.78	Inadequate	 sensitivity	 to	 local	 contexts	 in	 the	 formulation,	application	 and	 enforcement	 of	 moderation	 rules	 can	 leave	platforms	 open	 to	 instrumentalization	 for	 the	 spread	 of	 hate	speech	and	disinformation,	with	the	attendant	risk	of	triggering	or	fueling	 offline	 discrimination	 and	 violence. 79 	The	 Independent	International	 Fact-Finding	 Mission	 on	 Myanmar,	 for	 example,	recently	concluded	that	death	threats,	incitement	to	violence	and	discrimination,	 and	 online	 harassment	 against	 the	 Rohingya	minority	 group	had	become	 “common	 features”	 on	 social	media	platforms	in	Myanmar,	with	Facebook,	in	particular,	emerging	as	“a	useful	instrument	for	those	seeking	to	spread	hate	in	a	context	where	for	most	users	Facebook	is	the	Internet.”80	
 76.	 See	Citron,	supra	note	54,	at	1051;	Kaye	Content	Moderation	Report,	supra	note	10,	para.	26.	77.	 Kaye	Content	Moderation	Report,	supra	note	10,	para.	27;	Keller,	supra	note	49,	at	24;	ARTICLE	19,	supra	note	32,	at	16.	78.	 See	Kaye	Content	Moderation	Report,	supra	note	10,	at	11.	79.	 See	generally	Molly	K.	Land	&	Rebecca	J.	Hamilton,	Beyond	Takedown:	Expanding	
the	Tool	Kit	for	Responding	to	Online	Hate,	in	PROPAGANDA	AND	INTERNATIONAL	CRIMINAL	LAW:	FROM	COGNITION	TO	CRIMINALITY	143	(2019);	AM.	BAR	ASS’N	CTR.	FOR	HUMAN	RIGHTS,	INVISIBLE	THREATS:	MITIGATING	THE	RISK	OF	VIOLENCE	FROM	ONLINE	HATE	SPEECH	AGAINST	HUMAN	RIGHTS	DEFENDERS	 IN	 GUATEMALA	 (2019),	https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/human_rights/invisible-threats-guatemala-may-2019.pdf	 [https://perma.cc/99B5-LG9B];	 Evelyn	 Douek,	Why	
Were	Members	of	Congress	Asking	Mark	Zuckerberg	About	Myanmar?	A	Primer.,	LAWFARE	(Apr.	26,	2018,	7:00	AM),	https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-were-members-congress-asking-mark-zuckerberg-about-myanmar-primer	 [https://perma.cc/JQP5-BF5F];	 Dia	Kayyali,	Alex	Jones,	Myanmar,	and	Free	Expression	Online,	WITNESS	BLOG	(Sept.	11,	2018),	https://blog.witness.org/2018/09/alex-jones-myanmar-online-free-expression/	[https://perma.cc/9PJH-YX49].	80.	 Rep.	of	the	Detailed	Findings	of	the	Indep.	Int’l	Fact-Finding	Mission	on	Myanmar,	U.N.	Doc	A/HRC/39/CRP.2,	at	339-43	(Sept.	17,	2018);	Rep.	of	the	Indep.	Int’l	Fact-Finding	Mission	 on	 Myanmar,	 U.N.	 Doc	 A/HRC/39/64,	 at	 14	 (Sept.	 12,	 2018).	 For	 further	discussion	 of	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 online	 platforms	 in	 mass	 atrocity	 contexts,	 see	
958	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	In	 recent	 years,	 automation	 and	 algorithmic	 technologies	have	 increasingly	 been	 touted	 as	 possible	 solutions	 to	 the	challenges	 of	 inconsistent	 application	 of	 content	 moderation	rules.81	At	present,	however,	 such	 tools	 remain	no	substitute	 for	human	 judgment,	 particularly	 where	 detailed	 assessments	 of	context	 are	 required.82	As	Daphne	Keller	 explains,	 “no	 reputable	experts	suggest	that	filters	are	good	enough	to	be	put	in	charge	of	deciding	what	is	illegal	in	the	first	place,”	their	function	currently	limited	to	identifying	“duplicates	of	specific	material	that	a	human	previously	 flagged.” 83 	And	 even	 then,	 the	 risk	 remains	 that	algorithmic	decision-making	may	be	grounded	in	datasets	that	are	based	 on	 discriminatory	 assumptions,	 generating	 inbuilt	 biases	that	 are	 difficult	 to	 detect	 and	 risk	 marginalizing	 and	disproportionately	 targeting	 minority	 groups. 84 	Importantly,	moderation	 biases	 are	 not	 without	 consequence,	 potentially	triggering	 feelings	 of	 alienation,	 frustration,	 and	 moral	 outrage	within	individuals	and	communities	whose	content	is	erroneously	removed	or	restricted.85	
 generally	 Jenny	 Domino,	 Crime	 as	 Cognitive	 Constraint:	 Facebook’s	 Role	 in	 Myanmar’s	
Incitement	Landscape	and	the	Promise	of	International	Tort	Liability,	CASE	WESTERN	RESERVE	J.	 INT’L	 L.	 (forthcoming	 2020);	 Shannon	 Raj	 Singh,	Move	 Fast	 and	 Break	 Societies:	 the	
Weaponisation	of	Social	Media	and	Options	for	Accountability	Under	International	Criminal	
Law,	8	CAMBRIDGE	INT’L	L.	J.		331.	(2019).	81.	 See,	e.g.,	Tackling	Illegal	Content	Online,	supra	note	48,	at	12-13,	19	(encouraging	the	use	of	automatic	detection	and	filtering	technologies).	82.	 Keller,	supra	note	49,	at	5-8.	On	the	concerns	raised	by	the	use	of	automation	in	content	 moderation,	 see	 generally	 Hannah	 Bloch-Wehba,	 Automatic	 in	 Moderation,	CORNELL	 INT’L	 L.	 J.	 (forthcoming	 2020);	 Robert	 Gorwa,	 Reuben	 Binns,	 &	 Christian	Katzenbach,	 Algorithmic	 Content	 Moderation:	 Technical	 and	 Political	 Challenges	 in	 the	
Automation	of	Platform	Governance,	7	BIG	DATA	&	SOCIETY	(2020);	Emma	Llansó,	Joris	van	Hoboken,	Paddy	Leerssen	&	Jaron	Harambam,	Artificial	Intelligence,	Content	Moderation,	
and	Freedom	of	Expression,	TRANSATLANTIC	WORKING	GROUP,	26	Feb.	2020.		83.	 Keller,	supra	note	49,	at	7.	84.	 See,	e.g.,	David	Kaye,	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Promotion	and	Protection	of	the	Right	 to	 Freedom	of	Opinion	 and	Expression,	U.N.	Doc	A/73/348,	 at	 8-9	 29	Aug.	 2018	[hereinafter	 Kaye	 AI	 Report];	 COUNCIL	 OF	 EUR.,	 COMM.	 OF	 EXPERTS	 ON	 INTERNET	INTERMEDIARIES,	ALGORITHMS	AND	HUMAN	RIGHTS:	STUDY	ON	THE	HUMAN	RIGHTS	DIMENSIONS	OF	AUTOMATED	 DATA	 PROCESSING	 TECHNIQUES	 (IN	 PARTICULAR	 ALGORITHMS)	 AND	 POSSIBLE	REGULATORY	 IMPLICATIONS	 26-28	 (2018),	 https://edoc.coe.int/en/internet/7589-algorithms-and-human-rights-study-on-the-human-rights-dimensions-of-automated-data-processing-techniques-and-possible-regulatory-implications.html	[https://perma.cc/5KHZ-67E9]	[hereinafter	CoE	Report].	85.	 See	generally	Citron,	supra	note	54,	at	1058-61;	Keller,	supra	note	49,	at	22-24.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 959	2.	Process	Concerns	Beyond	 substantive	 concerns,	 a	 number	 of	 process	concerns	 have	 also	 been	 raised,	 centered	 on	 issues	 relating	 to	platform	transparency	and	oversight,	as	well	as	the	engagement	of	platforms	 with	 different	 stakeholders.	 In	 terms	 of	 platform	
transparency	 and	 oversight,	 ever	 since	 Google	 released	 its	 first	transparency	report	in	2010,	the	number	of	companies	producing	such	reports	has	 increased	year-on-year.86	To	date,	however,	 the	level	of	detail	contained	in	transparency	reports	has	proven	both	variable	 and	 inadequate.	 Ranking	Digital	 Rights’	2018	 Corporate	
Accountability	Index,	for	example,	found	serious	deficiencies	in	the	quality	of	information	disclosed	by	companies	with	respect	to	the	volume	and	nature	of	content	and	accounts	removed	or	restricted	for	 violating	 platform	 terms	 of	 service,	 the	 processes	 used	 by	platforms	 to	 identify	 violations	 including	 whether	 priority	consideration	 is	 given	 to	 flagging	 by	 governments	 or	 private	individuals,	and	the	number	and	nature	of	government	and	private	requests	 to	 restrict	 content	 or	 accounts	 received	 via	 formal	 or	official	channels.87	Inadequacies	in	platform	transparency	reports	are	illustrative	of	what	Sarah	Roberts	has	referred	to	as	a	“logic	of	opacity”	that	pervades	content	moderation	processes.88	For	instance,	platforms	have	 typically	 been	 reluctant	 to	 reveal	 details	 about	 the	 human	workforce	 that	 undertakes	 platform	 moderation,	 including	 the	nature	 of	 their	work,	 the	 stressful	 conditions	 under	which	 they	review	content,	and	significant	shortcomings	in	the	support	they	receive.89	The	logic	of	opacity	also	extends	to	algorithmic	decision-making	 within	 platform	 moderation	 processes.	 Dia	 Kayyali,	 for	example,	 argues	 that	 platforms	 have	 generally	 fallen	 short	 of	
 86.	 See	 generally	 Transparency	 Reporting	 Index,	 ACCESS	 NOW,	https://www.accessnow.org/transparency-reporting-index/	 [https://perma.cc/XR5C-JR6Z]	(last	visited	Feb.	13,	2020).	87.	 RANKING	 DIG.	 RIGHTS,	 2018	 CORPORATE	 ACCOUNTABILITY	 INDEX	 51-60	 (2018),	https://rankingdigitalrights.org/index2018/assets/static/download/RDRindex2018report.pdf	[https://perma.cc/29QM-BRES].	88.	 Sarah	T.	Roberts,	Digital	Detritus:	‘Error’	and	the	Logic	of	Opacity	in	Social	Media	
Content	 Moderation,	 FIRST	 MONDAY	 (Mar.	 5,	 2018),	https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/8283/6649	[https://perma.cc/WX46-A6EL].	89.	 See	generally	SARAH	T.	ROBERTS,	BEHIND	THE	SCREEN:	CONTENT	MODERATION	IN	THE	SHADOWS	OF	SOCIAL	MEDIA	(2019).	
960	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	providing	“the	most	basic	assurances	of	algorithmic	accountability	or	 transparency,	 such	 as	 accuracy,	 explainability,	 fairness,	 and	auditability.”90	Transparency	concerns	have	also	been	raised	with	respect	to	platform	advertising	practices.	Platforms	market	their	advertising	services	as	enabling	advertisers	to	reach	not	only	larger	but	also	more	targeted	audiences	according	to	a	range	of	demographic	and	inferred	 characteristics. 91 	However,	 controversies	 surrounding	the	2016	US	presidential	election	and	the	UK	Brexit	referendum,	for	example,	have	brought	to	light	the	potential	for	these	services	to	be	repurposed	by	political	actors	in	an	effort	to	tailor	and	target	messages	at	narrow	categories	of	prospective	voters	in	ways	that	may	be	corrosive	to	democracy.92	In	 addition	 to	 inadequate	 transparency	 and	 oversight,	concerns	 have	 also	 arisen	 over	 the	 processes	 that	 social	 media	companies	 have	 established	 to	manage	 stakeholder	 engagement.	For	example,	online	platforms	have	been	criticized	for	adopting	a	piecemeal	 approach	 to	 resisting	 repressive	 regulatory	arrangements	 with	 States.	 Of	 particular	 concern	 are	 informal	forms	 of	 cooperation	 that	 have	 been	 established	 between	platforms	 and	 law	 enforcement	 agencies,	 which	 encourage	platforms	 to	 respond	 to	 removal	 requests	 within	 narrow	 time-frames	by	evaluating	compliance	with	their	terms	of	service.	Such	schemes	 not	 only	 incentivize	 platforms	 to	 sacrifice	 thoughtful	deliberation	in	favor	of	speed	but	also	circumvent	the	rule	of	law	by	enabling	States	to	avoid	seeking	the	removal	of	illegal	content	through	 formal	 legal	 avenues	 such	 as	 domestic	 courts. 93 	In	addition,	 where	 such	 arrangements	 are	 based	 on	 inadequately	defined	terms	such	as	“hate	speech,”	they	may	serve	as	pretexts	for	
 90.	 Dia	Kayyali,	European	“Terrorist	Content”	Proposal	is	Dangerous	for	Human	Rights	
Globally,	 WITNESS	 BLOG	 (Dec.	 6,	 2018),	 https://blog.witness.org/2018/12/european-terrorist-content-proposal-dangerous-human-rights-globally/	 [https://perma.cc/2SKQ-T9NC];	see	also	Lorna	McGregor,	Daragh	Murray	&	Vivian	Ng,	International	Human	Rights	
Law	 as	 a	 Framework	 for	 Algorithmic	 Accountability,	 68	 INT’L	 &	 COMP.	 L.Q.	 309,	 317-20	(2019).	91.	 For	a	skeptical	view,	see	BENKLER,	FARIS,	&	ROBERTS,	supra	note	7,	at	276-79.	92.	 See	generally	Vaidhyanathan,	supra	note	73,	at	146-74.	93.	 ARTICLE	19,	supra	note	32,	at	16-17;	Lucie	Krahulcova,	Europol’s	Internet	Referral	
Unit	Risks	Harming	Rights	and	Feeding	Extremism,	ACCESS	NOW	(June	17,	2016,	6:11	AM),	https://www.accessnow.org/europols-internet-referral-unit-risks-harming-rights-isolating-extremists/	[https://perma.cc/9T8R-Y75V].	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 961	governments	to	request	platforms	to	suppress	legitimate	debate.94	And	 by	 leveraging	 platforms’	 own	 terms	 of	 service—which	 are	typically	drafted	to	apply	globally—as	proxies	for	illegality,	States	can	also	use	these	types	of	arrangements	to	ensure	that	content	is	removed	worldwide	rather	than	merely	on	a	country-by-country	basis.95	Beyond	 concerns	 over	 their	 relationships	 with	 States,	platforms	have	also	 failed	 to	put	 in	place	structured	systems	 for	engaging	with	 their	 users	 and	 other	 relevant	 stakeholders.	 As	 a	result,	 the	 responsiveness	of	platforms	 to	concerns	 raised	about	their	 content	 moderation	 policies	 has	 been	 somewhat	inconsistent.	 Twitter,	 for	 example,	 has	 relied	 on	 the	 subjective	notion	of	“newsworthiness”	to	explain	why	many	of	US	President	Donald	Trump’s	most	controversial	tweets	have	not	been	removed	from	 its	 platform	 despite	 seemingly	 contravening	 its	 terms	 of	service.96	Meanwhile,	Facebook	only	saw	fit	to	re-instate	a	famous	and	 historical	 photo	 of	 a	 nine-year-old	 Vietnamese	 girl	 running	naked	following	a	napalm	attack	once	the	editor	and	CEO	of	a	major	Norwegian	newspaper	wrote	a	letter	in	protest.97	These	examples	suggest	 that	 platforms	may	be	 susceptible	 to	 giving	preferential	treatment	 in	 their	 content	 moderation	 practices	 to	 those	 with	public	influence	or	financial	power.98	
 94.	 FREEDOM	HOUSE,	FREEDOM	ON	THE	NET:	MANIPULATING	SOCIAL	MEDIA	TO	UNDERMINE	DEMOCRACY	12-15	(Nov.	2017),	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2017	[https://perma.cc/68DF-HM64].	95.	 Hannah	 Bloch-Wehba,	 Terrorist	 Speech	 and	 Global	 Platform	 Governance,	BALKINIZATION	 (Aug.	 22,	 2018),	 https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/08/terrorist-speech-and-global-platform.html	[https://perma.cc/R8WU-693U];	see	also	Citron,	supra	note	54,	at	1056-57	(describing	how	the	shared	industry	database	of	violent	terrorist	content	“has	the	 potential	 to	 blacklist	 content	 across	 the	 world”);	 Douek,	 supra	 note	 55,	 at	 23-31	(outlining	 how	 informal	 and	 opaque	 forms	 of	 collaboration	 between	 platforms	 may	exacerbate	 existing	 concerns	 with	 content	 moderation	 practices	 by	 compounding	accountability	deficits,	creating	a	false	patina	of	legitimacy	for	their	decisions,	augmenting	the	power	of	the	largest	platforms,	and	suggesting		a	false	consensus	on	where	lines	should	be	drawn	regarding	online	speech	governance).	96.	 	Abby	Ohlheiser,	The	3	Loopholes	That	Keep	Trump’s	Tweets	on	Twitter,	WASH.	POST	 (July	 23,	 2018),	 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2018/01/03/the-3-loopholes-that-keep-donald-trumps-tweets-on-twitter/	[https://perma.cc/QBU4-KPY4].	97.	 Klonick,	supra	note	16,	at	1654-55.	98.	 ARTICLE	 19,	 SELF-REGULATION	 AND	 “HATE	 SPEECH”	 ON	 SOCIAL	 MEDIA	 16	 (2018),	https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Self-regulation-and-%E2%80%98hate-speech%E2%80%99-on-social-media-platforms_March2018.pdf	[https://perma.cc/S69D-PHTW];	Klonick,	supra	note	16,	at	1654-	55,	1665-66.	
962	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	Failures	 to	 adequately	 consult	 relevant	 stakeholders	 over	platform	moderation	policies	can	also	generate	avoidable	errors.	In	 2017,	 for	 example,	 YouTube’s	 adoption	 of	 a	 new	 machine-learning	algorithm	designed	to	monitor	extremist	content	resulted	in	the	platform	removing	hundreds	of	thousands	of	channels	and	videos	documenting	the	civil	war	in	Syria,	including	content	that	is	of	 potentially	 significant	 value	 to	 human	 rights	 investigators. 99	While	 the	 platform	 subsequently	 worked	 closely	 with	 human	rights	groups	to	restore	some	of	this	content,	its	ad	hoc	restoration	process	was	itself	criticized	for	favoring	groups	and	individuals	in	Europe	and	 the	United	States	with	closer	 ties	 to	 the	platform.100	Both	 the	 erroneous	 removal	 of	 content	 and	 biases	 in	 the	restoration	 process	 could	 arguably	 have	 been	 avoided	 or	 at	 the	very	 least	 mitigated	 had	 YouTube	 consulted	 more	 widely	 with	relevant	 civil	 society	 groups	 in	 advance	 before	 changing	 its	moderation	processes.	3.	 Procedural-Remedial	Concerns	Finally,	 platform	 moderation	 policies	 have	 also	 proven	procedurally	 and	 remedially	 deficient	 in	 a	 number	 of	 respects.	Concerns	 include	 inadequate	 user	 notification	 that	 content	 has	been	 removed	 or	 flagged,	 or	 an	 account	 penalized,	 insufficient	notification	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 such	 actions,	 limited	 appeals	processes,	 and	 untimely	 and	 insufficient	 remedies	 for	 wrongful	removals. 101 	These	 issues	 are	 all	 the	 more	 pressing	 given	 that	platform	moderation	effectively	amounts	to	a	new	privatized	and	digital	 form	of	prior	 restraint	over	public	 speech.	As	 Jack	Balkin	explains,	 platform	 practices	 of	 blocking	 and	 removal	 generally	occur	“without	any	judicial	determination	of	whether	their	speech	is	protected	or	unprotected,	without	any	Bill	of	Rights	protections,	
 99.		Dia	Kayyali	&	Raja	Althaibani,	Vital	Human	Rights	Evidence	in	Syria	is	Disappearing	
from	YouTube,	WITNESS	(Aug.	30,	2017),	https://blog.witness.org/2017/08/vital-human-rights-evidence-syria-disappearing-youtube/	[https://perma.cc/2D2F-Q64J].	100.	 Avi	Asher-Schapiro,	YouTube	and	Facebook	are	Removing	Evidence	of	Atrocities,	
Jeopardizing	 Cases	 Against	 War	 Criminals,	 INTERCEPT	 (Nov.	 2,	 2017),	https://theintercept.com/2017/11/02/war-crimes-youtube-facebook-syria-rohingya/	[https://perma.cc/3UE2-JM2J].	101.	 JAMILA	 VENTURINI	 ET	 AL.,	 TERMS	 OF	 SERVICE	 AND	HUMAN	RIGHTS:	 AN	ANALYSIS	 OF	ONLINE	PLATFORM	CONTRACTS	58	(2016);	See	generally	How	to	Appeal,	ONLINE	CENSORSHIP,	https://onlinecensorship.org/resources/how-to-appeal	 [https://perma.cc/SXQ3-778P]	(last	visited	Feb.	14,	2020)	(for	a	useful	overview	of	platform	appeals	processes).	
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III.	 THE	PROMISE	AND	PITFALLS	OF	A	HUMAN	RIGHTS-BASED	
APPROACH	TO	PLATFORM	MODERATION	As	anxieties	over	platform	moderation	have	risen	sharply	in	recent	 years,	 online	platforms	have	begun	 to	open	up	about	 the	substance,	processes,	and	procedures	of	their	content	moderation	policies	and	to	acknowledge	the	importance	of	taking	an	expanded	view	of	 their	 responsibilities.103	Accompanying	 this	 shift	 in	 tone,	today’s	largest	platforms	have	also	begun	to	hint	at	the	influence	of	human	 rights	 law	 within	 their	 moderation	 processes. 104	Facebook’s	 Vice-President	 of	 Policy	 Solutions,	 for	 example,	recently	confirmed	that	the	platform’s	moderation	teams	already	“look	for	guidance	in	documents	like	Article	19	of	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	 and	Political	Rights”	 (“ICCPR”)	 in	determining	where	to	draw	the	line	on	freedom	of	expression	with	respect	to	user	 content. 105 	The	 company	 also	 revealed	 that	 it	 “look[s]	 to	international	human	rights	standards”	to	determine	whether	the	content	 that	 would	 otherwise	 violate	 the	 platform’s	 community	standards	should	be	allowed	because	it	is	newsworthy	and	in	the	public	interest.106	Beyond	Facebook,	Twitter	CEO	Jack	Dorsey	has	
 102.	 Balkin,	supra	note	17,	at	2018.	103.	 See,	e.g.,	Mark	Zuckerberg,	A	Blueprint	for	Content	Governance	and	Enforcement,	FACEBOOK	 NEWSROOM	 (Nov.	 15,	 2018),	 https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-blueprint-for-content-governance-and-enforcement/10156443129621634/	[https://perma.cc/YN8R-SQWE].	104.	 See	 generally	 Rikke	 Frank	 Jørgensen,	 Rights	 Talk:	 In	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 Online	
Giants,	in	HUMAN	RIGHTS	IN	THE	AGE	OF	PLATFORMS	163	(2019)	(on	the	different	narratives	related	to	online	platforms’	commitment	to	respect	human	rights).	105.	 Richard	 Allen,	 Hard	 Questions:	 Where	 Do	 We	 Draw	 the	 Line	 on	 Freedom	 of	
Expression,	 FACEBOOK	 NEWSROOM	 (Aug.	 9,	 2018),	https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/hard-questions-free-expression/	[https://perma.cc/RWX2-T99T].	106.	 Monika	 Bickert,	Updating	 the	 Values	 That	 Inform	 Our	 Community	 Standards,	FACEBOOK	 NEWSROOM	 (Sept.	 12,	 2019),	 https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/updating-the-values-that-inform-our-community-standards/	 [https://perma.cc/P6AA-NHEK];	 see	
generally	 E.	 Douek,	Why	 Facebook’s	 ‘Values’	 Update	Matters,	 LAWFARE	 (Sept.	 16,	 2019),	https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-facebooks-values-update-matters	[https://perma.cc/A6QG-3FZE].	
964	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	also	acknowledged	that	his	company’s	values	should	be	rooted	in	human	rights	law.107	Whether	these	views	signal	the	beginnings	of	a	more	general	turn	 towards	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 to	 content	moderation	remains	to	be	seen.	In	any	case,	momentum	is	clearly	building	 in	support	of	such	an	approach.108	Beyond	David	Kaye’s	landmark	 report	mentioned	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 the	 Article,	 a	human	 rights-based	 approach	 to	 platform	 moderation	 has	received	the	support	of	a	growing	number	of	civil	society	actors,109	whilst	references	to	human	rights	have	also	begun	to	appear	in	a	number	of	statements	and	regulatory	initiatives	concerning	online	speech	governance	supported	by	States.110	Against	 this	background,	 this	section	begins	by	defining	 the	contours	 of	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 and	 explaining	 its	value	and	limitations	in	the	platform	moderation	context	(Section	A).	 The	 section	 then	 turns	 to	 elaborate	 some	of	 the	 choices	 and	challenges	that	platforms	are	likely	to	confront	in	operationalizing	a	 human	 rights-based	 approach,	 focusing	 in	 particular	 on	 the	substantive	 (Section	 B),	 process-related	 (Section	 C),	 and	procedural-remedial	 (Section	 D)	 dimensions	 of	 content	moderation.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 illuminate	 both	 the	 promise	 and	 the	pitfalls	of	a	human	rights-based	approach	to	platform	moderation.	
 107.	 Jack	 Dorsey	 TWITTER	 (August	 10,	 2018),	 accessible	 here	[https://perma.cc/A297-PPMA].	108.	 See	 generally	 Dennis	 Redeker,	 Lex	 Gill,	 &	 Urs	 Gasser,	 Towards	 Digital	
Constitutionalism?	 Mapping	 Attempts	 to	 Craft	 an	 Internet	 Bill	 of	 Rights,	 80	 INT’L	COMMUNICATION	GAZETTE	 302	 (2018);	 NICOLAS	 P.	 SUZOR,	LAWLESS:	 THE	 SECRET	 RULES	 THAT	
GOVERN	OUR	DIGITAL	LIVES	(Submitted	Version	2019).	109.	 See,	e.g.,	Jillian	C.	York	&	Corynne	McSherry,	Content	Moderation	is	Broken.	Let	
Us	 Count	 the	 Ways,	 ELECTRONIC	 FRONTIER	 FOUNDATION	 DEEPLINKS	 BLOG	 (Apr.	 29,	 2019),	https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/content-moderation-broken-let-us-count-ways	[https://perma.cc/YAN5-TBZ5];	ACCESSNOW,	Protecting	Free	Expression	in	the	Era	of	
Online	 Content	 Moderation	 (May	 2019),	https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2019/05/AccessNow-Preliminary-Recommendations-On-Content-Moderation-and-Facebooks-Planned-Oversight-Board.pdf	[https://perma.cc/ZEH2-T5T7];		ARTICLE	19,	supra	note	32.	110 .	 	 See,	 e.g.,	 CHRISTCHURCH	 CALL	 TO	 ELIMINATE	 TERRORIST	 &	 VIOLENT	 EXTREMIST	CONTENT	 ONLINE,	 https://www.christchurchcall.com/	 [https://perma.cc/UE4Q-X9YT]	(last	visited	Feb.	14,	202)	(“All	action	on	this	issue	must	be	consistent	with	principles	of	a	free,	 open	 and	 secure	 internet,	 without	 compromising	 human	 rights	 and	 fundamental	freedoms,	including	freedom	of	expression”);		and	French	Interim	Report,	supra	note	23,	at	19	(“the	objectives	of	the	regulatory	system	must	be	to	defend	the	exercise	of	all	rights	and	freedoms	on	social	media	platforms”).	
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A.	 Defining	a	Human	Rights-Based	Approach	to	Platform	
Moderation	The	 starting	 point	 for	 defining	 a	 human	 rights-based	approach	 to	 platform	moderation	 is	 the	United	 Nations’	 Guiding	
Principles	 on	Business	 and	Human	Rights	 (“UNGP”).111	The	UNGP	elaborates	 a	 three-pillar	 framework,	 generally	 referred	 to	 as	“Protect,	 Respect	 and	 Remedy,”	 whose	 purpose	 is	 to	 prevent,	mitigate	and	redress	business-related	human	rights	abuses.112	The	
first	pillar	outlines	the	State	duty	to	protect	against	human	rights	abuses	within	their	territory	and/or	jurisdiction	by	third	parties,	including	 business	 enterprises.	 The	 second	 pillar	 elaborates	 the	corporate	 responsibility	 to	 ‘respect’	 human	 rights	 by	 avoiding	infringing	on	the	human	rights	of	others	and	addressing	adverse	human	 rights	 impacts	 with	 which	 they	 are	 involved.	 The	 third	
pillar	 addresses	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 States	 and	 businesses	 to	ensure	victims	have	adequate	access	to	remedies.113	Although	 the	 UNGP	 framework	 encompasses	 both	 State	obligations	and	corporate	responsibilities,	the	focus	of	the	Article	is	on	the	latter.	The	corporate	responsibility	to	respect	constitutes	a	non-binding	“global	standard	of	expected	conduct”	applicable	to	business	 enterprises,	 which	 exists	 independently	 of	 States’	abilities	 and/or	 willingness	 to	 fulfil	 their	 own	 human	 rights	obligations. 114 	In	 particular,	 businesses	 are	 expected	 to	 “avoid	causing	or	contributing	to	adverse	human	rights	impacts	through	their	own	activities,	and	address	such	impacts	when	they	occur,”	as	 well	 as	 “seek	 to	 prevent	 or	 mitigate	 adverse	 human	 rights	impacts	 that	 are	 directly	 linked	 to	 their	 operations,	 products	 or	services	 by	 their	 business	 relationships,	 even	 if	 they	 have	 not	contributed	 to	 those	 impacts.” 115 	As	 such,	 the	 corporate	responsibility	 to	 respect	 stems	 from	 both	 a	 social	 expectation,	sometimes	referred	to	as	a	company’s	“social	licence	to	operate,”116	
 111.	John	Ruggie	(Special	Representative	of	the	Secretary-General),	Guiding	Principles	
on	 Business	 and	 Human	 Rights:	 Implementing	 the	 United	 Nations	 “Protect,	 Respect	 and	
Remedy”	Framework,	U.N.	Doc.	A/HRC/17/31	(Mar.	21,	2011)	[hereinafter	“UNGP”].	112.	 Id.	at	4.	113.	 Id.	114.	 UNGP,	annex	para.	11.	115.	 UNGP,	annex	para.	13.	116.		John	Ruggie	(Special	Representative	of	the	Secretary-General),	Protect,	Respect	
and	Remedy:	A	Framework	for	Business	and	Human	Rights,	para.	54,	U.N.	Doc.	A/HRC/8/5	(Apr.	7,	2008).	
966	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	as	well	as	the	existence	of	a	link	between	a	company’s	activities	and	adverse	human	rights	impacts.	While	some	human	rights	may	be	at	greater	risk	and	therefore	require	heightened	attention	in	particular	industries	or	contexts,	the	 responsibility	 to	 respect	 applies	 to	 all	 human	 rights	 on	 the	basis	 that	“business	enterprises	can	have	an	 impact—directly	or	indirectly—on	virtually	the	entire	spectrum	of	these	rights.”117	The	responsibility	 to	 respect	 also	 applies	 to	all	business	 enterprises	“regardless	 of	 their	 size,	 sector,	 operational	 context,	 ownership	and	structure.”118	A	frequently	aired	concern	is	that	the	corporate	responsibility	to	respect	may	risk	over-burdening	profit-driven	companies	and	chilling	 innovation.119	Under	 the	UNGP	 framework,	however,	 the	scale	and	complexity	of	the	means	through	which	businesses	meet	their	 responsibility	 to	 respect	 may	 vary	 according	 to	 the	 size,	sector,	operational	context,	ownership	and	structure,	as	well	as	the	severity	of	an	enterprise’s	adverse	human	rights	 impacts	 judged	according	 to	 their	 “scale,	 scope	 and	 irremediable	 character.”120	Moreover,	as	Emily	Laidlaw	has	explained,	while	operationalizing	the	corporate	responsibility	to	respect	inevitably	entails	a	degree	of	market	 disruption	 in	 order	 to	 realign	 business	 conduct	 along	human	rights-compatible	terms,	the	aim	is	“to	narrowly	tailor	the	obligations	to	minimize	disruption	beyond	the	intended	purpose	of	encouraging	human	rights	compliance.”121	1.	 The	Value	of	a	Human	Rights-Based	Approach	to	Platform	Moderation	Applied	 to	 the	 specific	 context	 of	 online	 platform	moderation,	 the	 value	 of	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 is	threefold.	 First,	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 provides	 online	platforms	 with	 an	 organizing	 framework	 to	 transform	 their	predominantly	ad	hoc	and	reactive	approaches	to	the	development	of	 platform	moderation	 policies	 towards	 a	 more	 principled	 and	
structured	 approach.122	To	 satisfy	 their	 responsibility	 to	 respect	
 117.	 UNGP,	annex	para.	12.	118.		Id.	Principle	14	&	Commentary.	119.	 LAIDLAW	supra	note	4,	at	242	(critiquing	this	concern).	120.	 	UNGP,	Principle	14	&	Commentary.	121.	 LAIDLAW,	supra	note	4,	at	242.	122.	 See	SUZOR,	supra	note	108,	at	173.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 967	human	rights,	online	platforms	are	expected	to	put	in	place	a	range	of	policies,	processes	and	procedures	appropriate	to	their	size	and	circumstances,	which	 should	 include	at	 a	minimum:	a	high-level	policy	commitment	to	meet	their	responsibility	to	respect	human	rights; 123 	a	 human	 rights	 due	 diligence	 process	 that	 identifies,	prevents,	mitigates	and	accounts	 for	actual	and	potential	human	rights	impacts	of	their	activities;124	verification	of	whether	adverse	human	 rights	 impacts	 are	 being	 addressed	 by	 tracking	 the	effectiveness	 of	 company	 responses,	 whilst	 communicating	relevant	 policies	 and	 processes	 externally	 to	 affected	stakeholders; 125 	and	 appropriate	 remediation	 of	 any	 adverse	human	rights	impacts	they	cause	or	to	which	they	contribute.126	In	this	 way,	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 offers	 a	 structured	methodology	 for	 approaching	 the	 development	 of	 platform	moderation	systems,	as	well	as	guidance	concerning	the	types	of	measures	 through	 which	 the	 responsibility	 to	 respect	 can	 be	operationalized	in	practice.127	Second,	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 also	 provides	platforms	with	the	tools	to	assess	the	actual	and	potential	human	rights	impacts	of	their	platform	moderation	rules,	processes,	and	procedures	 holistically,	 spanning	 their	 conception,	 design,	 and	testing,	their	deployment	in	different	contexts,	and	their	ongoing	monitoring	and	evaluation.128	Finally,	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 provides	 platforms	with	a	common	conceptual	language	to	identify	the	impact	of	their	moderation	rules,	processes	and	procedures	in	different	contexts	and	to	explain,	discuss,	and	justify	their	moderation	decisions	in	an	open	and	transparent	manner.129	To	this	end,	international	human	rights	 law	 establishes	 thresholds	 for	 when	 rights	 have	 been	interfered	with,	together	with	a	series	of	tests	to	determine	when	
 123.	 UNGP,	Principle	16	&	Commentary.	124.	 Id.	Principles	17-19	&	Commentary.	125.	 Id.	Principles	20-21	&	Commentary.	126.	 Id.	Principles	22,	29	&	31	and	Commentary	UNGP.	127.	 See	 McGregor,	 Murray,	 &	 Ng,	 supra	 note	 90,	 at	 313	 &	 329-35;	 Amnesty	International	&	Access	Now,	The	Toronto	Declaration:	Protecting	the	Right	to	Equality	and	
Non-discrimination	 in	 Machine	 Learning	 Systems,	 (May	 16,	 2018)	 [hereinafter	 Toronto	Declaration,	para.	42-56.	128.	 See	McGregor,	Murray,	&	Ng,	supra	note	90,	at	325,	327-28,	334.	129.	 SUZOR,	supra	note	108,	at	192.	
968	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	rights	 may	 be	 restricted. 130 	Importantly,	 international	 human	rights	law	does	not	always	dictate	a	specific	or	uniform	outcome,	but	it	provides	a	framework	and	vocabulary	for	platforms	to	assess	whether	the	human	rights	impacts	of	their	moderation	systems	are	justifiable—with	due	sensitivity	to	the	objectives	and	interests	of	the	communities	they	nurture	and	the	different	contexts	in	which	they	operate.131	2.	Limitations	and	Challenges	to	a	Human	Rights-Based	Approach	to	Platform	Moderation	Notwithstanding	its	value,	it	is	important	not	to	view	a	human	rights-based	approach	to	platform	moderation	as	a	panacea.132	In	particular,	the	approach	is	subject	to	at	least	three	limitations	and	challenges.	 First,	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 is	 not	 a	 silver	
bullet	for	alleviating	all	harms	that	arise	on	online	platforms.	Given	the	sheer	volume	of	content	moderated	by	platforms,	a	degree	of	human	and	algorithmic	error	is	unavoidable.133	Moreover,	content	moderation	 inevitably	 involves	 trade-offs	 between	 competing	rights	 and	 interests.	 As	 such,	 the	 aim	 of	 a	 human	 rights-based	approach	is	not	to	resolve	moderation	trade-offs	in	ways	that	are	attractive	 to	 everyone,	 but	 more	 modestly	 to	 reduce	 adverse	human	rights	impacts	and	more	openly	and	transparently	manage	the	trade-offs	between	the	different	rights	and	interests	inevitably	implicated	by	platform	moderation	practices.	Second,	since	the	corporate	responsibility	to	respect	is	non-binding,	there	is	also	the	challenge	of	enforcement.	While	a	human	rights-based	 approach	 can	 be	 implemented	 on	 a	 purely	 self-regulatory	basis,	it	is	likely	that	platforms	will	be	resistant	where	their	commercial	 interests	and	profitability	are	threatened.	With	this	 in	 mind,	 a	 combination	 of	 social	 pressure	 and	 smart	governmental	(co-)regulation	is	likely	to	be	required	to	assist	and	incentivize	platforms	to	ensure	the	human	rights	compatibility	of	
 130.	 McGregor,	Murray,	&	Ng,	supra	note	90,	at	326.	131.	 See	SUZOR,	supra	note	108,	at	198-201.	132.	 See	McGregor,	Murray,	&	Ng,	supra	note	90,	at	313.	133.	 See	M.	Masnick,	Impossibility	Theorem:	Content	Moderation	at	Scale	is	Impossible	
to	 do	 Well,	 TECH	 DIRT	 (Nov.	 20,	 2019),	https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20191111/23032743367/masnicks-impossibility-theorem-content-moderation-scale-is-impossible-to-do-well.shtml	[https://perma.cc/9JKU-WHSQ].	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 969	their	content	moderation	systems.	Yet,	given	the	inherent	limits	of	social	 pressure, 134 	as	 well	 as	 the	 risk	 of	 heavy-handed	governmental	 regulation, 135 	effective	 enforcement	 of	 a	 human	rights-based	approach	is	far	from	guaranteed.136	Arguably	 the	 biggest	 challenge,	 however,	 resides	 in	 the	
translation	of	general	human	rights	principles	into	particular	rules,	
processes	 and	 procedures	 tailored	 to	 the	 platform	 moderation	
context. 137 	This	 task	 is	 complicated	 by	 the	 distinct	 and	 highly	variable	 capacities	 and	 functions	 of	 platforms	 compared	 to	States,138	the	diversity	of	products	and	services	offered	by	today’s	largest	online	platforms,139	the	nascent	state	of	development	of	the	scope	and	content	of	businesses’	human	rights	responsibilities,140	and	the	difficulty	of	defining	how	platforms	should	exercise	their	pseudo-judicial	 role	 of	 weighing	 competing	 rights	 and	 interests	
 134 .	 A	 promising	 proposal	 that	 is	 currently	 gaining	 traction	 is	 the	 creation	 of	voluntary	multistakeholder	 Social	 Media	 Councils.	 See	 generally	 ARTICLE	 19,	The	 Social	
Media	Councils:	Consultation	Paper	(June	2019).	On	informal	regulation	of	online	content,	see	also	Gorwa,	supra	note	54.	135 .	 On	 the	 features	 of	 freedom	 of	 expression	 and	 online	 platforms	 that	 make	designing	 a	 legitimate	 system	of	 speech	 governance	particularly	 difficult,	 see	 generally	Douek,	Verified	Accountability:	Self-Regulation	of	Content	Moderation	as	an	Answer	to	the	
Special	Problems	of	Speech	Regulation,	Aegis	Series	Paper	No.	1903	(2019),	at	4-8;	Damien	Tambini,	 Rights	 and	 Responsibilities	 of	 Internet	 Intermediaries	 in	 Europe:	 The	 Need	 for	
Policy	 Coordination,	 CENTRE	 FOR	 INTERNATIONAL	GOVERNANCE	 INNOVATION	 (Oct.	 28,	 2019),	https://www.cigionline.org/articles/rights-and-responsibilities-internet-intermediaries-europe-need-policy-coordination	[https://perma.cc/Y5R2-HVA8].	136.	 It	is,	however,	possible	to	envisage	smart	models	of	government	regulation	in	this	 context.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Kaye	 Content	 Moderation	 Report,	 supra	 note	 10,	 at	 19	 (“smart	regulation”);	Bunting,	supra	note	8,	at	176	(“procedural	accountability”);	French	Interim	Report,	supra	note	23,	at	17	(“a	regulatory	policy	based	on	a	compliance	approach	to	be	applied	and	designed	with	pragmatism	and	agility”);	Douek,	supra	note	135,	at	8	(“a	model	of	 ‘verified	 accountability’”);	 and	 Marsden,	 Meyer,	 &	 Brown,	 ‘Platform	 Values	 and	Democratic	Elections:	How	Can	The	Law	Regulate	Digital	Disinformation’,	Computer	Law	
&	Security	Review	(forthcoming).	137.	 See	LAIDLAW,	supra	note	4,	at	233.	138.	 SUZOR,	 supra	 note	 108,	 at	 247-48	 (“There’s	 no	 easy	 answer	 yet	 about	 what	different	societies	expect	from	digital	media	platforms.	We	wouldn’t	want	even	the	largest	platforms	to	be	bound	by	the	same	rules	that	regulate	state	power”).	139.	 	 See,	 e.g.,	 Ingram,	 Talking	 with	 Former	 Facebook	 Security	 Chief	 Alex	 Stamos,	GALLERY	 BY	 CJR	 (Oct.	 2019),	 https://galley.cjr.org/public/conversations/-LsHiyaqX4DpgKDqf9Mj	[https://perma.cc/2VFM-NRDR].	(in	which	Alex	Stamos	observes	how	Facebook	“is	actually	something	like	a	dozen	different	products	strung	together”,	with	each	 product	 possessing	 “very	 different	 safety,	 security	 and	 trust	 models”	 and	 “very	different	levels	of	amplification	and	therefore	potential	for	abuse”).	140.	 McGregor,	Murray,	&	Ng,	supra	note	90,	at	313.	
970	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	across	a	wide	range	of	societal	contexts.141	The	remainder	of	 the	Article	takes	up	this	final	challenge,	exploring	some	of	the	choices	and	 hurdles	 that	 online	 platforms	 are	 likely	 to	 confront	 in	attempting	to	implement	their	corporate	responsibility	to	respect	in	the	content	moderation	context.142	
B.	 The	Substance	of	Content	Moderation	Turning	 first	 to	 the	 substance	 of	 content	 moderation,	adherence	 to	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 requires	 online	platforms	 to	 align	 their	 substantive	 moderation	 rules	 with	international	 human	 rights	 law.	 The	 practice	 of	 content	moderation	 potentially	 implicates	 a	 range	 of	 human	 rights,	including	rights	to	equality,	non-discrimination,	privacy,	and	fair	process.	 However,	 the	 right	 that	 is	 impacted	 to	 a	 particularly	significant	 extent	 in	 this	 context—and	which	 forms	 the	 focus	 of	discussion	 in	this	section—is	the	right	to	 freedom	of	expression.	Pursuant	 to	 Article	 19(2)	 of	 the	 ICCPR,	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	expression	 is	defined	 in	broad	 terms	 to	 include	 the	 freedom	 “to	seek,	 receive	 and	 impart	 information	 and	 ideas	 of	 all	 kinds,	regardless	of	frontiers,	either	orally,	 in	writing	or	in	print,	 in	the	form	 of	 art,	 or	 through	 any	 other	 media	 of	 his	 choice.” 143	Importantly,	any	restriction	of	an	individual’s	right	to	freedom	of	expression	must	 satisfy	 the	 tripartite	 test	 of	 legality,	 legitimacy,	and	necessity	set	out	in	Article	19(3)	of	the	ICCPR.	Applying	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 in	 practice,	 these	provisions	should	be	at	the	center	of	platform	moderation	policies.	As	David	Kaye	has	argued,	online	platforms	 “should	 incorporate	directly	 into	 their	 terms	 of	 service	 and	 ‘community	 standards’	relevant	 principles	 of	 human	 rights	 law	 that	 ensure	 content-related	actions	will	be	guided	by	 the	 same	standards	of	 legality,	necessity	 and	 legitimacy	 that	 bind	 State	 regulation	 of	expression.” 144 	Yet,	 while	 the	 tests	 of	 legality,	 legitimacy,	 and	necessity	are	 relatively	 simple	 to	elaborate	 in	 the	abstract,	 their	
 141.	 LAIDLAW,	supra	note	4,	at	112	&	243-44.	142.	 See	 also	 Evelyn	Mary	Aswad,	The	 Future	 of	 Freedom	of	 Expression	Online,	 17	
Duke	L.	&	Tech.	Rev.	26	(2019);	Council	of	Europe,	‘Recommendation	CM/Rec	(2018)2	of	the	Committee	of	Ministers	to	Member	States	on	the	Role	and	Responsibilities	of	Internet	Intermediaries’,	7	Mar.	2018,	at	Appendix,	para.	2.	143.	 Article	19(2)	ICCPR.	144.	 Kaye	Content	Moderation	Report,	supra	note	10,	para.	45.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 971	translation	 from	 the	 State	 to	 the	 corporate	 context	 of	 platform	moderation	is	likely	to	pose	a	number	of	challenges	in	practice.	1.	Legality	Arguably	the	simplest	condition	to	translate	to	the	platform	moderation	 context	 is	 the	 requirement	 that	 restrictions	 on	 the	right	 to	 freedom	of	 expression	must	 be	 “provided	 by	 law.”145	In	General	 Comment	 No.	 34,	 the	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Committee	(“HRC”)	 confirmed	 that	 restrictions	 on	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	expression	 should	 be	 “formulated	 with	 sufficient	 precision	 to	enable	 an	 individual	 to	 regulate	his	 or	her	 conduct	 accordingly”	and	 “made	 accessible	 to	 the	 public.”146	Additionally,	 “unfettered	discretion”	 should	 not	 be	 conferred	 on	 those	 charged	 with	executing	restrictions	of	 freedom	of	expression,	while	 “sufficient	guidance”	should	be	provided	to	enable	such	persons	to	determine	“what	sorts	of	expression	are	properly	restricted	and	what	sorts	are	not.”147	Although	platforms	are	not	empowered	to	make	formal	laws,	there	are	a	range	of	actions	that	online	platforms	could	adopt	to	align	their	content	moderation	rules	with	these	standards.	In	terms	of	accessibility,	platforms	could	clearly	alert	users	to	the	existence	of	their	terms	of	service	and	community	standards	documents	both	upon	registration	and	during	general	use	of	their	platforms.	Platforms	could	also	ensure	such	documents	are	easy	to	find	on	their	sites	and	available	in	different	languages	in	line	with	their	 global	 reach.	 In	 addition,	 platforms	 could	 maintain	 an	accessible	 public	 archive	 of	 former	 versions	 of	 the	 moderation	rules	and	ensure	users	are	notified	of	any	updates	to	their	policies	as	well	as	the	reasons	for	such	changes.148	With	 respect	 to	 precision,	 today’s	 leading	 online	 platforms	already	elaborate	on	the	different	categories	of	content	that	will	be	subject	 to	 moderation,	 often	 developing	 distinct	 standards	 for	general	 user-generated	 content	 and	 promoted	 content	 such	 as	
 145.	 Article	19(3)	ICCPR.	146.	 UN	Human	Rights	Committee,	General	Comment	No.	34:	Article	19:	Freedom	of	opinion	 and	 expression,	 U.N.	 Doc.	 CCPR/C/GC/34,	 12	 Sept.	 2011	 [hereinafter	 General	Comment	No.	34],	para.	25.	147.	 Id.	148.	 A	Rights-Respecting	Model	of	Online	Regulation	by	Platforms,	GLOBAL	PARTNERS	DIGITAL	 (May	 2018),	 https://www.gp-digital.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/A-rights-respecting-model-of-online-content-regulation-by-platforms.pdf	[https://perma.cc/BY2Y-7GJ9].	
972	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	advertising.	As	noted	earlier	in	the	Article,	however,	concerns	have	arisen	 that	 such	 policies	 often	 lack	 clarity	 and	 specificity.	Responding	to	these	concerns,	platforms	could	improve	the	level	of	 detail	 provided	 with	 respect	 to	 categories	 of	 problematic	content	by	producing	more	detailed	guidance	notes	to	accompany	their	moderation	rules,	as	well	as	elaborating	real	or	hypothetical	examples	and	case	studies	to	illustrate	how	such	rules	are	applied	in	 practice. 149 	Beyond	 precision	 concerning	 the	 substance	 of	moderation	 rules,	 platforms	 could	 also	 provide	 clearer	information	concerning	how	content	is	flagged,	the	different	forms	of	 stakeholder	 engagement	 conducted	 as	 part	 of	 the	 process	 of	formulating	particular	rules,	the	range	of	response	measures	that	may	be	implemented	when	different	types	of	content	are	found	to	be	 in	 violation	 of	 community	 standards	 (for	 example,	 filtering,	blocking,	 removal,	 deprioritization,	 demonetization,	 and/or	suspension	or	termination	of	accounts),	as	well	as	any	review	and	grievance	procedures	that	are	available	to	users.	Twitter’s	 recent	 update	 concerning	 when	 tweets	 will	 be	allowed	to	remain	on	the	platform	despite	violating	the	platform’s	rules	 because	 they	 are	 deemed	 to	 be	 in	 “the	 public	 interest”	provides	 a	 clear	 example	 of	 how	 a	 platform	 can	 improve	 the	precision	 of	 its	 moderation	 policies	 in	 practice. 150 	The	 update	includes	details	concerning	who	the	policy	applies	to,	what	criteria	will	be	used	to	define	the	public	interest	(including,	for	example,	the	 immediacy	 and	 severity	 of	 potential	 harm	 from	 the	 rule	violation),	as	well	as	what	action	will	be	taken	in	response	to	such	tweets	(including,	for	example,	placing	a	notice	on	such	tweets	to	provide	 additional	 context	 and	 clarity).	 The	 update	 brings	welcome	detail	to	a	policy	that	has	traditionally	been	shrouded	in	mystery.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 since	 the	 criteria	 used	 to	 define	 the	public	interest	will	often	require	difficult	judgments,	Twitter	could	further	align	its	policies	with	the	standards	required	by	the	legality	
 149.	 Kaye	Content	Moderation	Report,	supra	note	10,	at	15;	GLOBAL	PARTNERS	DIGITAL,	
supra	note	148,	at	16.	150.		Twitter	Safety,	Defining	Public	Interest	on	Twitter,	TWITTER	BLOG	(June	27,	2019),	https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/publicinterest.html	[https://perma.cc/NS9G-FVRF].	For	an	additional	example	 concerning	 the	alignment	of	platform	policies	 on	hate	 speech	with	 the	 legality	 standard	under	 international	 human	rights	law,	see	generally	Report	of	the	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Promotion	and	Protection	of	 the	 Right	 to	 Freedom	 of	 Opinion	 and	 Expression,	 UN	 Doc	 A/74/486,	 Oct.	 9,	 2019	[hereinafter	Kaye	Hate	Speech	Report],	para.	4-28	&	46-50.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 973	test	 by	 accompanying	 these	 criteria	with	 case	 studies	 to	 further	assist	users	to	understand	how	the	policy	is	applied	in	practice.	2.	Legitimacy	Article	19(3)	of	the	ICCPR	also	provides	that	any	restriction	of	the	right	 to	 freedom	of	expression	must	pursue	one	of	a	 limited	number	 of	 legitimate	 aims,	 namely:	 respect	 for	 the	 rights	 or	reputations	 of	 others;	 the	 protection	 of	 national	 security;	 the	protection	of	public	order;	the	protection	of	public	health;	or	the	protection	of	public	morals.	According	to	the	UN	HRC,	“restrictions	must	 be	 applied	 only	 for	 those	 purposes	 for	 which	 they	 were	prescribed	 and	must	 be	 directly	 related	 to	 the	 specific	 need	 on	which	they	are	predicated.”151	There	 are	 also	 certain	 exceptional	 types	 of	 expression	 that	States	are	required	to	prohibit	under	international	law.152	Article	20	of	the	ICCPR,	for	example,	establishes	an	obligation	to	prohibit	propaganda	 for	 war	 and	 any	 advocacy	 of	 national,	 racial	 or	religious	 hatred	 that	 constitutes	 incitement	 to	 discrimination,	hostility	 or	 violence—a	 prohibition	 which,	 according	 to	 the	 UN	Special	Rapporteur	on	Freedom	of	Opinion	and	Expression,	should	be	understood	 to	 apply	 to	 a	 broader	 set	 of	 protected	 categories	now	 covered	 under	 international	 human	 rights	 law,	 including	“race,	 colour,	 sex,	 language,	 religion,	 political	 or	 other	 opinion,	national	or	social	origin,	property,	birth	or	other	status,	including	indigenous	origin	or	identity,	disability,	migrant	or	refugee	status,	sexual	orientation,	gender	 identity	or	 intersex	status.”153	Beyond	the	ICCPR,	Article	4	of	the	Convention	on	the	Elimination	of	Racial	Discrimination	 establishes	 an	 obligation	 to	 prohibit	 all	dissemination	of	 ideas	based	on	racial	superiority	or	hatred	and	incitement	 to	 racial	 discrimination,	 while	 Article	 3(1)	 of	 the	
 151.	 General	Comment	No.	34,	supra	note	146,	para.	22.	152.	 See	generally	Report	of	the	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Promotion	and	Protection	of	 the	 Right	 to	 Freedom	 of	 Opinion	 and	 Expression,	 UN	 Doc	 A/66/290,	 10	 Aug.	 2011	[hereinafter	La	Rue	Report],	para.	20-36.	153.	 Kaye	Hate	Speech	Report,	 supra	 note	150,	para.	 9.	See	also	 Van	Ho,	Twitter’s	
Responsibility	 to	 suspend	Trump’s,	 and	Rouhani’s,	 Accounts,	 Part	 1,	OPINIO	 JURIS	 (Jan.	 21,	2010),	 https://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/21/twitters-responsibility-to-suspend-trumps-and-rouhanis-accounts-part-1/	 [https://perma.cc/HK5Z-V2TH];	 Van	 Ho,	 Twitter’s	
Responsibility	 to	Suspend	Trump’s,	 and	Rouhani’s,	Accounts,	Part	2,	OPINIO	 JURIS	 (Jan.	21,	2020),	 https://www.newsbreak.com/news/0Nu8Hwu2/twitters-responsibility-to-suspend-trumps-and-rouhanis-accounts-part-2	[https://perma.cc/UZ68-VDAN].	
974	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	Optional	Protocol	to	the	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	on	the	 sale	 of	 children,	 child	 prostitution	 and	 child	 pornography	establishes	an	obligation	 to	prohibit	 the	production,	distribution	and	 dissemination	 of	 child	 pornography.	 In	 addition,	 Security	Council	 resolution	1624	(2005)	calls	upon	States	 to	“prohibit	by	law	 incitement	 to	 commit	 a	 terrorist	 act	 or	 acts,”	 while	 certain	forms	 of	 expression	 are	 also	 prohibited	 under	 international	criminal	law	including,	for	example,	direct	and	public	incitement	to	commit	genocide.154	Applied	to	the	platform	moderation	context,	two	implications	flow	from	these	provisions.155	First,	platforms	should	prohibit	the	same	exceptional	and	narrowly-defined	forms	of	expression	that	States	 are	 required	 to	 prohibit	 under	 international	 law.	Importantly,	 since	 the	prohibition	of	 these	 categories	of	 content	amount	to	restrictions	on	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression,	their	prohibition	 must	 comply	 with	 the	 tripartite	 test	 of	 legality,	legitimacy,	and	necessity	set	out	in	Article	19(3)	of	the	ICCPR.156	A	particular	challenge	in	this	regard	resides	in	defining	these	forms	of	 expression,	 several	 of	 which	 –	 such	 as	 incitement	 to	 commit	terrorism	 –	 have	 been	 subject	 to	 conflicting	 guidance	 and	interpretation.157	The	 importance	of	 this	challenge	should	not	be	understated:	if	platforms	define	these	categories	too	broadly,	they	risk	removing	content	beyond	what	is	necessary	in	pursuance	of	a	legitimate	aim;	by	contrast,	if	platforms	define	these	categories	too	narrowly,	 they	 risk	 nurturing	 dangerous	 online	 environments.	 I	return	to	this	challenge	below	in	the	context	of	examining	the	test	of	necessity.	Second,	 a	 platform	 should	 only	 restrict	 other	 categories	 of	content	provided	such	restrictions	are	in	pursuance	of	at	least	one	
 154.	 See	 generally	 GREGORY	 S.	 GORDON,	 ATROCITY	 SPEECH	 LAW:	 FOUNDATION,	FRAGMENTATION,	FRUITION	(2017).	155.	 	See	GLOBAL	PARTNERS	DIGITAL,	supra	note	148,	at	16-17	156.	 La	Rue	Report,	supra	note	152,	para.	37;	General	Comment	No.	34,	supra	note	146,	 para.	 50-52.	 See,	 however,	 OSCE	 Representative	 on	 Freedom	 of	 the	 Media,	
Propaganda	and	Freedom	of	the	Media,	Non-Paper	(2015),	at	15-17	(arguing	that	freedom	of	expression	under	the	ICCPR	“should	be	interpreted	as	not	 including	war	propaganda	and	hate	speech	that	constitutes	incitement	to	discrimination,	hostility	or	violence”);	Van	Ho,	Part	2,	supra	note	153	(“The	ICCPR’s	Article	20	prohibition	stands	in	contrast	to	the	ICCPR’s	Article	19(3)	balancing	 terms	 for	 freedom	of	 expression	 generally	because	 the	international	 community	 has	 determined	 that	 propaganda	 for	 war	 serves	 no	 public	interest	and	cannot	be	favourably	balanced”).	157.	 	La	Rue	Report,	supra	note	152,	para.	20-36.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 975	of	the	legitimate	aims	elaborated	in	Article	19(3).	The	prospect	of	applying	 this	 test	 in	 the	platform	moderation	 context	has	 led	 to	questions	concerning	the	appropriateness	of	requiring	platforms	to	 justify	 their	 online	 content	 restrictions	 solely	 on	 the	 limited	public	 interest	 grounds	 recognized	 under	 Article	 19(3). 158	Although	understandable,	such	concerns	should	not	be	overstated.	It	is	true	that	companies	are	not	well-placed	to	assess	threats	to	 “national	 security”	or	 “public	order”—grounds	 that	 should	be	relied	 upon	 by	 platforms	 only	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 legal	 orders	 from	States,	which	themselves	are	subject	to	the	tripartite	test	set	out	in	Article	 19(3). 159 	Nonetheless,	 many	 of	 the	 most	 common	categories	 of	 content	 restricted	 by	 online	 platforms	 correspond	with	little	difficulty	to	at	least	one	of	the	legitimate	aims	elaborated	in	 Article	 19(3). 160 	As	 David	 Kaye	 has	 observed,	 human	 rights	standards	 “would	 justify	 taking	 action	 against	 anti-vaccination	sites	that	harm	public	health,	white	supremacists	who	incite	harm	of	others,	and	terrorist	groups	like	ISIS	that	use	platforms	to	extend	their	violence.”161	In	 addition,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 the	 legitimate	 aim	 of	 “the	rights	 of	 others”	 can	 afford	 platforms	 sufficient	 leeway	 to	 tailor	their	moderation	 policies	 to	 the	 different	 communities	 they	 are	designed	to	serve.162	In	particular,	reliance	on	the	legitimate	aim	of	“the	rights	of	others”	would	enable	a	platform	to	examine	whether	restrictions	 on	 freedom	 of	 expression	 are	 necessary	 to	 create	positive	 and	 supportive	 spaces	 that	 nurture	 the	 freedom	 of	expression	of	specific	categories	of	users	(for	example,	children	or	those	with	mental	health	issues),163	to	protect	the	rights	of	users	to	privacy	and	security,164	or	even	simply	to	create	particular	online	experiences	 (for	 example,	 designing	 a	 platform	 for	 sharing	 dog	
 158.	 Aswad,	supra	note	142,	at	52-56.	159.	 Kaye	Hate	Speech	Report,	supra	note	150,	para.	47(b).	160.	 GLOBAL	PARTNERS	DIGITAL,	supra	note	148,	at	16-17.	161.	 David	 Kaye,	 The	 Clash	 Over	 Regulating	 Online	 Speech,	 SLATE	 (June	 6,	 2019),	https://slate.com/technology/2019/06/social-media-companies-online-speech-america-europe-world.html	[https://perma.cc/KG9F-QDJ3].	162.	 See	 General	 Comment	 No.	 34,	 supra	 note	 146,	 para.	 28	 (“the	 term	 “rights”	includes	human	rights	as	recognized	in	the	Covenant	and	more	generally	in	international	human	rights	law”).	163.	 GLOBAL	PARTNERS	DIGITAL,	 supra	 note	 148,	 at	 17.	 See	 also	 KATE	 JONES,	 ONLINE	DISINFORMATION	 AND	 POLITICAL	 DISCOURSE:	 APPLYING	 A	 HUMAN	 RIGHTS	 FRAMEWORK	 29,	 46	(2019).	164.	 Kaye,	supra	note	73,	at	120.	
976	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	photos	to	the	exclusion	of	photos	related	to	other	pets)	as	part	of	the	 platform’s	 entrepreneurial	 freedom	 to	 design,	 innovate,	 and	conduct	 a	 business—the	 latter	 freedom	 falling	 within	 the	platform’s	right	to	property	and	freedom	of	expression.165	At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 emphasize	 that	 the	legitimate	aim	of	“the	rights	of	others”	is	not	unlimited:	 it	would	not	 justify	 the	 establishment	 of	 platforms	 designed	 to	 serve	communities	whose	purpose	is	to	share	content	prohibited	under	international	 human	 rights	 law,	 such	 as	 revenge	 porn	 or	 racist	sites.	Moreover,	the	legitimate	aim	of	“the	rights	of	others”	remains	subject	to	the	test	of	necessity,	which,	as	the	next	section	explains,	generally	 requires	 a	 careful	 contextually-informed	 balancing	 of	different	 rights	and	 interests.	 In	practice,	 therefore,	 the	 trickiest	challenge	for	platforms	seeking	to	align	their	substantive	content	moderation	rules	with	human	rights	standards	will	not	generally	reside	 in	 identifying	 a	 relevant	 legitimate	 aim,	 but	 rather	 in	weighing	 and	 balancing	 competing	 rights	 and	 interests	 in	accordance	with	 the	 final	 requirement	 under	Article	 19(3)—the	test	of	necessity.	
 165.	 See,	 e.g.,	Magyar	 Tartalomszolgáltatók	 Egyesülete	 &	 Index.hu	 ZRT	 v.	 Hungary,	HUDOC,	 at	 10	 (2016),	 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-160314	[https://perma.cc/E6EQ-YFYD]	(referring	to	a	company’s	right	to	freedom	of	expression);	Rep.	of	the	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Promotion	&	Protection	of	the	Right	to	Freedom	of	Opinion	 &	 Expression	 on	 Its	 Thirty-Second	 Session,	 U.N.	 Doc.	 A/HRC/32/38,	 para.	 55	(2016)	 (“[i]t	 remains	 an	open	question	how	 freedom	of	 expression	 concerns	 raised	by	design	and	engineering	choices	should	be	reconciled	with	the	freedom	of	private	entities	to	design	and	customize	their	platforms	as	they	choose.”).	See	also	WOLFGANG	BENEDEK	&	MATTHIAS	KETTEMANN,	FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	AND	THE	INTERNET	106	(2013)	(referring	to	“the	right	to	property	and	the	right	to	keep	privately	owned	social	networks	private	and	subject	 only	 to	 terms	of	 service”);	Nicolas	 Suzor,	The	Role	 of	 the	Rule	 of	 Law	 in	Virtual	
Communities,	25	BERKELEY	TECH.	L.	J.	1817,	1853-54	(2010)	(referring	to	“the	free	speech	interests	 of	 the	 providers”);	 Rikke	 Frank	 Jørgensen	 and	 Anja	 Møller	 Pedersen,	 Online	
Service	 Providers	 as	 Human	 Rights	 Arbiters,	 in	 THE	 RESPONSIBILITIES	 OF	 ONLINE	 SERVICE	PROVIDERS	179,	183	(2017)	(referring	 to	 “the	 freedom	of	 the	 intermediary	 to	conduct	a	business	(provide	internet	services)”);	Jack	Balkin,	Virtual	Liberty:	Freedom	to	Design	and	
Freedom	 to	 Play	 in	 Virtual	Worlds,	 90	 VA.	 L.	 REV.	2043,	 2080	 (2004)	 (referring	 to	 “the	platform	owner’s	constitutional	right	to	design”);	French	Interim	Report,	supra	note	23,	at	19	 (recognizing	 social	networks’	 entrepreneurial	 freedom,	 including	 the	 right	 to	define	and	apply	terms	of	use,	 to	exercise	an	unrestricted	 information	ordering	system	and	to	innovate	(especially	for	smaller	operators).	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 977	3.	Necessity	Article	19(3)	of	the	ICCPR	also	provides	that	restrictions	on	the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 expression	must	 be	 “necessary”	 for	 the	achievement	of	at	 least	one	of	 the	prescribed	 legitimate	aims.166	According	 to	 the	UN	HRC,	 the	concept	of	necessity	 requires	 that	restrictions	 on	 freedom	 of	 expression	 “not	 be	 overbroad,”	 but	rather	 represent	 “the	 least	 intrusive	 instrument	 amongst	 those	which	 might	 achieve	 their	 protective	 function.” 167 	In	 addition,	necessity	requires	“demonstrat[ing]	in	specific	and	individualized	fashion	 the	 precise	 nature	 of	 the	 threat,	 and	 the	 necessity	 and	proportionality	 of	 the	 specific	 action	 taken,	 in	 particular	 by	establishing	 a	 direct	 and	 immediate	 connection	 between	 the	expression	 and	 the	 threat.” 168 	In	 practice,	 the	 test	 of	 necessity	generally	 requires	 a	 context-sensitive	 balancing	 of	 competing	rights	 and	 interests. 169 	However,	 applying	 the	 balancing	assessments	 conducted	 in	 existing	 human	 rights	 caselaw	 to	 the	platform	moderation	context	is	complicated	for	two	reasons.	First,	 although	 a	 variety	 of	 sources	may	 assist	 platforms	 in	applying	 the	 test	 of	 necessity—including	 the	 concluding	observations,	 commentaries	 and	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 UN	 treaty	bodies,	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 international,	 regional	 and	national	courts,	as	well	as	reports	produced	by	UN	Special	Rapporteurs	and	civil	society	groups—the	guidance	produced	by	these	sources	has	not	always	been	clear	or	consistent.	For	example,	Article	20(2)	of	the	ICCPR—which,	it	will	be	recalled,	obliges	States	to	prohibit	any	advocacy	 of	 national,	 racial	 or	 religious	 hatred	 that	 constitutes	incitement	 to	 discrimination,	 hostility	 or	 violence—has	 been	subject	 to	 reservations	 issued	 by	 numerous	 States,	 divergent	implementation	 in	 domestic	 law	 and	 practice,	 as	 well	 as	
 166.	 Article	19(3),	ICCPR	167.	 General	Comment	No.	34,	supra	note	146,	para.	34.	168.	 Id.	para.	35.	169.	 See,	e.g.,	Magyar	Tartalomszolgáltatók	Egyesülete	and	Index.hu	ZRT	v.	Hungary,	HUDOC,	 para.	 58	 (2016),	 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-160314	[https://perma.cc/JDE9-3G3Y]	 (observing	 that	 the	 Court	may	 be	 required	 to	 ascertain	whether	the	domestic	authorities	have	struck	“a	fair	balance”	when	protecting	two	values	guaranteed	by	 the	Convention	which	may	come	 into	conflict	with	each	other	 in	certain	cases).	See	also	Equality	&	Hum.	Rts.	Comm’n,	Guidance	–	Legal	Framework:	Freedom	of	
Expression,	 at	 6	 (2015),	https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/20150318_foe_legal_framework_guidance_revised_final.pdf	[https://perma.cc/9359-JKP9].	
978	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	inconsistent	 interpretation	 within	 international	 and	 regional	jurisprudence. 170 	Where	 such	 disagreement	 exists,	 platforms	should	be	afforded	greater	 leeway	 to	determine	 the	appropriate	way	 to	 apply	 the	 relevant	 standards	 within	 their	 community	standards,	 giving	 due	 consideration	 to	 the	 diversity	 of	 guidance	available	and	the	different	contexts	in	which	the	platform	operates,	whilst	 also	 taking	 care	 so	 far	 as	 feasible	 to	 consult	 with	 local	stakeholders.171	Second,	 even	 where	 guidance	 is	 clear	 and	 consistent,	transplanting	assessments	of	necessity	from	existing	human	rights	case	law	to	the	platform	moderation	context	is	also	complicated	by	the	 distinct	 and	 variable	 capacities	 and	 functions	 of	 online	platforms	compared	to	States,	as	well	as	the	diversity	of	contexts	in	 which	 platforms	 operate. 172 	Moreover,	 since	 certain	 larger	platforms,	such	as	Facebook,	offer	a	number	of	different	services	(for	example,	enabling	users	not	only	to	post	but	also	to	promote	and	 amplify	 their	 content	 through	 advertising)	 and	 manage	 a	diversity	 of	 spaces	 (for	 example,	 the	 news	 feed,	 public	 pages,	 a	
 170.	 See	generally	Rabat	Plan	of	Action	on	the	Prohibition	of	Advoc.	of	Nat’l,	Racial	or	Religious	Hatred	 that	Constitutes	 Incitement	 to	Discrimination,	Hostility	or	Violence,	at	Appendix,	 U.N.	 Doc.	 A/HRC/22/17/Add.4,	 (2012)	 [hereinafter	 Rabat	 Plan	 of	 Action];	ARTICLE	 19,	 Hate	 Speech	 Explained:	 A	 Toolkit,	 at	 70-75,	 (2015),		https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38231/'Hate-Speech'-Explained---A-Toolkit-%282015-Edition%29.pdf	[https://perma.cc/27Q6-GHX9];	see	generally	Amal	Clooney	&	Philippa	Webb,	The	Right	to	Insult	in	International	Law,	48	COLUM.	HUM.	RTS.	L.	REV.	 1	 (2017);	 Catherine	 O’Regan,	 Hate	 Speech	 Online:	 An	 (Intractable)	 Contemporary	
Challenge?,	71	CURRENT	LEGAL	PROBS.	403,	407	(2018).	171.	 See	also	LAIDLAW,	supra	note	4,	at	241;	Evelyn	Aswad,	The	Role	of	U.S.	Technology	
Companies	as	Enforcers	of	Europe’s	New	Internet	Hate	Speech	Ban,	COLUM.	HUM.	RTS.	L.	REV.	ONLINE	1,	13	(2016)	http://hrlr.law.columbia.edu/hrlr-online/the-role-of-u-s-technology-companies-as-enforcers-of-europes-new-internet-hate-speech-ban/	[https://perma.cc/KS3V-YNCB]	(arguing	 that,	 for	 the	purpose	of	adhering	 to	 the	UNGP,	technology	companies	should	adhere	to	international	human	rights	standards	under	the	ICCPR	rather	than	regional	human	rights	standards).	172.	 See	also,	Nicolas	Suzor,	supra	note	165,	at	1865	(“It	is	not	possible	to	provide	any	 definitive	 answers	 as	 to	 which	 values	 should	 be	 read	 into	 virtual	 community	governance	structures…	The	exact	content	and	boundaries	of	any	such	limits	will	always	be	 highly	 contextual”);	 Patrick	 Leerssen,	 Cut	 Out	 by	 The	 Middle	 Man:	 The	 Free	 Speech	
Implications	of	Social	Network	Blocking	and	Banning	In	The	EU,	6	J.	INTELL.	PROP.	INFO.	TECH.	&	 ELECTRONIC	 COM.	 L.	 99,	 112	 (2015)	 (arguing	 that	 the	 balance	 between	 a	 ground	 for	removing	content	and	the	end	user’s	free	speech	rights	“requires	a	different	calculus	than	that	which	is	applied	to	state	interference…”);	JONES,	supra	note	163,	at	30	(“Establishing	how	existing	norms	apply	in	new	contexts	is	likely	to	be	contested,	and	reaching	settled	views	 takes	 time	 whether	 it	 is	 done	 through	 expert	 opinion,	 through	 the	 drafting	 of	normative	guidance,	through	state	negotiation	or	litigation”).		
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 979	variety	 of	 groups,	 and	 personal	 profiles),	 the	 assessment	 of	whether	a	restriction	is	necessary	may	vary	across	the	services	and	spaces	operated	within	the	same	platform.173	Notwithstanding	the	complexity	of	the	task,	it	is	nonetheless	possible	to	identify	a	number	of	general	principles	within	existing	human	 rights	 jurisprudence	 that	may	 assist	 online	 platforms	 in	applying	 the	 test	 of	 necessity	 in	 practice.	 The	 following	 is	 not	intended	 to	 be	 exhaustive.	 Rather,	 the	 aim	 is	 to	 illustrate	 the	different	types	of	considerations	that	platforms	should	consider	in	applying	the	test	of	necessary	in	the	platform	moderation	context.	a.	 Local	Context	First,	assessments	of	necessity	require	careful	consideration	of	 various	 dimensions	 of	 the	 local	 context	 where	 the	 content	 is	
transmitted,	 including	 both	 the	 timing	 and	 location	 of	 the	expression.	In	Kim	Jong-Cheol	v.	Republic	of	Korea,	for	example,	the	UN	HRC	confirmed	that	it	might	be	legitimate	for	a	State	to	restrict	the	publication	of	political	polling	for	a	limited	period	in	advance	of	 an	 election	 in	 order	 to	maintain	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 electoral	process.174	In	reaching	this	conclusion,	the	UN	HRC	expressly	took	into	account	“the	recent	historical	specificities	of	 the	democratic	political	 processes”	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	 Korea,	 including	 the	vulnerability	 of	 its	 election	 culture	 and	 climate	 to	 political	manipulation	 and	 irregularities.175	In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 David	 Kaye	has	emphasized	 the	 importance	of	 contextual	 considerations	 for	determining	 whether	 an	 expression	 constitutes	 incitement	 to	hatred,	 including	 factors	 such	 as	 “the	 existence	 of	 patterns	 of	tension	 between	 religious	 or	 racial	 communities,	 discrimination	against	the	targeted	group,	the	tone	and	content	of	the	speech,	the	person	 inciting	 hatred,	 and	 the	 means	 of	 disseminating	 the	expression	of	hate.”176	Applied	 to	platform	moderation,	 these	 findings	suggest	 that	platforms	should	consider	whether	certain	restrictions	may	only	
 173.	 See	Ingram,	supra	note	139.	174 .	 Kim	 Jong-Cheol	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Korea,	 Hum.	 	 Rts.	 Committee,	 Comm.	 No.	968/2001,	U.N.	Doc.	CCPR/C84/D/968/2001,	para.	8.3	(2005).	175.	 Id.	176.	 Rep.	of	 the	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Promotion	&	Protection	of	the	Right	to	Freedom	of	Opinion	&	Expression	on	Its	Sixty-Seventh	Session,	UN	Doc	A/67/357,	para.	46	(2012).	See	also	Rabat	Plan	of	Action,	supra	note	170,	para.	29.	
980	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	be	necessary	during	certain	periods	of	time	and	how	restrictions	should	apply	in	particular	contexts,	having	due	regard	for	social,	historical,	cultural	and	linguistic	nuance	as	far	as	possible.177	In	the	latter	regard,	 it	 is	notable	 that	Samidh	Chakrabarti,	a	director	of	product	management	at	Facebook,	recently	confirmed	that	a	key	challenge	for	the	company	is	“how	not	to	think	of	our	platforms	as	one	thing	that’s	the	same	across	the	world,	but	how	should	they	be	different	 in	 different	 regions	 to	 try	 to	mitigate	 […]	 risks.”178	To	meet	this	challenge,	platforms	should	engage	–	so	far	as	possible	in	light	of	their	of	size	and	circumstances—	with	local	stakeholders	to	assist	in	the	development	of	their	content	moderation	rules,	as	well	as	any	accompanying	guidelines	for	their	interpretation	in	the	different	contexts	in	which	they	operate.179	b.	 Platform	Characteristics	Second,	assessments	of	necessity	also	require	consideration	of	 the	means	used	 to	 transmit	 the	expression,	 taking	 into	account	both	the	purpose	of	the	expression	and	its	intended	audience.	In	the	case	of	Jersild	v.	Denmark,	for	example,	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	concluded	that	Denmark	had	violated	a	journalist’s	right	 to	 freedom	of	 expression	by	 convicting	him	 for	 aiding	 and	abetting	the	dissemination	of	racist	remarks	through	the	broadcast	of	a	programme	that	 included	an	item	on	young	extremists.180	In	reaching	 this	 conclusion,	 the	 Court	 had	 regard	 not	 only	 to	 the	manner	in	which	the	feature	had	been	prepared	and	its	contents	but	also	the	purpose	of	the	program	and	the	setting	in	which	it	was	broadcast,	including	the	fact	that	“the	item	was	broadcast	as	part	
 177.	 See	 AccessNow,	 supra	 note	 109,	 at	 7	 (“Companies	 should	 not	 apply	 content	moderation	 rules	 in	 a	 “one	 size	 fits	 all”	 fashion…	 [but]	 should	 take	 social,	 cultural	 and	linguistic	nuance	into	account,	as	much	as	possible.”);	ARTICLE	19,	supra	note	134,	at	13	(“A	degree	of	variation	is	 inherent	to	 international	human	rights	 law	.	.	.	 fundamental	rights	are	 general	 principles,	 they	 are	 standards,	 and	 when	 they	 are	 translated	 into	 actual	detailed	 rules	 through	 (judicial)	 approaches,	 there	 is	 unavoidably	 a	 certain	 margin	 of	manoeuvre	that	comes	into	play.”).	178.	 David	Ingram,	Facebook’s	New	Rapid	Response	Team	has	a	Crucial	Task:	Avoid	
Fueling	 Another	 Genocide,	 NBC	 NEWS,	 (June	 20,	 2019),	https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-s-new-rapid-response-team-has-crucial-task-avoid-n1019821	[https://perma.cc/9UUU-ESAR].	Cf.	Keller,	supra	note	56,	at	8	(discussing	“platforms’	operational	preference	for	a	single	set	of	rules”).	179.	 AccessNow,	supra	note	109,	at	7.	180.		Jersild	v.	Denmark,	HUDOC,	para.	37	(1994),	http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57891[https://perma.cc/N8PF-59RX].	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 981	of	a	serious	Danish	news	programme	and	was	intended	for	a	well-informed	audience.”181	Translated	to	the	platform	moderation	context,	these	findings	suggest	 that	 the	 test	 of	 necessity	 should	 be	 applied	 with	 due	sensitivity	to	the	function	of	a	platform	and	the	size	and	nature	of	the	 community	 it	 serves.182	For	 example,	 a	 human	 rights-based	approach	would	 afford	 leeway	 to	 platforms	 to	 implement	more	restrictive	 moderation	 rules	 where	 necessary	 to	 create	 virtual	spaces	 specifically	 designed	 to	 nurture	 and	 protect	 particular	communities	 (for	 example,	 restricting	 content	 that	 could	 trigger	anxiety	or	panic	amongst	users	of	a	platform	designed	 for	 those	with	 mental	 health	 problems)	 or	 to	 establish	 particular	 online	experiences	(for	example,	restricting	photos	of	cats	on	a	platform	designed	 solely	 for	 sharing	 and	 discussing	 photos	 of	 dogs)	provided	 doing	 so	 does	 not	 generate	 disproportionate	 adverse	human	rights	impacts	within	and/or	beyond	the	platform.183	By	 contrast,	 where	 an	 online	 platform	 functions	 as	 a	more	general	space	for	the	free	exchange	of	ideas—particularly	one	that	has	 become	 a	 dominant	 and	 essential	 channel	 for	 public	communication	due	to	a	dearth	of	viable	alternative	platforms	that	command	similar	network	effects—the	application	of	the	necessity	test	will	generally	require	a	more	nuanced	approach.184	For	these	
 181.	 Id.	para.	30-37.	182.	 See	Balkin,	supra	note	165,	at	2080	(“Everything	depends	on	the	nature	of	the	virtual	 space	 that	 the	 platform	 owner	 has	 created”);	 Suzor,	 supra	 note	 165,	 at	 1852	(referring	to	the	importance	of	“a	thorough	examination	of	the	circumstances	and	social	structure	of	the	particular	community”).	183 .	 See	 also	 GLOBAL	 PARTNERS	 DIGITAL,	 supra	 note	 148,	 at	 17	 (“there	 may	 be	situations	where	platforms	have	been	(or	may	be)	developed	for	a	specific	purpose,	or	for	a	particular	 community,	which	needs	 restrictions	on	 certain	 content	 to	ensure	 that	 the	platform	can	meet	the	 legitimate	needs	of	 its	users”);	York	&	McSherry,	supra	note	109	(“smaller	platforms	dedicated	to	serving	specific	communities	may	want	to	take	a	more	aggressive	 approach.	 That’s	 fine,	 as	 long	 as	 Internet	 users	 have	 a	 range	 of	meaningful	options	with	which	to	engage”).	184.	 The	relevance	of	a	platform’s	dominance	finds	support	in	the	jurisprudence	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	which	has	circumscribed	the	obligations	of	States	to	respect	 and	 ensure	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	of	 expression	 in	 a	 range	of	 contexts	 based	on	whether	applicants	whose	expression	has	been	restricted	by	private	actors	have	at	their	disposal	 viable	 alternative	 platforms	 to	 exercise	 their	 expression.	 See,	 e.g.,	 	 Animal	Defenders	 International	 v.	 the	 UK,	 57	 Eur.	 Ct.	 H.R.	 Ap.	 No.48876/08	 (2013)	 21,	 41-43	(concluding	that	the	UK’s	prohibition	of	political	advertising	on	television	and	radio	did	not	violate	Article	10	ECHR,	based	in	part	on	the	fact	that	“a	range	of	alternative	media	were	available	to	the	applicant”,	including	“radio	or	television	discussion	programmes	of	a	 political	 nature”,	 as	 well	 as	 “non-broadcasting	 media	 including	 the	 print	 media,	 the	
982	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	virtual	spaces,	a	useful	way	of	approaching	the	application	of	the	necessity	 test	 is	 to	distinguish	between	a	platform’s	gatekeeping	function,	 through	 which	 it	 determines	 the	 permissibility	 of	content,	 and	 its	 recommendation	 function,	 through	 which	 it	determines	the	visibility	of	content.185	With	respect	to	the	gatekeeping	function,	it	is	suggested	that	the	necessity	 test	will	 generally	 require	 larger	market-dominant	platforms	to	adopt	a	more	 inclusive	and	permissive	approach	to	the	moderation	of	content,	pursuant	to	which	the	removal	of	only	a	limited	range	of	narrowly	defined	categories	of	content	is	likely	to	 be	 deemed	necessary	 in	 practice.	 Similar	 to	 States,	 platforms	managing	 larger	more	 general	 online	 spaces	 are	 likely	 to	 find	 it	difficult	 to	 justify	 the	 necessity	 of	 removing	most	 forms	 of	 hate	speech	that	are	merely	offensive,	disturbing	or	shocking,	but	which	do	not	rise	to	the	level	of	threats	of	violence,	harassment	or	assault	against	 individually	 identifiable	 victims	 or	 the	 advocacy	 of	discriminatory	 hatred	 constituting	 incitement	 to	 hostility,	discrimination	or	violence.186	At	the	same	time,	since	larger	virtual	spaces	 also	 enable	 users	 to	 disseminate	 their	 content	 to	 wider	audiences,	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 also	 expects	 these	
 internet	 (including	 social	media)	as	well	 as	 [	.	.	.	 ]	demonstrations,	posters	and	 flyers”);	Cengiz	and	Others	v.	Turkey,	App.	Nos.	48226/10	and	14027/11,	Eur.	Ct.	H.R.	(2015)	para.	51-55	 (observing	 that	 YouTube	 contained	 “specific	 information	 of	 interest	 to	 the	applicants	 that	 is	not	easily	accessible	by	other	means”	 to	reach	 the	conclusion	 that	no	viable	alternatives	were	available	 to	 the	applicants	 to	exercise	their	 freedom	to	receive	and	 impart	 information	 and	 ideas).	 See	 also	 Christina	 Angelopoulos	 et	 al.,	 Study	 of	
Fundamental	Rights	Limitations	for	Online	Enforcement	Through	Self-Regulation,	Inst.	for	Info.	L.	50	(2015)	(noting	that	 the	“degree	of	dominance”	of	a	company	 is	relevant	 to	a	human	 rights	 analysis	 because,	 inter	 alia,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 service	 can	 make	 it	 more	difficult	 to	 abandon	 the	 service,	 for	 example	 “when	 the	 alternative	 services	 are	 very	limited	or	are	not	of	practical	worth”);	Leerssen,	supra	note	172,	at	112	(“An	important	factor	in	determining	the	intermediary’s	discretion	should	be	their	degree	of	dominance	as	reflected	in	the	ECHR’s	case	law”);	Keller,	supra	note	56,	at	18	(“Many	critics	argue	[	.	.	.	]	 that	 the	platform	ecosystem	has	created	new	 forms	of	 scarcity.	Even	 if	users	 can	still	speak	on	less-popular	platforms,	they	argue,	those	may	be	inadequate	because	not	enough	other	people	are	there	to	listen	or	respond”).	185.	 Timothy	B.	Lee,	Alex	Jones	is	a	crackpot	–	but	banning	him	from	Facebook	might	
be	 a	 bad	 idea,	 ARS	 TECHNICA	 (August	 6,	 2018),	 https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/08/op-ed-alex-jones-is-a-crackpot-but-banning-him-from-facebook-might-be-a-bad-idea	 [https://perma.cc/Q48R-VSYG]	 (referring	 to	 platforms	 as	 “two	 separate	products:	a	hosting	product	and	a	recommendation	product”).	See	also	Keller,	supra	note	56,	 at	 25-26	 (referring	 to	 the	 “rank	 but	 don’t	 remove”	model	 of	 platform	moderation,	“requiring	major	platforms	to	offer	an	uncurated,	unranked	service	but	preserving	their	discretion	over	the	curated	version”).	186.	 See	ARTICLE	19,	supra	note	170,	at	18-23.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 983	larger	 platforms	 to	 exercise	 particular	 vigilance	 and	 engage	 in	structured	and	sustained	engagement	with	 local	 stakeholders	 to	understand	 the	 coded	 language	 that	 may	 be	 relied	 upon	 in	particular	contexts,187	both	in	identifying	prohibited	forms	of	hate	speech	 constituting	 incitement	 to	 discrimination,	 hostility	 or	violence	 and	 in	 ensuring	 its	 timely	 removal	 in	 order	 to	 protect	individuals	and	communities	that	may	be	adversely	 impacted	by	such	 speech	 whether	 online	 and/or	 offline—particularly	 in	environments	experiencing	heightened	tension	or	conflict.188	With	 respect	 to	 a	 platform’s	 recommendation	 function,	 by	contrast,	it	is	suggested	that	the	necessity	test	will	generally	afford	larger	platforms	much	greater	 leeway	to	adopt	a	more	hands-on	approach	 to	 moderation,	 permitting	 reliance	 on	 a	 diversity	 of	measures	to	reduce	the	visibility	of	a	broader	range	of	categories	of	content—for	example,	by	adopting	higher	standards	for	content	that	 is	 amplified	 or	microtargeted	 as	 a	 paid	 advertisement	 or	 a	sponsored	post,189	attaching	a	warning	label	to	photos	and	videos	that	depict	various	forms	of	especially	graphic	or	violent	content,	or	 down-ranking	 content	 that	 has	 been	 identified	 to	 be	disinformation	by	 an	 independent	 fact-checking	organization.	 In	other	words,	 it	 is	envisaged	 that	 larger	platforms	will	be	able	 to	rely	on	their	recommendation	function	to	ensure	their	sites	remain	functional	 and	 attractive	 spaces	 to	 interact, 190 	as	 well	 as	 to	
 187.	 See	also	Kaye	Hate	Speech	Report,	supra	note	150,	para.	50	(“Human	evaluation	[	.	.	.	]	must	be	based	on	real	learning	from	the	communities	in	which	hate	speech	may	be	found,	that	is,	people	who	can	understand	the	“code”	that	language	sometimes	deploys	to	hide	 incitement	 to	 violence,	 evaluate	 the	 speaker’s	 intent,	 consider	 the	 nature	 of	 the	speaker	 and	 audience	 and	 evaluate	 the	 environment	 in	which	 hate	 speech	 can	 lead	 to	violent	acts”).	188 .	 On	 the	 dangers	 of	 platforms	 failing	 to	 remove	 unlawful	 categories	 of	 hate	speech,	see,	e.g.,	EQUALITY	LABS,	FACEBOOK	INDIA:	TOWARDS	THE	TIPPING	POINT	OF	VIOLENCE:	CASTE	AND	RELIGIOUS	HATE	SPEECH	(2019).	189.	 See	 Ingram,	 supra	 note	 139	 (in	which	 Alex	 Stamos	 argues	 that,	 “[i]f	 you	 are	allowing	for	amplification	because	of	money	or	are	financially	supporting	speech,	there	is	a	much	larger	[platform]	responsibility”).	See	also	Henry	Farrell,	A	Conservative	YouTube	
Star	 Just	 Lost	 his	 Income	 Stream	 for	 Homophobic	 Slurs,	 WASH.	 POST,	 (June	 6,	 2019),	https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/06/conservative-youtube-star-just-lost-his-income-stream-homophobic-slurs-heres-what-happened-why	[https://perma.cc/Y8M3-B47A].	190.	 See	Kyle	Langvardt,	Regulating	Online	Content	Moderation,	GEO.	L.	J.	1353,	1363	(2018)	 (“Any	 attempt	 to	 protect	 online	 speakers	 from	 oppressive	 content	moderation	must	simultaneously	accommodate	the	content	moderation	that	makes	the	Internet’s	‘vast	democratic	forums’	usable	–	a	delicate	and	difficult	balance”).	
984	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	differentiate	 their	 respective	 virtual	 spaces	 in	 ways	 that	 reflect	their	commercial	objectives,	culture	and	feel.191	c.	 Least	Intrusive	Restrictive	Measure	Third—and	very	much	related	 to	 the	 latter	discussion—the	test	 of	 necessity	 also	 requires	 consideration	 of	 whether	 the	imposition	of	a	restrictive	measure	 is	 the	 least	 intrusive	amongst	
those	which	might	achieve	their	protective	function.	 In	the	case	of	
Ballantyne,	Davidson	and	McIntryre	v.	Canada,	for	example,	the	UN	HRC	 concluded	 that	 a	 prohibition	 on	 commercial	 advertising	 in	English	with	the	aim	of	protecting	the	vulnerable	position	of	the	francophone	minority	within	 Canada	 “may	 be	 achieved	 in	 other	ways	that	do	not	preclude	the	freedom	of	expression,	in	a	language	of	 their	 choice,	 of	 those	 engaged	 in	 such	 fields	 as	 trade.”192	For	instance,	the	law	could	have	required	that	advertising	appears	in	both	French	and	English.193	In	 the	 platform	 moderation	 context,	 when	 content	 that	violates	 a	 platform’s	 moderation	 rules	 has	 been	 identified,	 the	terms	of	service	and/or	community	standards	generally	identify	a	range	of	actions	and	sanctions	that	may	be	taken	in	response.	In	order	 to	 align	 their	 content	 moderation	 policies	 with	 the	 least	intrusive	 standard,	platforms	 could	 commit,	 so	 far	 as	 feasible	 in	light	 of	 their	 size	 and	 circumstances,	 to	 diversify	 the	 range	 of	restrictive	measures	that	may	be	adopted	in	response	to	different	types	 of	 content.194	With	 respect	 to	disinformation,	 for	 example,	while	its	removal	may	be	necessary	for	certain	circumstances,	such	as	where	it	is	used	to	incite	violence,195	in	general,	it	is	possible	to	
 191.	 SUZOR,	 supra	 note	 108,	 at	 198-99;	 ARTICLE	 19,	 supra	 note	 134,	 at	 13.	 On	 the	challenge	 of	 promoting	 and	 protecting	 diversity	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 recommendation	function	of	online	platforms,	see	generally	Natali	Helberger,	Paddy	Leerssen,	&	Max	Van	Drunen,	Germany	Proposes	Europe’s	First	Diversity	Rules	 for	Social	Media	Platforms,	LSE	
Media	 Policy	 Project,	 (May	 29,	 2019),	https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2019/05/29/germany-proposes-europes-first-diversity-rules-for-social-media-platforms	[https://perma.cc/X9GP-LG3V].	192 .	 Ballantyne,	 Davidson,	 McIntyre	 v.	 Canada,	 Communications	 359/1989	 and	385/1989,	Human	Rights	Committee,	para.	11.4	(May	5,	1993).	193.	 	Id.	194.	 See	generally	Land	&	Hamilton,	supra	note	79;	Kaye	Hate	Speech	Report,	supra	note	150,	para.	51-52.	195.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Lu,	 Update	 on	 Myanmar,	 FACEBOOK	 NEWSROOM	 (August	 15,	 2018)	https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/update-on-myanmar	 [https://perma.cc/J638-TML2]	(observing	how	“in	Myanmar,	false	news	can	be	used	to	incite	violence,	especially	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 985	envisage	 a	 broader	 spectrum	 of	 response	 options	 focused	 on	combatting	 its	 spread	 and	 influence,	 including	 educational	initiatives	 focused	on	media	 literacy,	 counter-narrative	and	 fact-checking	collaborations,	demonetization,	as	well	as	reductions	in	its	visibility.196	Beyond	 diversifying	 response	 options,	 larger	 platforms,	 in	particular,	could	also	commit	to	enhancing	the	ability	of	users	to	control	 the	 types	 of	 content	 they	 view	 on	 their	 platforms.	Enhanced	user	controls	would	serve	two	functions:	first,	enabling	users	 to	 protect	 themselves	 from	 the	 abusive	 behavior	 of	 other	users	 online;	 and	 second,	 enabling	 platforms	 to	 manage	 more	permissive	speech	environments	in	the	knowledge	that	their	users	are	 equipped	 with	 the	 means	 to	 select	 the	 personalized	 online	experience	they	desire.	Some	platforms	have	already	begun	empowering	users	to	set	their	own	 filters	and	rules	 for	what	 they	see	online.	Twitter,	 for	example,	 enables	 users	 to	 mute	 or	 block	 the	 accounts	 of	 other	users,197	while	 Facebook	 enables	 users	 to	 unfollow	 other	 users,	pages	 and	 groups	 in	 their	 news	 feed	 so	 as	 to	 avoid	 seeing	 their	content	whilst	remaining	connected	to	the	entities	producing	it.198	More	recently,	Facebook	has	confirmed	plans	“to	give	people	more	control	 of	 what	 they	 see,”	 initially	 by	 enabling	 users	 to	 decide	whether	to	view	less	content	that	is	close	to	the	line	of	violating	the	platform’s	 standards	 and	 in	 the	 future	 by	 providing	 users	 with	flexible	controls	over	categories	like	nudity	where	cultural	norms	and	personal	preferences	vary	considerably	around	the	world.199	While	 these	 initiatives	 are	 welcome,	 several	 commentators	have	argued	that	online	platforms	could	go	much	further	in	terms	of	the	level	of	control	they	provide	to	their	users.	Timothy	Garton	Ash	and	his	colleagues,	for	example,	have	proposed	that	Facebook	should	establish	a	range	of	new	controls,	 including	a	“news	 feed	
 when	 coupled	 with	 ethnic	 and	 tensions”	 and	 that	 therefore	 Facebook	 would	 remove	“misinformation	 that	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 contribute	 to	 imminent	 violence	 or	 physical	harm”).	196.	 For	an	overview	of	platform	policies	concerning	disinformation,	see	generally	ARTICLE	19,	supra	note	32,	at	27-29.	197.		How	to	Control	Your	Twitter	Experience,	TWITTER,	https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/control-your-twitter-experience	[https://perma.cc/Q2WU-RVWU].	198.	 Garton	Ash,	Gorwa,	&	Metaxa,	supra	note	2,	at	14-15.	199.	 Zuckerberg,	supra	note	103.	 	
986	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	analytics	 feature”	 that	 would	 deconstruct	 the	 extent	 to	 which	different	types	of	content	appear	on	users’	news	feeds,	an	“adopt	a	different	point	of	view”	function	that	would	expose	users	to	feeds	with	entirely	different	content	to	their	own,	and	buttons	or	sliders	that	would	enable	users	to	control	“whether	they	wish	to	see	more	content	 that	 cross-cuts	 against	 their	 political	 ideology,	 whether	they	wish	 to	 see	more	news,	and	whether	 they	wish	 their	News	Feed	to	be	curated	at	all,	or	if	it	should	proceed	chronologically.”200	In	the	latter	regard,	buttons	or	sliders	might	also	be	developed	to	enable	users	to	determine	their	tolerance	across	a	range	of	content	categories	including,	for	example,	nudity	or	graphic	violence.201	An	even	more	ambitious	proposal	would	involve	companies	opening	 up	 their	 platforms	 to	 allow	 third	 parties	 to	 develop	“collective	lenses”	or	“feed	recipes”—essentially,	customized	user	interfaces	 with	 their	 own	 bespoke	 content	 visibility	 and	permissibility	policies	to	which	users	could	subscribe.202	As	Mike	Masnick	 explains,	 this	 approach	 would	 “push	 the	 power	 and	decision	 making	 out	 to	 the	 ends	 of	 the	 network,	 rather	 than	keeping	 it	 centralized	 among	 a	 small	 group	 of	 very	 powerful	companies”	so	as	to	enable	users	to	choose	the	online	experience	or	filtering	setup	they	desire.203	In	addition,	as	Tarleton	Gillespie	argues,	such	an	approach	would	also	empower	groups	of	users	and	independent	 organizations	 to	 collaborate	 “to	 help	 curate	 the	platform	 landscape,	 in	 areas	 and	 around	 topics	 they	 are	 most	invested	and	expert	in,	at	a	granularity	and	precision	greater	than	the	platform	could	by	 itself.”204	Interestingly,	 in	December	2019,	Jack	Dorsey	announced	that	Twitter	would	provide	funding	for	a	small	 independent	 team,	called	BlueSky,	 to	develop	an	open	and	
 200.	 Garton	 Ash,	 Gorwa,	 &	 Metaxa,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 16-17.	 See	 also	 The	 Invisible	
Curation	of	Content:	Facebook’s	News	Feed	and	our	 Information	Diets,	WORLD	WIDE	WEB	FOUNDATION	(April	2018),	https://webfoundation.org/research/the-invisible-curation-of-content-facebooks-news-feed-and-our-information-diets/	 [https://perma.cc/TBY3-YDYA].	201.	 Keller,	supra	note	49,	at	24.	202.	 GILLESPIE,	supra	note	3,	at	199	(“collective	lenses”);	see	also	Columbia	Journalism	School,	 Peter	 Zenger	 Lecture	 with	 Jonathan	 Zittrain,	 YOUTUBE	 (Nov.	 13,	 2018)	 (“feed	recipes”);	 Masnick,	 Protocols	 Not	 Platforms:	 A	 Technological	 Approach	 to	 Free	 Speech,	KNIGHT	 FIRST	 AMENDMENT	 INSTITUTE	 (Aug.	 21,	 2019),	https://knightcolumbia.org/content/protocols-not-platforms-a-technological-approach-to-free-speech	[https://perma.cc/H8PP-B8G3]	(“a	protocols-based	system”).	203.	 See	generally	Masnick,	supra	note	133.	204.		See	generally	GILLESPIE,	IMPROVING	MODERATION	(2018).	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 987	decentralized	 protocol	 standard	 for	 social	media—opening	 up	 a	potential	pathway	for	this	type	of	initiative	to	be	operationalized	in	practice.205	Yet,	while	enhancing	user	controls	would	result	in	a	less	top-down	 approach	 to	 platform	moderation,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	recognize	 the	 limits	 and	 challenges	 that	 administering	 such	controls	would	entail.206	First,	any	system	of	user	controls	will	only	be	 as	 effective	 as	 the	 technology	 on	 which	 it	 relies.	 Given	 the	current	limits	of	artificial	intelligence,	it	is	likely	to	be	a	long	time	before	 platforms	 are	 able	 to	 establish	 user	 controls	 that	 enable	users	to	accurately	control	their	viewing	experience	with	respect	to	 complex	 context-dependent	 categories	 of	 content. 207 	Second,	platforms	 will	 presumably	 still	 need	 to	 ensure	 that	 certain	categories	of	content	are	beyond	user	control,	for	example,	due	to	their	 illegality. 208 	With	 this	 in	 mind,	 difficulties	 may	 arise	 in	selecting	which	categories	of	content	should	be	excluded	from	user	control,	defining	the	boundaries	of	excluded	categories	of	content,	and	policing	those	lines	in	practice.209	Finally,	it	also	seems	fair	to	assume	 that	 many	 users	 will	 simply	 lack	 the	 time,	 energy,	 or	inclination	to	take	advantage	of	controls	delegated	to	them,	with	the	 result	 that	 the	 most	 significant	 question	 may	 become	 what	default	 settings	 apply	 and,	 more	 specifically,	 whether	 default	settings	should	vary	according	to	geographical	region.210	
 205.	 Mike	Masnick,	Twitter	Makes	A	Bet	On	Protocols	Over	Platforms,	TECHDIRT	(Dec.	11,	2019), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20191210/21054943552/twitter-makes-bet-protocols-over-platforms.shtml	 [https://perma.cc/S3BA-LSUD].	 For	 a	 skeptical	perspective,	 see	 Michael	 Kwet,	 Can	 Twitter	 Ever	 Be	 Decentralized?,	 SLATE	 (December	2019),	 https://slate.com/technology/2019/12/jack-dorsey-open-decentralized-twitter.html	[https://perma.cc/U4YM-KX77].	206 .	 See	 Langvardt,	 supra	 note	 190,	 at	 1380-83	 (on	 the	 relative	 benefits	 and	drawbacks	of	enhanced	user	controls	on	platforms);	see	also	Masnick,	supra	note	202.	207.	 See	Zuckerberg,	supra	note	103	(“We	won’t	be	able	to	consider	allowing	more	content	until	our	artificial	intelligence	is	accurate	enough	to	remove	it	for	everyone	else	who	doesn’t	want	to	see	it”).	208.	 Id.	(“Of	course,	we’re	not	going	to	offer	controls	to	allow	any	content	that	could	cause	real	world	harm”).	209.	 Langvardt,	supra	note	190,	at	1381-82.	See,	however,	Masnick,	supra	note	202	(“the	 reality	 is	 that	 these	 kinds	 of	 communities	 [around	 things	 like	 child	 exploitation	content	or	other	criminal	activities,	for	example]	are	already	forming	–	often	on	the	dark	web	–	and	the	way	they	are	dealt	with	today	is	mostly	via	law	enforcement	[…]	There	is	little	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 in	 a	 protocol-focused	world,	 this	 problem	would	 be	 all	 that	different	than	what	currently	exists”).	210.	 Mark	 Zuckerberg,	 Building	 Global	 Community,	 FACEBOOK	 (Feb.	 16,	 2017),	https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/building-global-
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restrictive	 measures	 taken	 in	 response	 to	 particular	 forms	 of	
expression	actually	 fulfill	 their	 protective	 function.	 Applied	 to	 the	content	moderation	context,	platforms	could	commit	to	assessing	whether	 a	 particular	 response	 measure	 has	 any	 unintended	negative	consequences	that	may	outweigh	its	protective	benefits	through	 an	 evidence-based	 approach. 211 	According	 to	 Daphne	Keller,	 for	 example,	 some	 of	 the	 policies	 adopted	 by	 online	platforms	 to	 counter	 violent	 extremism	 “may	 cultivate	 precisely	the	 attitudes	 and	 animosities	 that	 counter-radicalization	 efforts	are	 supposed	 to	 prevent.”212 	As	 Keller	 explains,	 “if	 suppressing	propaganda	 from	 real	 terrorists	 comes	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 high	 over-removal	rates	for	innocent	Arabic-language	posts	or	speech	about	Islam	 generally,	 the	 trade-off	may	 be	 not	 only	 disrespectful	 and	unfair	but	dangerous.”213	Where	a	 response	measure	 is	 found	 to	restrict	 the	 freedom	 of	 expression	 of	 users	 without	 effectively	furthering	 a	 legitimate	 purpose,	 platforms	 should	 commit	 to	revising	their	policies	accordingly.	Ultimately,	the	application	of	the	test	of	necessity	is	one	of	the	most	challenging	aspects	of	operationalizing	a	human	rights-based	approach	 to	 content	moderation—and	 one	which	would	 benefit	significantly	from	an	independent	multistakeholder	mechanism	to	assist	platforms	in	determining	what	restrictions	are	necessary	in	light	of	their	diverse	functions	and	contexts	of	operation.	Yet,	even	in	the	trickiest	cases,	the	test	of	necessity	remains	valuable	to	the	extent	that	it	requires	platforms	to	openly	explain	and	justify	the	trade-offs	they	inevitably	have	to	make	in	a	manner	that	surfaces	the	different	rights	and	interests	involved.	
C.	 The	Process	of	Content	Moderation	In	 addition	 to	 aligning	 the	 substance	 of	 their	 content	moderation	rules	with	international	human	rights	law,	adherence	
 community/10154544292806634/	[https://perma.cc/32EY-9E6B]	(suggesting	that	“the	default	 will	 be	 whatever	 the	 majority	 of	 people	 in	 your	 region	 selected,	 like	 a	referendum”).	211.	 Aswad,	supra	note	142,	at	51-52.	212.	 Keller,	supra	note	49,	at	22.	213.	 Id.	at	24.	
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processes.	Important	processes	in	this	context	include	the	revision	of	terms	of	service	and	community	standards,	the	management	of	systems	of	community	and	algorithmic	flagging,	the	governance	of	human	and	algorithmic	decision-making,	the	transparency	of	user-generated	and	advertising	content,	and	the	response	of	platforms	to	regulatory	pressures.214	In	 order	 to	 identify,	 prevent,	mitigate	 and	 account	 for	 how	they	 address	 the	 adverse	 human	 rights	 impacts	 of	 their	moderation	processes,	online	platforms	should	establish	a	policy	commitment	to	meet	their	responsibility	to	respect	and	carry	out	ongoing	human	rights	due	diligence.215	The	due	diligence	process	should	be	initiated	as	early	as	possible	in	the	development	of	new	platform	activities	or	relationships	and	be	undertaken	at	regular	intervals	 throughout	 the	 life	 of	 an	 activity	 or	 relationship.216	As	part	 of	 the	 process,	 platforms	 should	 put	 in	 place	 “policies	 and	processes	through	which	they	can	both	know	and	show	that	they	respect	human	rights	in	practice.”217	In	 practice,	 there	 are	 three	 core	 stages	 to	 the	 process	 of	human	rights	due	diligence:218	first,	identifying	and	assessing	any	actual	 or	 potential	 adverse	 human	 rights	 impacts	 with	 which	 a	platform	may	be	involved	either	through	their	own	activities	or	as	a	result	of	their	business	relationships;219	second,	taking	effective	action	to	prevent	and	mitigate	adverse	human	rights	impacts	and	tracking	 those	 responses	 to	 ensure	 they	 are	 being	 implemented	optimally;220	and	 finally,	 transparently	 communicating	 sufficient	information	 externally	 about	 the	 platform’s	 efforts	 to	 identify,	prevent	 and	mitigate	 adverse	 human	 rights	 impacts	 so	 that	 the	adequacy	 of	 any	 response	 measures	 may	 be	 evaluated. 221 	To	elaborate	 on	 the	 challenges	 of	 applying	 these	 standards	 in	 the	platform	moderation	context,	this	section	examines	four	forms	of	transparency	 and	 oversight—rule-making,	 decision-making,	
 214.	 See	SUZOR,	supra	note	108,	at	201-20.	215.	 UNGP,	Principles	16-17	and	Commentary.			216.	 Id.	Principles	17-18	and	Commentary.			217.	 Id.	Principle	21	and	Commentary.	218.	 See	Toronto	Declaration,	supra	note	127,	para.	44.	219.	 UNGP,	Principles	17-18	and	Commentary.		220.	 Id.	Principles	19-20	and	Commentary.	221.	 Id.	Principle	21	and	Commentary.	
990	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	content	 and	 advertising,	 and	 regulatory	 compliance—that	platforms	 should	 address	 as	 part	 of	 their	 human	 right	 due	diligence	processes	in	practice.	1.	 Rule-making	First,	 platforms	 should	 address	 their	 rule-making	transparency	and	oversight.222	Online	platforms	have	often	been	criticized	 for	 failing	 to	 adequately	 consult	with	 their	 users,	 civil	society	groups,	or	the	general	public	concerning	the	development	and	 revision	 of	 their	 moderation	 rules.	 According	 to	 Rebecca	MacKinnon,	 for	 example,	 Facebook	 adheres	 to	 “a	 Hobbesian	approach	 to	 governance	 in	 which	 people	 agree	 to	 relinquish	 a	certain	amount	of	freedom	to	a	benevolent	sovereign	who	in	turn	provides	 security	 and	 other	 services.” 223 	This	 approach	 is	 in	tension	 with	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 to	 content	moderation.	According	to	Principle	18	of	the	UNGP,	human	rights	due	diligence	conducted	by	business	enterprises	should	draw	on	“internal	 and/or	 independent	 external	 human	 rights	 expertise”	and	 involve	 “meaningful	 consultation	 with	 potentially	 affected	groups	and	other	relevant	stakeholders,	as	appropriate	to	the	size	of	 the	 business	 enterprise	 and	 the	 nature	 and	 context	 of	 the	operation.”	224	In	 recent	 years,	 online	 platforms	 have	 taken	 steps	 to	 offer	more	 opportunities	 for	 participation	 and	 feedback	 concerning	their	 moderation	 rules.	 Facebook,	 for	 example,	 has	 stated	 that	when	 its	 content	 policy	 team	meet	 every	 few	 weeks	 to	 discuss	potential	changes	to	its	moderation	policies,	they	regularly	invite	outside	 experts	 and	 have	 begun	 to	 make	 the	 meeting	 minutes	publicly	 available. 225 	Facebook	 also	 launched	 a	 series	 of	 public	events	 around	 the	 world	 entitled	 Facebook	 Forums:	 Community	
Standards	 to	obtain	public	 feedback	on	 its	policies	directly.226	In	addition,	 Facebook	has	 voluntarily	 submitted	 to	 three	 audits—a	
 222.	 Kaye,	supra	note	73,	at	121	(“rulemaking	transparency”).	223.	 MACKINNON	ET	AL.,	supra	note	47,	at	408.	224.		UNGP,	Principle	18	and	Commentary.		225.	 Zuckerberg,	supra	note	103.	226.		Monika	Bickert,	Publishing	Our	Internal	Enforcement	Guidelines	and	Expanding	
Our	 Appeals	 Process,	 FACEBOOK	 (Apr.	 24,	 2018),	https://about.fb.com/news/2018/04/comprehensive-community-standards/	[https://perma.cc/WU8Y-PRAF].	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 991	civil	rights	review	of	its	internal	operations,	an	investigation	into	whether	the	platform	is	biased	against	conservatives,	and	a	human	rights	 impact	 assessment	 of	 the	 company’s	 presence	 in	Myanmar—and	 established	 an	 independent	 election	 research	commission	 to	 identify	 research	 topics	 and	 select	 independent	researchers	to	examine	them	using	Facebook	data.227	While	 these	 developments	 have	 resulted	 in	 important	recommendations	 and	 commitments	 concerning	 the	 platform’s	moderation	 rules	 and	 policies, 228 	Facebook	 and	 other	 major	platforms	 could	 go	 much	 further	 in	 ensuring	 more	 structured	multistakeholder	participation	in	the	development	and	revision	of	their	 content	 moderation	 rules.	 In	 recent	 years,	 a	 number	 of	proposals	 have	 been	 put	 forward	 by	 scholars	 and	 civil	 society	groups	 that	 platforms	 could	 consider	 for	 this	 purpose.	 For	example,	platforms	could	adopt	“notice-and-comment”	procedures	to	obtain	public	feedback	on	proposed	changes	to	their	moderation	policies,229	appoint	outside	experts	as	“amici	curiae”	or	in	the	form	of	 an	 advisory	 panel	 to	 inform	 their	 policy	 decisions,230	and/or	support	 the	 creation	 of	 independent	multistakeholder	 bodies	 to	help	ensure	the	compatibility	of	platform	moderation	policies	with	international	 human	 rights	 law. 231 	While	 these	 proposals	 are	varied—and	would	be	subject	to	feasibility	constraints	according	to	the	size	and	circumstances	of	a	platform—they	are	premised	on	a	 shared	 belief	 that	 platforms	 would	 benefit	 from	 a	 more	structured	and	sustainable	approach	 to	stakeholder	engagement	concerning	their	rule-making	processes.	
 227.	 Garton	Ash,	Gorwa,	&	Metaxa,	supra	note	2,	at	18-19;	see	also	Mark	Zuckerberg,	
Preparing	 for	 Elections,	 FACEBOOK	 (Sep.	 13,	 2008).	https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/preparing-for-elections/10156300047606634/	[https://perma.cc/3XAN-S4TF].	228.	 See,	e.g.,	Facebook’s	Civil	Rights	Audit	–	Progress	Report,	9-13	(June	30,	2019),	https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/civilrightaudit_final.pdf	[https://perma.cc/4UPA-UNKA]	 (outlining	 recommendations	 to	 improve	 Facebook’s	white	nationalism,	hate	speech	and	harassment	policies).	229.	 Bloch-Wehba,	Global	Platform	Governance:	Private	Power	in	the	Shadow	of	the	
State,	72	SMU	L.	REV.	27,	76	(2019).	230.	 Id.;	Gillespie,	supra	note	18,	at	214;	Garton	Ash,	Gorwa,	&	Metaxa,	supra	note	2,	at	19-20.	231.	 See,	e.g.,	Gillespie,	supra	note	18,	at	214	(Public	Ombudsman);	ARTICLE	19,	supra	note	 134	 (Social	 Media	 Councils);	 GLOBAL	 PARTNERS	 DIGITAL,	 supra	 note	 148,	 at	 26-28	(Independent	Online	Platform	Standards	Oversight	Body).	
992	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	2.	Decision-making	Beyond	 rule-making,	 platforms	 should	 also	 address	 their	systems	 of	 transparency	 and	 oversight	 concerning	 their	 human	and	algorithmic	decision-making	processes.	 In	practice,	 this	 form	of	 transparency	 and	 oversight	 has	 both	 quantitative	 and	qualitative	 dimensions.	 Quantitative	 transparency	 and	 oversight	refer	 to	 the	 statistical	 information	disclosed	by	online	platforms	concerning	their	content	moderation	systems.	Applying	a	human	rights-based	 approach,	 platforms	 should	 disclose	 statistical	information	concerning	the	different	categories	of	content	removal	requests	they	receive,	the	different	types	of	actors	that	submit	such	requests,	 and	 the	 range	 of	 measures	 adopted	 in	 response.	Moreover,	 to	 the	 extent	 feasible,	 platforms	 could	 also	 develop	accuracy	metrics,	which	enable	platforms	to	calculate	and	publish	error	 rates	 for	 human	 reviewers	 and	 algorithmic	 detection	 for	different	categories	of	violation,232	as	well	as	a	range	of	metrics	to	evaluate	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 platform	 decision-making—for	example,	a	metric	 that	measures	 the	virality	of	 content	 found	 to	violate	moderation	rules	prior	to	its	removal.233	Although	online	platforms	have	generally	made	incremental	progress	in	the	quality	of	their	transparency	reports,	greater	care	and	attention	could	be	directed	towards	how	content	moderation	statistics	 are	 disaggregated.	 In	 particular,	 platforms	 could	distinguish	 between	 requests	 received	 through	 lawful	 channels	such	 as	 court-orders,	 demands	 received	 from	 governments	pursuant	to	a	platform’s	terms	of	service,	requests	received	from	Internet	 referral	 units,	 requests	 received	 pursuant	 to	 voluntary	arrangements	such	as	the	EU	Code	of	Conduct	on	Countering	Illegal	
Hate	 Speech	 Online,	 complaints	 submitted	 by	 private	 users,	 and	proactive	 actions	 taken	 by	 platforms	 themselves	 including	different	 forms	 of	 algorithmic	 decision-making. 234 	To	 this	 end,	platforms	could	draw	guidance	from	the	Santa	Clara	Principles	on	
Transparency	and	Accountability	 in	Content	Moderation,235	which	set	 out	 the	 minimum	 level	 of	 detail	 that	 platforms	 should	 be	
 232.	 Report	 of	 the	 Facebook	 Data	 Transparency	 Advisory	 Group,	 April	 2019	[hereinafter	Facebook	DTAG	Report]	at	16.	233.	 Id.	at	18-28.	234.	 Kaye	Content	Moderation	Report,	supra	note	10,	at	16-17.	235 .	 The	 Santa	 Clara	 Principles	 on	 Transparency	 and	 Accountability	 in	 Content	Moderation	(2018)	[hereinafter	Santa	Clara	Principles].	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 993	expected	 to	 disclose	 concerning	 their	 content	 moderation	practices.236	Quantitative	 insights	 by	 themselves,	 however,	 are	 an	inadequate	 means	 for	 assessing	 platform	 decision-making	systems—for	 the	 simple	 reason	 that,	 without	 any	 form	 of	independent	 verification,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 discern	 whether	aggregate	statistics	accurately	reflect	the	definitions	and	standards	elaborated	in	a	platform’s	moderation	rules.	As	Evelyn	Douek	has	put	 it,	 “[w]ithout	 verification	 or	 intelligibility,	 aggregate	 reports	become	a	form	of	transparency	theater,	deployed	to	ward	off	calls	for	greater	accountability.”237	With	this	in	mind,	applying	a	human	rights-based	approach,	platforms	should	also	establish	qualitative	forms	of	transparency	and	oversight,	ideally	through	independent	forms	of	verification	and	auditing	that	aim	to	identify	and	assess	the	 actual	 and	 potential	 adverse	 human	 rights	 impacts	 of	 their	systems	 of	 community	 and	 algorithmic	 flagging	 of	 potentially	disallowed	content,	 the	different	 tiers	of	human	and	algorithmic	review	that	such	content	is	subjected	to,	and	any	algorithms	relied	upon	 to	 personalize	 user	 experience—making	 sure	 to	 integrate	findings	 from	 their	 impact	 assessments	 through	 appropriate	action,	track	the	effectiveness	of	such	measures,	and	communicate	how	 they	 address	 adverse	 human	 rights	 impacts	 externally.	 In	practice,	 appropriate	 action	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 adverse	 human	rights	impacts	identified.	In	 terms	of	community	 flagging,	 for	example,	concerns	have	been	raised	about	the	practice	of	minority	and	vulnerable	groups	being	 targeted	 by	 coordinated	 mass	 reporting	 sprees	 of	 their	accounts	by	groups	that	are	politically	or	ideologically	opposed	to	them.	 Appropriate	 action	 to	 guard	 against	 this	 practice	 could	include	 treating	 reporting	 sprees	 as	 abusive	 behavior	 that	 is	prohibited	in	platform	moderation	rules	and	placing	limits	on	how	many	reports	any	single	account	can	make	in	a	day.238		With	 respect	 to	 human	 review,	 concerns	 have	 been	 raised	about	 inadequacies	 in	 the	 number	 and	 cultural	 competency	 of	moderators	 to	 accurately	 and	 effectively	 remove	 content	 that	
 236.	 See	generally	Facebook	DTAG	Report,	supra	note	232.	237.	 Douek,	supra	note	135,	at	12.	238.		Dia	Kayyali,	Facebook’s	Name	Policy	Strikes	Again,	This	Time	at	Native	Americans,	EFF	DEEPLINKS	BLOG	(Feb.	13,	2015),	https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/02/facebooks-name-policy-strikes-again-time-native-americans	[https://perma.cc/3TZQ-FFVR].	
994	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	violates	 platform	 moderation	 rules	 in	 different	 local	 contexts,	including	 countries	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 turmoil	 or	 conflict,	 such	 as	Myanmar,	 Sri	 Lanka,	 Libya,	 and	 the	 Philippines. 239 	Appropriate	action	 to	 address	 these	 concerns	 could	 include	 platforms	committing	 to	 ensure	 adequate	 cultural	 and	 linguistic	 expertise	across	all	markets	in	which	they	operate,240	as	well	as	establishing	structured	forms	of	engagement	with	local	stakeholders,	including	early	warning	and	emergency	escalation	functions,	to	enhance	the	ability	of	platforms	to	prevent	their	sites	being	 instrumentalized	for	 the	 promotion	 of	 violence. 241 	Beyond	 the	 accuracy	 and	effectiveness	 of	 human	 review,	 concerns	 have	 also	 been	 raised	about	 the	 damaging	 work	 conditions	 and	 inadequate	 labor	protections	 afforded	 to	 human	 reviewers,	 a	 particularly	 serious	concern	 in	 light	 of	 the	 severe	 psychological	 toll	 that	 content	moderation	 entails. 242 	Appropriate	 action	 to	 address	 such	concerns	 could	 include	 disclosing	 more	 information	 concerning	the	number,	diversity,	location,	working	conditions,	support,	and	training	put	in	place	for	human	moderators,	as	well	as	committing	to	 establish	 adequate	 labor	 protections	 in	 accordance	 with	international	human	rights	standards.243	Finally,	 in	 terms	 of	 algorithmic	 decision-making,	 a	 range	 of	concerns	have	arisen	over	the	opacity	of	algorithms,	including	the	potential	for	algorithmic	biases	that	adversely	impact	the	human	rights	of	different	groups	of	users.	Appropriate	action	in	response	to	 these	 concerns	 could	 take	 various	 forms.	 Recognizing	 the	current	 limits	 of	 algorithmic	 decision-making,	 platforms	 could	commit	 to	ensuring	that	 there	will	always	be	meaningful	human	involvement	 in	 their	 algorithmic	 decision-making	processes	 and	adequate	 safeguards	 in	 place	 in	 case	 an	 algorithm	 acts	unpredictably.244	Facebook,	 for	example,	has	 recently	 committed	
 239.	 Garton	Ash,	Gorwa,	&	Metaxa,	supra	note	2,	at	11.	240.	 Kaye	Content	Moderation	Report,	supra	note	10,	at	18.	241.	 See,	e.g.,	 Ingram,	supra	note	178	(describing	a	new	Facebook	tool	 that	allows	approved	 civil	 society	 groups	 to	 flag	 problematic	material	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 seen	more	quickly	by	the	company	than	if	a	regular	user	had	reported	the	material).	242.	 See	generally	ROBERTS,	supra	note	89.	243.	 Kaye	Content	Moderation	Report,	supra	note	10,	at	18.	244.	 GLOBAL	PARTNERS	DIGITAL,	supra	note	148,	at	22;	McGregor,	Murray	&	Ng,	supra	note	90,	at	341-42.	See	also	Spandana	Singh,	Everything	in	Moderation:	An	Analysis	of	How	
Internet	 Platforms	 Are	 Using	 Artificial	 Intelligence	 to	 Moderate	 User-Generated	 Content,	NEW	 AMERICA	 (July	 22,	 2019),	 https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/everything-moderation-analysis-how-internet-platforms-are-using-artificial-intelligence-moderate-
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 995	to	removing	thousands	of	targeting	terms	for	advertisers	offering	housing,	 employment,	 or	 credit	 opportunities	 as	 part	 of	 a	settlement	 of	 multiple	 discrimination	 lawsuits. 245 	While	 a	promising	development,	similar	changes	may	be	required	for	other	categories	of	online	advertising—for	example,	political	advertising	in	light	of	evidence	that	voter	suppression	and	intimidation	tactics	have	been	deployed	on	Facebook.246	Steps	 could	 also	 be	 taken	 to	 improve	 algorithmic	transparency	by	explaining	when	algorithms	are	used,	how	they	work,	 and	 their	 consequences	 for	 users	 in	 different	 contexts	including	the	key	criteria	that	underpin	particular	decisions.247	In	practice,	 however,	 enhancing	 algorithmic	 transparency	 in	 the	platform	 moderation	 context	 raises	 a	 number	 of	 challenges.	Meaningful	transparency	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	algorithms	are	 frequently	 altered—Google,	 for	 example,	 updates	 its	algorithms	hundreds	of	times	per	year—and	often	rely	on	machine	learning	techniques,	which	can	lead	to	a	divergence	between	what	programmers	 believe	 an	 algorithm	 does	 and	 how	 it	 actually	behaves. 248 	There	 is	 also	 a	 risk	 that	 making	 algorithms	 more	transparent	will	expose	platforms	to	manipulation	and	gaming.249	And	even	if	a	human	moderator	is	“in	the	loop”	of	an	algorithmic	decision-making	process,	the	risk	remains	that	the	moderator	may	unquestioningly	 or	 subconsciously	 defer	 to	 the	 algorithmic	decision	 due	 to	 perceptions	 of	 technological	 neutrality	 and	accuracy—often	referred	to	as	“automation	bias.”250	
 user-generated-content/	 [https://perma.cc/7J2L-YNHF]	 (arguing	 that	 platforms	 should	invest	greater	efforts	in	hiring	developers	who	are	non-Western	and	non-English	speakers	to	help	reduce	data	and	creator	biases).		245.	 See	generally	Facebook’s	Civil	Rights	Audit	–	Progress	Report,	(June	30,	2019),	at	 15-17.	Cf.	 	 Ava	 Kofman	&	Ariana	 Tobin,	Facebook	 Ads	 Can	 Still	 Discriminate	 Against	
Women	and	Older	Workers,	Despite	a	Civil	Rights	Settlement,	PROPUBLICA	(Dec.	13,	2019),	https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-ads-can-still-discriminate-against-women-and-older-workers-despite-a-civil-rights-settlement	 [https://perma.cc/QAJ5-GTPS].	246 .	 Siva	 Vaidhyanathan,	 Facebook	 is	 Ripe	 for	 Exploitation	 –	 Again	 –	 in	 2020,	GUARDIAN	 (July	 9,	 2019),	https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/09/facebook-is-ripe-for-exploitation-again-in-2020	[https://perma.cc/MF9Y-BXUW].	247.	 Kaye	AI	Report,	supra	note	84,	at	18.	248.	 CoE	Report,	supra	note	84,	at	38.	249.	 Langvardt,	supra	note	190,	at	1384.	250.	 McGregor,	Murray,	&	Ng,	supra	note	90,	at	338-41.	
996	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	Some	 commentators	 have	 also	 cautioned	 that	 focusing	narrowly	 on	 individual	 rights	 to	 algorithmic	 transparency	 risks	creating	a	“transparency	fallacy”	since	“individuals	are	mostly	too	time-poor,	resource-poor,	and	lacking	in	the	necessary	expertise	to	meaningfully	make	use	of	these	individual	rights.”251	Edwards	and	Veale,	for	example,	argue	that	“creating	better	systems,	with	less	opacity,	clearer	audit	trails,	well	and	holistically	trained	designers,	and	 input	 from	 concerned	 publics	 seems	 eminently	 more	appealing	 than	 grimly	 pursuing	 against	 the	 odds	 a	 “meaningful”	version	of	the	interior	of	a	black	box.”252	Following	this	approach,	platforms	should	devote	more	time	and	attention	to	establishing	systems	 of	 internal	 and	 external	 review	 concerning	 how	 their	algorithms	 are	 developed	 and	 deployed	 in	 decision-making	processes.253	Proposals	 to	 expose	 algorithms	 to	 external	 audits	 are	 also	likely	to	meet	with	resistance	because	platforms	generally	regard	their	 underlying	 software	 code	 as	 protected	 proprietary	technology.254	However,	 these	 concerns	 are	 not	 insurmountable.	Joshua	 Kroll,	 for	 example,	 has	 discussed	 the	 possibility	 of	“accountability	 by	 design,”	 which	 relies	 on	 techniques	 from	computer	science	“to	create	systems	with	properties	 that	can	be	checked	 by	 regulators	 or	 the	 public	 without	 revealing	 the	
underlying	code	and	data.”255	Other	options	include	examining	the	outcomes	 of	 algorithmic	 decision-making	 to	 identify	 biases	 or	using	counterfactual	explanations	to	reveal	how	algorithms	arrive	at	 their	 decisions. 256 	Ultimately,	 regardless	 of	 the	 precise	modalities	for	improving	the	transparency	and	oversight	of	human	and	algorithmic	processes,	an	important	value	of	the	human	rights-based	 approach	 is	 the	 expectation	 it	 generates	 for	 platforms	 to	adopt	a	cyclical	approach	to	accountability	whereby	ongoing	due	
 251.	 Lilian	 Edwards	&	Michael	 Veale,	Slave	 to	 the	 Algorithm?	What	 a	 ‘Right	 to	 an	
Explanation’	is	Probably	Not	the	Remedy	You	Are	Looking	For,	16	DUKE	L.	&	TECH.	REV.	18,	67	(2017).	252.	 Id.	at	82.	253.	 Kaye	AI	Report,	supra	note	84,	at	19-20;	Douek,	supra	note	135,	at	12.	254.	 CoE	Report,	supra	note	84,	at	38.	255 .	 Joshua	 A.	 Kroll,	 Accountable	 Algorithms	 (A	 Provocation),	 LSE	 MEDIA	 POLICY	PROJECT	 (Feb.10,	 2016),	 https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2016/02/10/accountable-algorithms-a-provocation/	[https://perma.cc/XH86-7CD6].	256.	 	See	generally	Sandra	Wachter,	Brent	Mittelstadt,	&	Chris	Russell,	Counterfactual	
Explanations	without	Opening	the	Black	Box:	Automated	Decisions	and	the	GDPR,	31	HARV.	J.	OF	L.	&	TECH.	841	(2018).	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 997	diligence	efforts	are	enhanced	by	 lessons	 learned	 from	previous	results	across	the	entire	human	and	algorithmic	decision-making	life	cycle.257	 3.	Content	and	Advertising	The	third	form	of	transparency	and	oversight	that	platforms	should	 address	 concerns	 the	 data	 disclosed	 to	 users	 about	 the	
content	and	advertising	they	view	and	share.	Although	content	and	advertising	transparency	on	platforms	has	traditionally	been	very	limited,	 improvements	 have	 been	 made	 in	 recent	 years. 258	Facebook,	for	example,	enables	users	to	access	all	advertisements	that	a	page	is	running	across	Facebook,	Instagram,	and	Messenger,	to	 identify	 any	 recent	 name	 changes	 and	 the	 date	 a	 page	 was	created,	 and	 to	 obtain	 some	 insight	 into	 the	 categories	 used	 by	advertisers	to	micro-target	users	through	their	“Why	am	I	seeing	this?”	button.	In	addition,	in	the	US,	Facebook	requires	all	political	and	issue	advertisements	to	make	clear	who	paid	for	them,	to	be	stored	for	up	to	7	years	in	a	public	archive	which	anyone	can	access	and	 search	 to	 identify	 how	 much	 was	 spent	 on	 an	 individual	advertisement	 and	 the	 audience	 it	 reached,	 and	 also	 requires	anyone	running	such	ads	to	verify	their	identity	and	location.259	While	these	types	of	measures	are	a	step	in	the	right	direction,	they	are	still	relatively	modest.	Tarleton	Gillespie,	for	example,	has	challenged	online	platforms	to	provide	more	data	about	links	that	are	 shared	 by	 users,	 as	 well	 as	 more	 radical	 transparency	concerning	all	types	of	advertising.	With	respect	to	links	shared	by	users,	 Gillespie	 proposes	 a	 dashboard	 that	 would	 appear	 when	hovering	over	a	link,	which	would	report	“how	long	the	source	of	that	 link	has	been	online,	a	graph	of	how	much	and	how	quickly	that	headline	 is	being	 forwarded,	 the	headlines	before	and	after	this	one	from	the	same	source,	and	how	often	other	articles	from	that	source	have	been	disputed	by	fact	checkers,”	as	well	as	details	
 257.	 McGregor,	Murray,	&	Ng,	supra	note	90,	at	327-29.	258.	 But	 see	 Jeremy	 B.	 Merrill	 &	 Ariana	 Tobin,	 Facebook	 Moves	 to	 Block	 Ad	
Transparency	 Tools	 –	 Including	 Ours,	 PROPUBLICA,	 (Jan.	 28,	 2019),	https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-blocks-ad-transparency-tools	[https://perma.cc/F62D-N77P].	259.	 Zuckerberg,	supra	note	227.	For	a	critical	discussion	of	platform	ad	archives,	see	
generally	Leerssen	et	al.,	Platform	Ad	Archives:	Promises	and	Pitfalls,8	INTERNET	POL’Y	REV.	(2019).		
998	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	about	 the	 person	who	 posted	 the	 link,	 including	 how	 long	 they	have	 been	 on	 the	 platform,	 the	 last	 five	 articles	 they	 shared,	whether	they	have	previously	been	reprimanded	by	the	platform	and	 whether	 the	 user	 read	 the	 article	 before	 forwarding	 it. 260	Gillespie	also	argues	that	platforms	could	reveal	significantly	more	data	 about	 advertisements,	 including	 the	 days	 on	 which	 an	advertisement	was	delivered	 to	any	users,	 the	 targeting	criteria,	the	number	of	users	the	advertisement	was	delivered	to	directly	and	 reach	 indirectly,	 how	 much	 the	 advertiser	 paid	 for	 its	circulation,	and	a	 link	back	to	the	advertiser’s	profile	page,	all	of	which	could	be	stored	in	a	public	and	searchable	archive.261	Since	online	platforms	extract	significant	economic	value	from	the	data	shared	by	 and	 inferred	 from	 the	behavior	of	 their	users,	 radical	transparency	is	not	only	reasonable	in	this	context	but	also	a	tool	that	may	assist	civil	society	groups,	journalists,	and	regulators	to	monitor	and	hold	platforms	and	advertisers	to	account.	4.	Regulatory	Compliance	A	 final	 form	 of	 transparency	 and	 oversight	 concerns	 how	online	platforms	respond	to	both	mandatory	regulatory	measures	and	informal	regulatory	pressures	that	may	have	adverse	human	rights	 impacts	 on	 their	 users.	 According	 to	 Principle	 23	 of	 the	UNGP,	 while	 business	 enterprises	 should	 comply	 with	 all	applicable	 laws	 wherever	 they	 operate,	 they	 should	 also	 “seek	ways	to	honor	the	principles	of	internationally	recognized	human	rights	when	faced	with	conflicting	requirements.”262	In	particular,	if	the	domestic	context	renders	it	impossible	for	companies	to	fully	satisfy	 their	 corporate	 responsibility,	 “business	 enterprises	 are	expected	 to	 respect	 the	 principles	 of	 internationally	 recognized	human	rights	to	the	greatest	extent	possible	in	the	circumstances,	and	to	be	able	to	demonstrate	their	efforts	in	this	regard.”263	Examples	of	the	types	of	measures	that	platforms	may	adopt	in	 this	 context	 have	 been	 elaborated	 by	 the	 Global	 Network	Initiative	 (“GNI”).	 The	 GNI	 is	 a	 multistakeholder	 alliance	 of	companies,	 civil	 society	groups	and	academic	 institutions	whose	
 260.	 Gillespie,	supra	note	204,	iv.	261.	 Id.	vii-viii.	262.	 UNGP,	Principle	23.		263.	 Id.	Principle	23	and	Commentary.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 999	aim	is	to	“protect	and	advance	freedom	of	expression	and	privacy	in	the	Information	and	Communications	Technology	(ICT)	industry	globally.” 264 	Since	 its	 inception,	 the	 GNI	 has	 been	 subject	 to	significant	 criticism,	 with	 concerns	 raised	 over	 its	 inadequate	corporate	 membership,	 insufficiently	 independent	 assessment	process,	and	lack	of	a	remedial	mechanism.265	Without	diminishing	the	force	of	these	concerns,	the	documents	that	underpin	the	GNI’s	work	nonetheless	provide	useful	guidance	regarding	how	online	platforms	should	respond	when	confronted	by	State	demands	to	undermine	the	freedom	of	expression	rights	of	their	users.	According	to	the	GNI’s	Principles	on	Freedom	of	Expression	and	
Privacy,	when	confronted	by	national	laws,	regulations	or	policies	that	do	not	conform	to	international	standards,	“companies	should	avoid,	 minimize,	 or	 otherwise	 address	 the	 adverse	 impact	 of	government	demands,	laws,	or	regulations,	and	seek	ways	to	honor	the	 principles	 of	 internationally	 recognized	 human	 rights	 to	 the	greatest	extent	possible.”266	To	this	end,	the	GNI’s	Implementation	
Guidelines	 elaborate	 a	 number	 of	 tools	 that	 participating	companies	are	required	 to	rely	upon	 in	practice.267	In	particular,	participating	 companies	 agree	 to	 encourage	 governments	 to	 be	specific,	 transparent	 and	 consistent	 in	 demands,	 laws,	 and	regulations	that	impact	freedom	of	expression,	as	well	as	engage	proactively	with	governments	to	reach	a	shared	understanding	of	how	 government	 restrictions	 can	 be	 applied	 consistently	 with	international	 human	 rights	 law.	 Participating	 companies	 also	agree	to	require	governments	to	follow	established	domestic	legal	processes	when	seeking	to	restrict	freedom	of	expression,	and	to	request	clear	written	communications	from	the	government	that	explain	the	 legal	basis	 for	such	restrictions.	Finally,	participating	companies	 are	 also	 required	 to	 narrowly	 interpret	 government	
 264.	 The	Global	Network	Initiative,	Principles	on	Freedom	of	Expression	and	Privacy	[hereinafter	“GNI	Principles”],	at	1.	265.	 Jørgensen,	supra	note	6,	at	262-63;	LAIDLAW,	supra	note	4,	at	104-10.	266.	 GNI	Principles,	supra	note	264,	at	2.	267.	 The	Global	Network	Initiative,	Implementation	Guidelines	for	the	Principles	on	Freedom	of	Expression	and	Privacy,	at	8-10.	See	also	Hilary	Hurd,	How	Facebook	Can	Use	
International	 Law	 in	 Content	 Moderation,	 LAWFARE	 (Oct.	 30,	 2019),	https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-facebook-can-use-international-law-content-moderation	 [https://perma.cc/GJL4-G6M6]	 (proposing	 that	 Facebook	 should	 require	States	to	submit	 formal	explanations	of	why	and	how	their	 take-down	requests	comply	with	the	tripartite	test	set	out	in	Article	19(3)	ICCPR).	
1000	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	restrictions	and	demands	so	as	to	minimize	the	negative	effect	on	freedom	of	 expression	and,	where	 appropriate,	 to	 challenge	any	restrictions	 or	 demands	 that	 appear	 overbroad	within	 domestic	courts.	Beyond	adopting	measures	that	seek	to	reduce	the	impact	of	overly-intrusive	State	requests	and	regulations,	platforms	should	also	address	the	extent	to	which	they	publicly	disclose	the	different	pressures	exerted	by	States	over	their	moderation	practices.	For	instance,	platforms	could	consult	or	hire	ombudspersons	to	assess	State	content	removal	requests	and	 identify	requests	 that	would	result	 in	 the	 removal	 of	 content	 that	 is	 significant	 for	 public	debate.268	By	providing	meaningful	transparency,	online	platforms	may	be	able	to	help	 illuminate	and	generate	public	conversation	about	the	extent	to	which	particular	forms	of	regulatory	pressure	may	 be	 undermining	 the	 freedom	 of	 expression	 rights	 of	 their	users.	269	
D.	 The	Procedure	and	Remediation	of	Content	Moderation	However	 well-articulated	 and	 enforced	 a	 platform’s	moderation	processes	may	be,	mistakes	will	inevitably	occur	that	generate	adverse	effects	for	the	freedom	of	expression	of	platform	users.	Addressing	this	situation,	Principle	22	of	the	UNGP	confirms	that	 companies	 “should	 provide	 for	 or	 cooperate	 in	 their	remediation	 through	 legitimate	 processes.” 270 	More	 specifically,	Principle	 29	 of	 the	 UNGP	 provides	 that	 business	 enterprises	“should	 establish	 or	 participate	 in	 effective	 operational-level	grievance	mechanisms	for	individuals	and	communities	who	may	be	adversely	impacted.”271	Grievance	 mechanisms	 can	 take	 many	 forms,	 but	 are	generally	intended	to	perform	two	important	functions:272	first,	to	support	 the	 identification	 of	 adverse	 human	 rights	 impacts	 in	business	 operations;	 and	 second,	 to	 enable	 grievances	 to	 be	addressed	and	adverse	impacts	remediated	early	and	directly	by	business	enterprises.	Importantly,	Principle	31	elaborates	a	set	of	
 268.	 Citron,	supra	note	54,	at	1067-69.	269.	 Id.	270.	 UNGP,	Principle	22.	271.	 Id.	Principle	29.	272.	 Id.	Principle	29	and	Commentary.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 1001	effectiveness	 criteria	 that	 grievance	 mechanisms	 should	 reflect,	namely	 that	 they	 should	 be	 legitimate,	 accessible,	 predictable,	equitable,	 transparent,	rights-compatible,	a	source	of	continuous	learning,	and	based	on	engagement	and	dialogue.273	Applying	these	principles	and	criteria	to	the	specific	context	of	content	moderation,	there	are	three	areas	that	online	platforms	should	 address	 to	 improve	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 their	 procedural	and	 remedial	 processes. 274 	The	 first	 area	 concerns	 due	 process.	Adherence	 to	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 to	 content	moderation	 requires	platforms	 to	 afford	due	process	 to	 affected	users—including	adequate	notice	and	avenues	for	appeal.	Yet,	as	Evelyn	Douek	has	recently	observed,	“due	process	does	not	mean	
perfect	 process”	 and	 “what	 ‘due	 process’	 means	 needs	 to	 be	determined	contextually.”275	The	challenge,	as	Douek	puts	it,	is	to	identify	“what	the	‘due’	in	‘due	process’	means	in	the	context	of	the	scale	of	the	online	platforms.”276	A	useful	point	of	departure	for	this	conversation	is	offered	by	the	Santa	Clara	Principles.	In	 terms	 of	 notice,	 the	 Santa	 Clara	 Principles	 suggest	 that	“companies	should	provide	notice	 to	each	user	whose	content	 is	taken	 down	 or	 account	 is	 suspended	 about	 the	 reason	 for	 the	removal	or	suspension.”277	At	a	minimum,	notices	should	contain,	in	a	language	understandable	to	the	user,	information	sufficient	to	allow	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 removed	 content,	 the	 specific	provision	 of	 a	 platform’s	 moderation	 policies	 that	 has	 been	violated,	 how	 the	 content	 was	 detected	 and	 removed,	 and	 an	explanation	 of	 the	 process	 by	 which	 the	 user	 can	 appeal	 the	decision	 as	well	 as	 an	 indicative	 time	 frame	 and	what	 remedies	may	 be	 available	 if	 successful.278	In	 terms	 of	 appeals,	 the	 Santa	
Clara	 Principles	 suggest	 that	 “[c]ompanies	 should	 provide	 a	meaningful	opportunity	for	timely	appeal	of	any	content	removal	or	 account	 suspension.” 279 	At	 a	 minimum,	 meaningful	 appeal	means	human	review	by	a	person	or	panel	of	persons	not	involved	in	 the	 initial	 decision,	 an	 opportunity	 to	 present	 additional	
 273.	 Id. Principle 31. 	274.	 SUZOR, supra note 108, at 220-25 (referring to “scalable due process”).	275.	 Douek,	supra	note	135,	at	8	&	10	(emphasis	in	original).	276.	 Id.	at	9.	277.	 Santa	Clara	Principles,	supra	note	235.	278.	 Id.	279.	 Id.	
1002	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	information,	and	notification	of	the	results	of	the	appeal,	including	a	statement	of	the	reasoning	to	enable	the	user	to	understand	the	decision. 280 	In	 addition,	 given	 the	 importance	 of	 context	 for	assessing	content,	 it	would	also	be	beneficial	for	reviewers	to	be	granted	access	to	more	contextual	information	about	the	pieces	of	content	 that	 they	 review	on	appeal.281	Moreover,	 particular	 care	should	be	 taken	 to	 ensure	 that	 any	appeals	process	 is	 clear	 and	easy	to	use	for	the	average	user	and	not	susceptible	to	being	gamed	or	abused.	The	appeals	mechanism	administered	by	Amazon,	for	example,	has	recently	been	criticized	 for	becoming	“the	ultimate	weapon	 in	 the	 constant	 warfare	 of	 Marketplace,”	 its	 rules	 and	processes	“so	confounding	that	it’s	given	rise	to	an	entire	industry	of	consultants.”282	While	the	Santa	Clara	Principles	offer	a	useful	starting	point,	the	 challenge	 remains	 in	 defining	 what	 adequate	 due	 process	means	 in	 the	 specific	 context	 of	 different	 types	 of	 platforms.	According	 to	 Douek,	 for	 example,	 platforms	 should	 strive	 for	 a	“systematic	 understanding	 of	 due	 process”	 that	 contextually	calibrates	the	level	of	process	that	is	afforded	to	affected	users	in	practice,	 for	 instance	“by	more	explicitly	differentiating	between	the	 different	 categories	 of	 speech	 that	 content	 moderation	implicates,	 accounting	 for	 the	 difficulty	 of	 making	 a	 correct	decision	in	each	category,	the	public	importance	of	the	underlying	speech,	and	how	people	experience	different	kinds	of	decisions.”283	To	this	end,	some	form	of	oversight	mechanism	could	be	useful	in	providing	platforms	with	“a	forum	for	error	explanation	and	more	deliberate	 choices	 between	 trade-offs	 involved	 in	 any	 system	design.”284	To	date,	there	are	indications	that	oversight	mechanisms	may	emerge	at	both	the	cross-platform	and	individual	platform	levels.	At	the	cross-platform	level,	for	example,	civil	society	group	Article	19	 has	 proposed	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 multistakeholder	accountability	mechanism	for	platform	moderation	in	the	form	of	
 280.	 Id.	281.	 Garton	Ash,	Gorwa,	&	Metaxa,	supra	note	2,	at	13.	282.			Josh	Dzieza,	Prime	and	Punishment,	VERGE	(Dec.	19,	2018),		https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/19/18140799/amazon-marketplace-scams-seller-court-appeal-reinstatement	[https://perma.cc/42VB-P574].	283.	 Douek,	supra	note	135,	at	10.	284.	 Id.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 1003	multistakeholder	 Social	 Media	 Councils. 285 	At	 the	 individual	platform	 level,	 Facebook	 recently	 concluded	 a	 consultation	concerning	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 new	 Oversight	 Board	 for	Content	Decisions	 aimed	 at	 providing	 “a	 new	way	 for	 people	 to	appeal	content	decisions.”286	The	creation	of	each	of	these	bodies	raises	a	host	of	 issues	centered	on	institutional	design,	 including	questions	concerning	whether	such	bodies	will	be	global,	regional	or	national,	the	breadth	of	their	jurisdiction	and	powers,	and	the	extent	of	their	independence	and	authority.	Nonetheless,	each	has	the	 potential	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 useful	 mechanism	 to	 help	 platforms	navigate	 the	 complex	 terrain	 of	 translating	 international	 human	rights	 standards	 to	 the	 platform	 moderation	 context—whether	through	 reviewing	 the	 compatibility	 of	 emblematic	 individual	cases	 with	 international	 human	 rights	 law	 and/or	 providing	general	 guidance	 on	 the	 compliance	 of	 platform	 processes	 and	procedures	with	international	human	rights	standards.287	In	 addition	 to	 due	 process,	 a	 second	 area	 for	 platforms	 to	address	 is	 the	 question	 of	 remedies.	 In	 terms	 of	 remedies	 for	wrongful	 removal	 of	 content	 or	 suspension/termination	 of	 user	accounts,	David	Kaye	has	suggested	that	online	platforms	“should	institute	robust	remediation	programmes,	which	may	range	from	reinstatement	 and	 acknowledgement	 to	 settlements	 related	 to	reputational	or	other	harms.”288	In	a	typical	case,	reinstatement	of	the	content	or	the	account	may	be	the	most	effective	remedy.	Other	possible	 remedies	 such	 as	 a	 public	 apology,	 guarantees	 of	 non-repetition,	or	compensation	may	also	be	appropriate	depending	on	
 285.	 See	generally	ARTICLE	19,	supra	note	134.	286.	 Facebook	 Newsroom,	 Global	 Feedback	 and	 Input	 on	 the	 Facebook	 Oversight	
Board	for	Content	Decisions	(June	27,	2019),	https://about.fb.com/news/2019/06/global-feedback-on-oversight-board	 [https://perma.cc/99YJ-GZKG].	 See	 also	 Evelyn	 Douek,	
Facebook’s	“Oversight	Board:”	Move	Fast	with	Stable	Infrastructure	and	Humility,	21	N.C.	J.	L.	&	TECH.	1,	2-3	(2019).	287.	 See,	e.g.,	ARTICLE	19,	supra	note	134,	at	13	(acknowledging	that	any	Social	Media	Council	mechanism	will	need	to	afford	platforms	a	“margin	of	appreciation”	to	allow	the	application	 of	 international	 human	 rights	 standards	 in	 specific	 national	 contexts	 and	enable	 differentiation	 between	 different	 companies	 and	 their	 respective	 products);	Facebook	 Newsroom,	 supra	 note	 286	 (noting	 that	 a	 general	 theme	 to	 emerge	 from	Facebook’s	consultation	was	that	the	Oversight	Board	“will	need	a	strong	foundation	for	its	 decision-making,	 a	 set	 of	 higher-order	 principles	 –	 informed	 by	 free	 expression	 and	
international	human	rights	law	–	that	it	can	refer	to	when	prioritizing	values	like	safety	and	voice,	privacy	and	equality”)	(emphasis	added).	288.	 Kaye	Content	Moderation	Report,	supra	note	10,	at	18.	
1004	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	the	 circumstances.289	In	 terms	 of	 sanctions	 for	 violating	 content	moderation	rules,	Kaye	also	suggests	that	platforms	should	have	“graduated	responses	according	to	the	severity	of	the	violation	or	the	 recidivism	 of	 the	 user.” 290 	Sanctions	 might	 include,	 for	example,	de-amplification,	de-monetization,	requiring	suspended	users	 to	 issue	 an	 apology	 in	 order	 to	 be	 reinstated,	 or	compensation.291	A	 particular	 challenge	 in	 this	 regard—and	 one	which	would	benefit	from	further	multistakeholder	reflection—is	the	question	of	how	to	establish	a	process	for	providing	an	effective	remedy	 to	 victims	 who	 suffer	 physical,	 psychological	 or	reputational	harm	as	a	result	of	 failures	by	platforms	 to	remove	particular	types	of	content,	without	at	the	same	time	incentivizing	online	platforms	to	over-censor	the	content	of	their	users.	Finally,	 platforms	 should	 also	 address	 remediation	
transparency	and	stakeholder	engagement.	In	both	the	design	and	implementation	of	 their	remediation	processes,	online	platforms	should	 engage	 relevant	 stakeholders,	 including	 through	quantitative	transparency	concerning	the	frequency,	patterns	and	reasons	 for	 appeals,	 so	 that	 they	 are	 well-equipped	 to	 identify	policies	 and	 processes	 in	 need	 of	 reform. 292 	Accompanying	quantitative	 transparency,	 David	 Kaye	 has	 also	 suggested	 that	platforms	 should	 improve	 their	 qualitative	 “decisional	transparency”	 by	 developing	 a	 public,	 accessible	 and	 easily	searchable	 jurisprudence	 of	 “platform	 law.” 293 	And	 ultimately,	platforms	 should	 commit	 to	 address	 and	 revise	 problematic	aspects	of	their	remediation	processes	identified	by	stakeholders	in	a	timely	manner.	
IV.	CONCLUSION	The	 governance	 of	 speech	 in	 the	 digital	 age	 depends	 to	 a	significant	 degree	 on	 the	 policies	 and	 processes	 of	 online	platforms.	 Ensuring	 that	 these	 platforms	 govern	 in	 the	 public	interest	has	emerged	as	one	of	 the	most	pressing	 challenges	 for	freedom	of	expression	 in	 the	 twenty-first	century.	 In	 light	of	 the	
 289.	 GLOBAL	PARTNERS	DIGITAL,	supra	note	148,	at	24.	290.	 Kaye	Hate	Speech	Report,	supra	note	150,	para.	54-55.	291.	 Id.	292.	 GLOBAL	PARTNERS	DIGITAL,	supra	note	148,	at	24.	293.	 Kaye	 Content	Moderation	 Report,	 supra	 note	 10,	 at	 19.	 See	 also	Garton	 Ash,	Gorwa,	&	Metaxa,	supra	note	2,	at	12.	
2020]	 FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION	 1005	wide	 range	 of	 problems	 that	 have	 been	 identified	with	 existing	platform	moderation	practices,	the	Article	has	explored	the	extent	to	which	a	human	rights-based	approach	may	help	to	alleviate	such	concerns.	 In	 particular,	 the	 Article	 has	 demonstrated	 how	 the	adoption	 of	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 would	 mark	 a	significant	 shift	 towards	 a	 more	 structured	 and	 principled	approach	 to	 content	 moderation	 by	 providing	 platforms	 with	 a	framework	 and	 the	 conceptual	 tools	 to	 holistically	 assess	 and	address	 the	 adverse	 human	 rights	 impacts	 of	 their	 moderation	rules,	processes	and	procedures.		At	the	same	time,	the	Article	has	been	careful	not	to	present	the	human	rights-based	approach	as	a	panacea—revealing	the	various	challenges	and	choices	that	online	platforms	 are	 likely	 to	 confront	 in	 operationalizing	 such	 an	approach	in	practice.		The	 implementation	 of	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 to	content	 moderation	 is	 not	 simple,	 raising	 complex	 questions	concerning	how	to	translate	general	human	rights	standards	into	particular	rules,	processes,	and	procedures	tailored	to	the	platform	moderation	 context.	 This	 task	 is	 complicated	by	 the	diversity	 of	services	and	spaces	that	online	platforms	offer	and	the	wide	range	of	societies	in	which	they	operate.	Given	this	complexity,	the	risk	inevitably	 arises	 that	 online	 platforms	 may	 try	 to	 co-opt	 the	vocabulary	 of	 human	 rights	 to	 legitimize	 minor	 reforms	 at	 the	expense	 of	 undertaking	more	 structural	 or	 systemic	 changes	 to	their	 moderation	 processes.	 Moreover,	 even	 if	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 were	 to	 be	 effectively	 implemented	 by	 online	platforms,	it	is	important	to	remember	that	such	an	approach	is	not	a	 silver	 bullet	 for	 alleviating	 all	 concerns	 that	 have	 been	 raised	concerning	platform	moderation	practices.	Given	the	complexity	of	content	 moderation,	 there	 will	 always	 be	 trade-offs	 that	 are	disagreeable	 to	 some	 users,	 while	 a	 degree	 of	 human	 or	algorithmic	error	is	unavoidable.294		The	power	and	influence	of	online	platforms	also	suggest	that	they	should	not	be	considered	the	exclusive	province	of	any	single	regulatory	paradigm.	Rather,	multiple	paradigms	will	be	needed	to	address	 different	 dimensions	 of	 online	 platforms,	 including,	 for	example,	data	protection	law,	electoral	and	advertising	regulation,	
 294.	 See	also	GODWIN,	supra	note	73,	at	175-78.	
1006	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	and	 antitrust	 and	 competition	 law. 295 	Furthermore,	 while	 the	Article	has	 focused	on	 the	responsibilities	of	 the	companies	 that	manage	 online	 platforms,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 emphasize	 that	 the	protection	 of	 freedom	 of	 expression	 online	 necessarily	 entails	addressing	the	responsibilities	of	the	far	broader	range	of	actors	that	 participate	 in	 the	 digital	 public	 sphere—including,	 for	example,	governments,	political	parties,	data	brokers,	mass	media	organizations,	and	advertisers.	Finally,	 it	 should	 also	 be	 that	 the	 online	 information	ecosystem	is	more	diverse	than	the	online	platforms	discussed	in	the	 Article,	 encompassing	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 technologies,	 the	unique	 characteristics	 of	 which	 will	 require	 bespoke	 policy	responses.	 For	 example,	 the	 architecture	 of	 messaging	 services	such	as	WhatsApp—where	activity	consists	of	encrypted	personal	conversations	and	groups	 involving	up	 to	256	people—makes	 it	much	harder	to	stem	the	flow	of	disinformation	compared	to	the	virtual	spaces	administered	by	online	platforms.296	Going	forward,	more	attention	will	need	to	be	directed	towards	the	broader	array	of	services	and	technologies	relied	upon	for	online	communication	around	the	world.	
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